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Users and providers benefit considerably from public Wi-Fi hotspots.  Users receive 
wireless Internet access and providers draw new prospective customers.  While users are 
able to enjoy the ease of Wi-Fi Internet hotspot networks in public more conveniently, 
they are more susceptible to a particular type of fraud and identify theft, referred to as 
evil twin attack (ETA).  Through setting up an ETA, an attacker can intercept sensitive 
data such as passwords or credit card information by snooping into the communication 
links.  Since the objective of free open (unencrypted) public Wi-Fi hotspots is to provide 
ease of accessibility and to entice customers, no security mechanisms are in place.  The 
public’s lack of awareness of the security threat posed by free open public Wi-Fi hotspots 
makes this problem even more heinous.  Client-side systems to help wireless users detect 
and protect themselves from evil twin attacks in public Wi-Fi hotspots are in great need.  
In this dissertation report, the author explored the problem of the need for client-side 
detection systems that will allow wireless users to help protect their data from evil twin 
attacks while using free open public Wi-Fi.  The client-side evil twin attack detection 
system constructed as part of this dissertation linked the gap between the need for 
wireless security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots and limitations in existing client-side 
evil twin attack detection solutions. Based on design science research (DSR) literature, 
Hevner’s seven guidelines of DSR, Peffer’s design science research methodology 
(DSRM), Gregor’s IS design theory, and Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study evaluation 
methodology, the author developed design principles, procedures and specifications to 
guide the construction, implementation, and evaluation of a prototype client-side evil 
twin attack detection artifact.  The client-side evil twin attack detection system was 
evaluated in a hotel public Wi-Fi environment.  The goal of this research was to develop 
a more effective, efficient, and practical client-side detection system for wireless users to 
independently detect and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks while using 
free open public Wi-Fi hotspots.  The experimental results showed that client-side evil 
twin attack detection system can effectively detect and protect users from mobile evil 
twin AP attacks in public Wi-Fi hotspots in various real-world scenarios despite time 
delay caused by many factors.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Background 
     The use of IEEE 802.11 based Wi-Fi or wireless local area networks (WLANs) has 
grown to become the predominant method of access to the Internet in the last few years 
(Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014).  Mobile users can have Internet access anywhere there is 
service and anytime there is not an outage.  Public places, such as hotels, restaurants, 
cafes, airports and others have made open (unencrypted) Wi-Fi Internet access available 
at no cost to either attract customers or better serve current customers.  Locations that 
provide open and free Wi-Fi Internet access are called public Wi-Fi hotspots.  According 
to JiWire Mobile Audience Insights Report (2013), Internet access via public Wi-Fi 
networks has become widely available and largely free of charge, with over 81 percent of 
all public Wi-Fi hotspots offering free connections as an alternative to paid.  
Additionally, user demand for free, high speed Internet connections is growing rapidly as 
mobile devices that require higher bandwidth continue to increase.  Simultaneously, the 
number of public Wi-Fi hotspots are expanding.  Industry research overwhelmingly 
demonstrates that Wi-Fi is now the preferred free-access technology for travelers’ mobile 
devices.  Worldwide public Wi-Fi hotspot deployments have reached a total of 5.69 
million in 2014 and will grow at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 11.2% 
between 2015 and 2020. This includes public Wi-Fi hotspots deployed by mobile and 
fixed-line carriers as well as third-party Wi-Fi service providers. ABI Research expects 
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the number of worldwide carrier Wi-Fi hotspots will reach 13.3 million in 2020 (ABI 
Research, 2015). 
     Han, Sheng, Tan, Li, and Lu (2009, 2011) indicated that with the increase of users 
who come to expect free wireless availability, the security of such networks becomes 
increasingly more important.  According to a survey by Private Wi-Fi in partnership with 
The Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) (2013), U.S. consumers are three times more 
likely to connect to a Wi-Fi network if it is free. The ITRC calls this trend “The 
Convenience Factor”, which describes the fact that Wi-Fi hotspots are available in many 
public places, which affords users the ability to get and stay connected at no cost, 
wherever they are.   
     Additionally, Kim, Park, Jung, and Lee (2012) and Nikbakhsh, Zamani, Abdul Manaf, 
and Janbeglou (2012) stated in their studies that the growing popularity of WLANs, 
increases the risk of wireless security attacks. Since the goal of free open public Wi-Fi 
hotspots is to provide convenience and to attract customers, no security tools are in place. 
For instance, most public Wi-Fi hotspots provide free, open, and zero liability Internet 
access to customers (Hossen and Wenyuan, 2014).  Wi-Fi’s popularity makes it an 
attractive target for attackers to access and capture wireless client information.  For a 
wireless user, it is impossible to determine the safety of an open public Wi-Fi hotspot and 
identify the ones that are dangerous. Unfortunately, Wi-Fi users have to take 
responsibility for their own security when connecting to free open public Wi-Fi networks. 
     While users are able to access free open Wi-Fi Internet hotspot connections in public 
more conveniently, they are more vulnerable to a particular type of fraud and identity 
theft, referred to as evil twin attacks (ETA).  An evil twin attack in a wireless LAN is a 
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reference to a hard- or software-based 802.11 rogue Wi-Fi access point (AP) that looks 
like a legitimate one offered on the premises, but actually has been set up by a hacker to 
eavesdrop all wireless communications done by the victims.  Evil twin attacks can 
significantly threaten the security of wireless users of public Wi-Fi hotspots (Song, Yang, 
and Gu, 2010, 2012; Hossen and Wenyuan, 2014; Nakhila, Dondyk, Amjad, and Zou, 
2015; Hsu, Wang, Hsu, Cheng, and Hsneh, 2015).  Moreover, lack of knowledge and 
awareness possessed by the Wi-Fi hotspot users make this issue extremely disturbing 
(Nikbakhsh et al., 2012).  Many Wi-Fi hotspot users are oblivious to the hidden risks that 
the technology poses, such as identity theft, hacking, and stolen bank accounts. Due to its 
gravity, the evil twin attack has gained a notable interest in the media and research 
community (Han et al., 2009, 2011; Song et al., 2010, 2012; Lanze, Ponce-Alcaide, 
Panchenko, and Engel, 2014).         
     The detection of ETA has been researched for many years. Researchers have been 
investigating detection methods that can alert the wireless network administrator or the 
user about the presence of this type of attack.  Song et al. (2010, 2012) found that existing 
evil twin detection solutions are mainly for network administrators (administrator-side) 
instead of for a wireless client or user (client-side) to detect an evil twin attack.  
According to Song et al. (2010, 2012) and Hsu et al. (2015), administrator-side solutions 
are expensive, limited by requiring the knowledge of authorization users and AP list, 
hardly maintained, difficult to protect users timely when the attack is launched, and not 
available for many cases.   
     Kim et al. (2012) indicated that administrator-side methods utilize extra devices, 
sometimes referred to as Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) nodes. The WIDS 
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nodes monitor the wireless traffic and route the gathered traffic to their servers. The 
servers get to know the wireless environment in order to detect evil twin APs using 
wireless traffic from WIDS nodes. However, if a user moves to other locations where 
there are no WIDS nodes, the administrator-side methods can no longer assure secure 
communication in WLANs for mobile users.  Although there are WIDS nodes for secure 
communication, the detection methods hardly detect the evil twin access points (APs) 
when the servers have not yet learned the wireless environments.  In support of Kim et 
al.’s (2012) study, Hossen and Wenyuan (2014) found that businesses offer public Wi-Fi 
hotspots to provide free Internet service to attract customers.  They have little motivation 
to pledge secure Internet surfing or to setup more devices or install detection hardware 
and software in their infrastructure to detect an evil twin access point (AP) attack.  In 
addition, Hossen and Wenyuan (2014) found that administrator-side solutions are not 
applicable to public Wi-Fi hotspots and more practicable in environments such as 
infrastructure networks, e.g. corporate networks. In public Wi-Fi networks, wireless users 
should not assume that the network provider will deploy any type of security protections 
against evil twin attacks.  Furthermore, according to Nakhila et al. (2015), administrator-
side detection solutions will add more cost to the total wireless network construction 
price.  This is because network administrators need to implement wireless devices that act 
as wireless sensors to continuously scan the airwaves and gather information about the 
transmitting APs.   
     Monica and Ribeiro (2011) found that administrator-side solutions are not real-time, 
allowing short-term evil twin attacks to remain unnoticed.  Additionally, even if the 
detection is done in a timely manner, many users can still be victims of the attack, since 
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there is no automatic way of denying access to the evil twin APs or even to advise users 
of the attack.  Additionally, Song et al. (2010, 2012) and Monica and Ribeiro (2011) 
indicated that administrator-side approaches still have the risk of falsely claiming a 
normal neighbor AP as a rogue AP with a high probability. 
     To address this problem, Song et al. (2010, 2012) suggested that traveling users who 
use wireless networks at free open public hotspots need to protect themselves from evil 
twin attacks, instead of having any reliance on the providers of free open public Wi-Fi 
hotspots, which typically do not provide security for public Wi-Fi hotspot users. Song et 
al. (2010, 2012) claimed that a lightweight and effective client-side solution for traveling 
users is highly desirable.  According to Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) and Kim et al. (2012), 
client-side solutions help the user of public Wi-Fi (who neither has an AP authorization 
list nor any sophisticated software or hardware) to independently determine whether an 
AP is legitimate or not without any help from network administrators.  Public Wi-Fi users 
are vulnerable to big security risks such as connecting to a hacker’s rogue access point.  
This is due to users not having prior knowledge of the public Wi-Fi hotspot’s network 
they are connecting to.  Rogue access points expose wireless users to evil twin attacks in 
which the hacker can capture all the user’s network traffic.  Nakhila et al. (2015) further 
indicated that client-side detection is more appropriate than administrator-side detection 
since it gives security-sensitive users more control over their Wi-Fi connection security. 
     Monica and Ribeiro (2011) found that public Wi-Fi hotspots are beneficial for 
wireless users as well as service providers that wish to attract clients.  However, under 
evil twin attacks, the wireless user innocently associates to an attacker’s wireless access 
point and the attacker proceeds to compromise user’s sensitive information.  According 
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to Monica and Ribeiro (2011), client-side detection solutions that are efficient and 
effective are in great need. 
      Kim et al.’s (2012) study indicated that recently several evil twin AP detection 
methods have been designed in order to overcome the administrator-side problems on 
the client-side.  However, most of the existing client-side solutions only target multihop 
attacks where the attacker uses a legitimate AP for accessing the Internet to pass through 
client’s data (Nakhila et al., 2015).  According to Nakhila et al. (2015), these detection 
methods will fail when the attacker launches a mobile attack which uses a different 
gateway compare with the legitimate AP.  Evil twin attacks that use their mobile Internet 
(mobile attacks) will become more popular nowadays due to the increase in the Internet 
access speed of mobile connections, such as 3G/4G Long Term Evolution (LTE).  
Additionally, in support of Nakhila et al. (2015), Szongott, Henne, and Smith (2012) and 
Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) indicated that the inclusion of mobile hotspot capabilities in 
virtually all new mobile devices opens the door to mobile evil twin attacks.  
Unfortunately, there is limited research focused on client-side solutions that will allow 
wireless users to verify the authenticity of access points at free open public Wi-Fi 
hotspots and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks.  Additionally, the client-
side detection solutions proposed so far have limitations regarding requirements, 
assumptions, and evaluation approaches. 
 
Problem Statement      
     The problem explored in this dissertation report is the need for client-side detection 
solutions for wireless users to be able to protect themselves from evil twin attacks while 
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using free open public Wi-Fi.  Existing literature mainly focus on client-side evil twin 
attack detection methods for multihop attacks.  These detection methods will fail when 
the attacker launches a mobile attack.  Mobile evil twin attacks will become more popular 
nowadays due to the increase in the Internet access speed of mobile connections and the 
inclusion of mobile hotspot capabilities in virtually all new mobile devices (Szongott et 
al., 2012; Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014; Nakhila et al., 2015).  Unfortunately, there is 
limited research focused on client-side evil twin attack detection solutions for mobile 
attacks.  Additionally, existing solutions have limitations regarding requirements, 
assumptions, and evaluation approaches.  As a result, wireless users of free open public 
Wi-Fi hotspots are vulnerable to mobile evil twin attacks in which the attacker can 
intercept, collect, and manipulate user’s sensitive data.   
     The problem exists due to the lack of more effective, efficient and practical evil twin 
attack detection systems for mobile attacks on the client side.  According to Hossen & 
Wenyuan (2014) and Szongott et al. (2015), existing client-side detection solutions are 
impractical and thus have not seen any adoption.  As the literature in proceeding 
paragraphs and chapters will reveal, there are two types of evil twin attack scenarios 
(Song et al., 2010, 2012; Nikbakhsh et al., 2012; Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014; Nakhila et 
al., 2015).  The first scenario is when the attacker uses the legitimate AP for Internet 
access.  In this scenario, the evil twin AP can itself behave as a normal Wi-Fi client and 
uses the legitimate AP to connect to the Internet.  All the wireless traffic from the victim 
will pass through the attacker’s node.  In the literature, this type of attack is denoted as 
multihop attack.  The second scenario is when the attacker uses mobile Internet (e.g. 
3G/4G LTE) as the access network for connecting to the Internet.  In this scenario, the 
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evil twin AP uses a different gateway compared with the legitimate AP.  A hotspot router 
can act as an evil twin AP.  Also, a smartphone with mobile AP functionality built in 
operating systems such as Android or iOS, can act as an evil twin AP and the setup is 
trivially easy.  In the literature, this type of attack is denoted as mobile attack.  
     Most of the existing client-side evil twin detection methods fall under the first 
scenario.  Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro (2011), 
Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Kim et al. (2012), Lanze et al. (2014), and Hsu et al. (2015) 
assume in their studies that the attacker uses the legitimate wireless network gateway to 
pass through client data traffic (multihop attacks).  However, their detection methods will 
fail when the attacker uses a different gateway (mobile attack) with a faster Internet 
connection compared to the legitimate wireless network (Nakhila et al., 2015).  
Additionally, according to Szongott et al. (2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), and 
Nakhila et al. (2015), mobile attacks will become more popular nowadays due to the 
increase in the Internet access speed of mobile connections and the inclusion of mobile 
hotspot capabilities in virtually all new mobile devices. 
     Han et al. (2009, 2011) developed a client-side timing-base method for detection of 
rogue access points based on round-trip time (RTT) calculation between the wireless user 
and the DNS server, and does not require administrator assistance.  Their RTT-based 
method helps distinguish the route through a rogue AP from that through a legitimate AP 
(one hop versus two-hop wireless channels).  However, the issue with timing-based 
methods is that with the increase in wireless networks speeds, transmission delay 
differences between a wireless node and a wired node will eventually fade.  This means 
that a multihop setting may become indistinguishable from a one-hop setting (Monica & 
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Ribeiro, 2011).  Timing-based detection will be unreliable when the attacker uses a faster 
Internet connection as the evil twin AP (Nakhila et al., 2015).  Also, their approach 
utilizes the training detection technique which requires pre-gathering the information of 
the target wireless network.  This method could not be applied to public Wi-Fi users at 
the client side, since once users are in different areas, the network situation may have 
significantly changed.  The trained knowledge in one wireless network can be hardly 
applicable to another network (Song et al., 2010, 2012).   
     Song et al. (2010, 2012) also developed a client-side timing-base method called 
“ETSniffer” (Evil Twin Sniffer) based on Interpacket Arrival Time (IAT) to detect evil 
twin access points by distinguishing a one-hop from a two-hop wireless network setting 
between the wireless client and the remote IAT server (custom server).  Their method 
does not require administrator assistance.  However, their method requires setting up 
additional equipment such as a custom server within the LAN with their software 
installed for measuring server IAT and for detecting an evil twin AP.  According to Han 
et al.’ (2009, 2011), Kim et al.’ (2012), Nikbakhsh et al.’ (2012), Lanze et al.’ (2014), 
Hossen & Wenyuan’ (2014), and Nakhila et al.’ (2015) studies, to guarantee usability and 
availability to the client, a client-side detection method must discover evil twin APs using 
their Wi-Fi enabled devices (e.g. laptops, smartphones, tablets, etc.) without any 
additional equipment.   
     Monica & Ribeiro (2011) developed a client-side evil twin detection system called 
“WiFiHop”.  Their method does not require network administrator assistance.  This 
detection system is based on the behavior of the legitimate AP without depending on 
timing to detect a multihop setting between the wireless user and the Internet.  However, 
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their solution requires the implementation of an echo-server deployed through the use of 
a script on any public hosting server; therefore, requiring hotspot network modification.  
According to Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), a client-side detection solution must be able to 
verify an access point in a hotspot and thus cannot assume any custom infrastructure 
support.  Further, Hossen & Wenyuan stated that designing an infrastructure-side solution 
would require hotspot providers to re-design existing hotspots, which is unlikely to 
happen because most hotspots are free services with no independent revenue. 
     Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) developed a client-side approach based on traceroute that 
compares the gateways and routes that a packet travels to determine whether an access 
point is legitimate or not.  Their method does not require administrator assistance.  
However, according to Nakhila et al. (2015), the attacker can capture traceroute results 
transmitted to the wireless client using the legitimate wireless network and convey those 
results to the wireless client by means of the rogue wireless network.  This will give the 
same route information for both gateways.  Also, as mentioned previously this method 
provides limited client-side detection targeted only to the specific evil twin attack 
scenario where the attacker uses the legitimate AP for Internet access instead of a more 
popular scenario where the attacker uses mobile Internet as the access network for 
connecting to the Internet (Nakhila et al., 2015).  Lastly, Nikbakhsh et al.’s (2012) 
approach was not implemented or evaluated in a lab environment or in the field.  
Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn of its effectiveness. 
     During the same time, Kim et al. (2012) developed a client-side evil twin attack 
detection method for smartphones based on received signal strengths (RSSs), and does 
not require administrator assistance.  Their method measured RSSs from both the 
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legitimate and evil twin access points on the smartphone and used normalization of 
collected signal strengths for accurate measurement.  Highly correlated RSSs are 
considered fake signals from an evil twin access point.  However, their method was also 
based on the attacker using the legitimate wireless network gateway to pass through 
client data traffic.  In addition, Kim et al.’ (2012) method only works with smartphones 
associated with a mobile communication network. 
      Lanze et al. (2014) developed a client-side method for detection of evil twin attacks 
operated by software.  Their method does not require administrator assistance.  Their 
method separates software access points from legitimate hardware access points.  
However, their approach was only evaluated in a lab environment.  Therefore, no final 
conclusions can be drawn on its effectiveness. 
     Hsu et al. (2015) proposed a client-side evil twin attack detection system called “ET 
Detector” based on redirection behavior, and does not require administrator assistance.  
By operating the wireless network interface controller (WNIC) in monitor mode (which 
is able to capture all packets that conform to its monitoring channel and protocol) and 
through analyzing the captured packets, users can easily and precisely detect evil twin 
attacks.  However, the system has two detection mechanisms: default testing and 
secondary device testing.  Default testing only works when a user is not the only one 
using public Wi-Fi in a hotspot.  Otherwise, the system will be forced to use secondary 
testing which requires an extra Wi-Fi device with no sensitive data on it to associate to 
the target AP to make the detection.  Therefore, the system is not automated and requires 
intervention from users.  According to Han et al.’ (2009, 2011), Monica & Ribeiro’ 
(2011), Kim et al.’ (2012), Nikbakhsh et al.’ (2012), Lanze et al.’ (2014), Hossen & 
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Wenyuan’ (2014), and Nakhila et al.’ (2015) studies, to guarantee usability and 
availability to the client, a client-side detection method must discover evil twin APs 
without additional equipment.  Also, Monica & Ribeiro (2011), as well as Kim et al. 
(2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), Nakhila et al. (2015), and Szongott et al. (2015) 
indicated that the client-side evil twin detection system must be automated with no 
intervention from users.  Lastly, this method provides limited client-side detection 
targeted only to the specific evil twin attack scenario where the attacker uses the 
legitimate AP for Internet access. 
     Szongott et al. (2015) proposed a detection system called Mobile Evil Twin Detection 
System (METDS) for smartphones based on context-based recognition, which uses as 
much environmental data of smartphones as possible during the association process to 
help decide if the access point is legitimate or the user needs to be warned of a potential 
attack.  Their method does not require administrator assistance.  However, their method 
requires previous knowledge of the network in order to assist the user and also an 
external server to store learned data.  Studies conducted by Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) 
and Nakhila et al. (2015), indicated that to detect an evil twin AP, the system should not 
require any training knowledge of the target wireless network.  Also, according to Han et 
al.’ (2009, 2011), Kim et al.’ (2012), Nikbakhsh et al.’ (2012), Lanze et al.’ (2014), 
Hossen & Wenyuan’ (2014), and Nakhila et al.’ (2015) studies, to guarantee usability and 
availability to the client, a client-side detection method must discover evil twin APs using 
their Wi-Fi enabled devices (e.g. laptops, smartphones, tablets, etc.) without any 
additional equipment.  Lastly, their method only works with smartphones associated with 
a mobile communication network.   
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     As the literature review in proceeding paragraphs and chapters will reveal, Nakhila et 
al. (2015) and Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) are the only existing studies that assume the 
attacker using a different gateway from a legitimate AP (mobile attacks).  Nakhila et al. 
(2015) presented a client-side detection method for mobile attacks that detects whether or 
not different gateways are used by multiple APs in one hotspot location that have the 
same SSID.  Their method does not require administrator assistance.  Their detection 
technique relies on an SSL/TCP connection to a remote public server, and detects the 
changing of wireless network gateway’s public IP address in the middle of the SSL/TCP 
connection.  However, Nakhila et al.’s method does not take into account that the attack 
can be executed before the client establish a secure connection to the remote server.  
Additionally, Nakhila et al. assume that the BSSID (MAC address) of the hotspot APs is 
unique and use that as a reference in their method to switch between different APs with 
the same SSID in the hotspot.  Nakhila et al. did not assume the scenario when the 
attacker uses the same SSID and BSSID of a hotspot legitimate AP.  According to 
Szongott et al. (2015) and Kumar and Paul (2016), SSIDs and BSSIDs can easily be 
spoofed by an attacker as the legitimate APs always transmit the SSIDs and the BSSIDs.  
Furthermore, Nakhila et al. did not cover the scenario when the attacker blocks access to 
the public website.  Nakhila et al. assume that all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID 
are detected during the initial wireless network scanning and that the client is able to 
associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network, which in practice is not always the 
case.  Nakhila et al.’s (2015) method only works when the mobile evil twin AP is in the 
same subnet as the legitimate AP.  Lastly, their approach was only evaluated in a lab 
environment.  Therefore, no final conclusions can be drawn on its effectiveness. 
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     Furthermore, Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) introduced a method called Client End Evil 
Twin Access Point Detector (CETAD) to detect evil twin attacks, and does not require 
administrator assistance.  Their detection technique relies on a public server.  Their 
application included two detection techniques:  ISP-based and timing-based.  The 
application utilized the ISP-based detection technique, and if not successful, used the 
timing-based detection technique.  The ISP-based technique was used to detect mobile 
attacks as the ISP information of a legitimate AP and an evil twin AP are different.  
Similar to Nakhila et al.’s method, it detects whether or not different gateways are used 
by multiple APs in one hotspot location that have the same SSID.  Timing-based 
technique was used to detect multihop attacks because the attacker’s evil twin AP uses 
the legitimate AP as the gateway.  However, as stated previously, timing measurements 
are technology dependent (Monica & Ribeiro, 2011).  Also, Hossen & Wenyuan’s 
assume that the BSSID of the hotspot APs is unique and use that as a reference to switch 
between different APs with the same SSID in the hotspot.  Hossen and Wenyuan did not 
assume the scenario when the attacker uses the same SSID and BSSID of a hotspot 
legitimate AP.  Hossen & Wenyuan’s assumed that the mobile twin AP is in a different 
subnet as the legitimate AP.  Furthermore, Hossen & Wenyuan assumed that all the 
hotspot APs with the desired SSID are detected during the initial wireless network 
scanning and that the client is able to associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network, 
which in practice is not always the case.  Lastly, Hossen & Wenyuan’s ISP-based method 
for mobile attacks uses a public website to gather the global IP address shared by the 
legitimate APs. However, Hossen & Wenyuan’s method does not cover the scenarios 
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when the attacker blocks access to the public website or when the attacker presents an 
invalid certificate while ISP information is retrieved from the public website. 
     Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) and Nakhila et al.’s (2015) evil twin attack detection 
methods for mobile attacks do not protect the public Wi-Fi users for the duration of the 
Wi-Fi connection, discovering and reporting on new mobile evil twin access points.  
Protection is only provided to the user at the beginning based on the assumption that the 
attacker with a mobile evil twin AP will be in the hotspot when the user initially runs the 
detection system.  In a real life environment, an attacker may not be present when the 
user connects to the hotspot.  An attacker with an evil twin AP could arrive at the public 
Wi-Fi hotspot at a later time. 
     Additionally, all existing client-side approaches assumed that the client has not 
connected to the target public Wi-Fi network in the past.  According to Kumar & Paul 
(2016), the operating system stores the SSID and BSSID with which it was previously 
connected to in the client’s preferred network list, and it is always in the exploration of 
the same and whenever detects attempts to connect to it.  Therefore, the client will 
automatically connect to a potential evil twin AP when using the public Wi-Fi hotspot.  
Also, existing client-side detection systems only warn the user of the presence of an evil 
twin AP.  After detection, they do not allow the client to connect to a legitimate AP to 
access the Internet.  Specifically, in regards to mobile attack approaches, Nakhila et al.’s 
method is not able to identify which AP is rogue and which one is legitimate arguing that 
since both the legitimate AP and the rogue AP provide Internet access that could have 
similar quality, it is very difficult to further tell them apart.  In addition, Hossen & 
Wenyuan (2014) claim that after the attack has been detected, the system allows the 
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wireless user to connect to the legitimate AP; however, this was not included in their 
algorithm.  Finally, existing studies used their own mobile evil twin APs on their lab and 
field evaluations.  They did not aim at detecting real mobile evil twin APs in the wild. 
     The client-side detection system constructed as part of this dissertation linked the gap 
between the need of wireless security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots and limitations 
in existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions.   
 
Dissertation Goal 
     The goal of this dissertation was to develop a more effective, efficient, and practical 
client-side evil twin attack detection system for wireless users to independently detect 
and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks while using free open public Wi-Fi 
hotspots.  To resolve the problem statement above, the author focused on developing a 
client-side evil twin attack detection system for users of free open public Wi-Fi hotspots 
based on the following requirements gathered from the literature review: 
1. It protects users from attackers that use a different gateway from a legitimate AP 
(mobile attack). 
2. It protects users whether or not they have connected to a free open public Wi-Fi 
network in the past. 
3. It protects users when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are detected 
during the initial wireless network scanning.  
4. It protects users when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the public 
Wi-Fi network. 
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5. It protects users when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same 
SSID, BSSID (MAC address), and subnet of a legitimate AP. 
6. It protects users when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get 
ISP information. 
7. It protects users when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving 
ISP information from a public website. 
8. After mobile evil twin AP attack detection, it connects the user to a legitimate AP. 
9. It protects users for the duration of the public Wi-Fi connection, discovering and 
reporting on new mobile evil twin access points. 
10. It is evaluated in the wild aiming to detect real mobile evil twin APs.  In case of 
not detecting real mobile evil twin APs during the field evaluation period, it is 
evaluated with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab. 
11. It is not based on timing or traceroute. 
12. It does not require any additional equipment. 
13. It does not require modification of the hotspot network infrastructure (custom 
infrastructure support). 
14. It does not require trained knowledge of the target wireless hotspots 
infrastructure. 
15. It is automated with no intervention from users. 
     In support of the goal, this study leveraged DSR literature, Hevner, March, Park, and 
Ram (2004) seven steps of effective DSR, Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, and 
Chatterjee’s (2008) DSR Methodology (DSRM), Gregor and Jones (2007) IS Design 
Theory, and Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study evaluation methodology to promote 
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guiding design principles, procedures and specifications for the construction, 
implementation and evaluation of the prototype client-side evil twin attack detection 
artifact. 
 
Research Questions 
     The research questions identify the specific objectives this dissertation report 
addressed and helped shape the conceptual framework for the study.  This study focused 
on the design, development, and evaluation of a client-side evil twin attack detection 
system for public Wi-Fi users to protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks and 
answered the following questions: 
 
Peffers, Tuunanen, and 
Rothenberger (2008) - 
DSRM Activity 
Research Questions 
Define the objectives for 
a solution 
 
1. What requirements must the product meet in order to 
address the problem? 
Design & Develop 2. What are the major decision points in the design and 
development process? 
 
Demonstrate & Evaluate 
 
 
3. In what way does the product developed meet and fail to 
meet the requirements specified? 
 
 
Relevance and Significance 
     The problem in this dissertation is both meaningful and research-worthy since 
connecting to public Wi-Fi hotspots leaves users vulnerable to evil twin attacks from 
hackers.  According to the Identity Theft Resource Center (2013), an evil twin is the 
wireless version of a “phishing” scam: an attacker tricks wireless users into connecting 
their mobile devices by impersonating as a legitimate access point to eavesdrop on 
19 
 
 
wireless communications.  Wireless users make the assumption that using a Wi-Fi 
hotspot at a hotel or at an airport is no different than logging into the network at home or 
at the office.  Business travelers willing to connect to public Wi-Fi networks that provide 
free Internet access are specifically vulnerable to evil twin attacks.  It is impossible to tell 
the safe networks from the bad ones. Wireless eavesdropping can occur anywhere.  Many 
public Wi-Fi hotspots pass responsibility entirely to wireless users for their mobile device 
security. 
     Challenges exist in tracing a hack that occurs on a free open public Wi-Fi network.  
Song et al. (2010, 2012) and Monica & Ribeiro (2011) indicated that evil twin attacks can 
be hard to trace.  The attacker can shut off the attacks suddenly or randomly after 
accomplishing the malicious goals.  In a very short time frame, the attacker may already 
have compromised public Wi-Fi user’s sensitive information, such as passwords or credit 
card information.  Nevertheless, Norton Cybercrime Report (2011) stated that over three 
quarters 77% of those who use free open public Wi-Fi have experienced cybercrime in 
comparison to 62% of those who do not. 
     A study conducted by The Guardian in 2011, launched two evil twin attacks 
conducted with volunteers, in which they successfully gather users’ usernames, 
passwords, messages and even credit card information.  This study reinforced that many 
public Wi-Fi hotspots have no forms of identification, except their wireless network 
names (SSID), which can be easily impersonated.  Additionally, one recent study from 
Private Wi-Fi (2011) found that over 56% of laptops were broadcasting the name of their 
trusted Wi-Fi networks, and that 34% of them were willing to connect to unsecure public 
Wi-Fi networks.  Consequently, to quantify the scale of the threat of evil twin attacks on 
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victims, Szongott et al. (2015) completed a field study with 92 participants to gather their 
Wi-Fi usage patterns. With this data, Szongott et al. (2015) revealed the number of 
participants potentially exposed to an evil twin attack.  The authors collected data from 
223,877 connections that were initiated to access points during the study and gathered 
anonymous statistics about all configured networks on the participants’ devices.  Figure 1 
shows the amount of configured wireless networks per user.  They are differentiated by 
unencrypted networks like open (unencrypted) public access points and encrypted 
networks, that use encryption schemes like WPA2 (Szongott et al., 2015).  In total 
Szongott et al. (2015) gathered data about 239 open (unencrypted) Wi-Fi networks from 
all of the 92 participants’ devices. The study demonstrates that a significant number of 
users are exposed to evil twin attacks and that the mobile devices automatically initiated 
most connections to popular open access points without the user being aware of the 
connection (Szongott et al., 2015). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of configured Wi-Fi networks on participants’ devices, divided into 
unencrypted (green) and encrypted (blue) networks. 
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     To strengthen the relevance of this problem, there are a number of academic studies 
supporting the argument that client-side evil twin attack detection architecture supports 
public Wi-Fi hotspots, improves public Wi-Fi user security, and is significant.  Song et al. 
(2010, 2012) and Hsu et al. (2015) indicated that existing evil twin attack detection 
solutions are mostly for wireless network administrators instead of for a wireless client to 
detect an evil twin attack at public Wi-Fi hotspots.  The researchers also indicate that 
administrator-side solutions are expensive, limited by requiring the knowledge of 
authorization users and AP list, hardly maintained, difficult to protect users timely when 
the attack is launched, and not available for many public hotspots scenarios.  
Additionally, Song et al. (2010, 2012) indicate that traveling users who use public Wi-Fi 
hotspots need to protect themselves from evil twin attacks and that a lightweight and 
effective client-side solution for these users is highly desired.  
     Furthermore, Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) indicate that public Wi-Fi users are vulnerable 
to security risks such as connecting to a hacker’s rogue access point.  Users do not have 
prior knowledge of the public Wi-Fi hotspot’s network they are connecting to and usually 
connect to the wireless access point with the best signal strength. Further, Nikbakhsh et 
al. (2012) found that rogue access points expose wireless users to evil twin attacks in 
which the hacker can capture all the user’s network traffic and that wireless users lack of 
knowledge of this security issue.  Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) indicate that client-side 
methods such as the client-side artifact proposed in this study will need to be designed 
and constructed to warn wireless users to connect to rogue access points in public Wi-Fi 
hotspots. 
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     Additionally, Hossen and Wenyuan (2014) found that there is no security 
authentication mechanism of Wi-Fi access points available in open public Wi-Fi hotspots, 
which makes wireless users vulnerable to evil twin attacks.  This type of attack allows a 
hacker to steal sensitive data from wireless users.  Currently, there is not a method that 
will allow a user to verify the integrity of an access point at wireless hotspots.  
Consequently, the relevancy of evil twin attack detection solutions using client-side 
architecture is evident and supports the primary driver for advancing the research through 
this dissertation report. 
     According to Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) and Szongott et al. (2015), existing client-
side detection solutions are impractical and thus have not seen any adoption.  Most of 
existing client-side solutions protect users from multihop attacks.  These detection 
methods will fail when the attacker launches a mobile attack (Nakhila et al., 2015).  
According to Szongott et al. (2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), and Nakhila et al. 
(2015), mobile evil twin attacks will become more popular nowadays due to the increase 
in the Internet access speed of mobile connections and the inclusion of mobile hotspot 
capabilities in virtually all new mobile devices.  Unfortunately, there is limited research 
focused on client-side solutions for mobile attacks.  Additionally, existing solutions have 
limitations regarding requirements, assumptions, and evaluation approaches.  As a result, 
wireless users of public Wi-Fi hotspots are vulnerable to mobile evil twin attacks in 
which the attacker can intercept, collect, and manipulate user’s sensitive data.  To address 
the research problem, this study developed a more effective, efficient, and practical 
client-side evil twin attack detection system for wireless users to independently detect 
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and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks while using free open public Wi-Fi 
hotspots.     
     Finally, Hevner (2007) stated that DSR is essentially pragmatic in nature due to its 
emphasis on relevance; making a clear contribution into the application environment.  
The relevance cycle initiates DSR with an application context that not only provides the 
requirements for the research as inputs but also defines acceptance criteria for the 
ultimate evaluation of the research results.  Therefore, deriving artifact and process 
building to facilitate the construction and evaluation of the client-side evil twin attack 
detection architecture based on DSR developed in this study made a clear contribution to 
problems that span public Wi-Fi. 
 
Barriers and Issues 
     Despite the fact that the equipment, network, and facilities are accessible to design, 
construct, and evaluate the effectiveness of the prototype production system, challenges 
exist in evaluating the system using public Wi-Fi users (as users of the detection system) 
and at a large scale.  In order to analyze and evaluate the artifact using public Wi-Fi users 
and at a large scale, the system would need to be made available to a large number of 
actual traveling users who can test the system in many public Wi-Fi locations for a 
defined period and report back to the researcher on detection effectiveness and efficiency.  
Furthermore, before the study, the author would need to instruct the actual public Wi-Fi 
users on how to operate the system, and at that point, the study would contain bias, 
because the author would have made the users more attentive to security risks related to 
an evil twin attack.  
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     The client-side evil twin attack detection artifact reported in this study aimed at 
detecting mobile evil twin attacks in the wild.  Since no mobile evil twin APs were 
detected in the wild, the author proceeded to evaluate the artifact with the mobile evil 
twin AP used in the lab.  The system was designed and developed based on DSR with the 
objective of principally addressing the study research questions.  The system performance 
was evaluated extensively at a public Wi-Fi hotspot and using a researcher-participant 
approach.  The author received consent from the public Wi-Fi hotspot to perform the 
evaluation.  This is a requirement even when the evaluation is performed in public Wi-Fi 
hotspots. 
 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
     The first assumption made in this study is that, since the artifact was going to be 
evaluated in the wild at a hotel that offered free open public Wi-Fi, attackers were going 
to perform mobile evil twin AP attacks in the hotel public Wi-Fi hotspots during the 
evaluation time period.  The second assumption was that the attacker was going to use his 
smartphone with mobile AP functionality to launch an evil twin AP attack (mobile 
attack).  Since no mobile evil twin APs were detected in the wild during the field 
evaluation period, the author proceeded to evaluate the artifact with the mobile evil twin 
AP used in the lab. 
     The first limitation is that since the artifact was evaluated in the wild, the researcher 
could not control when the attackers would appear at the hotel to perform the evil twin 
AP attacks.  This limitation was mitigated by using the lab mobile evil twin AP in the 
field evaluation.  Similar approach was used by Hossen & Wenyuan’s study and the 
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remainder of the client-side evil twin attack detection studies referenced in this 
dissertation.   
     The second limitation was that the client-side evil twin attack detection system built as 
part of this study is not applicable under the scenario that the attacker performs an evil 
twin attack using the legitimate AP’s Internet access.  The author proposed that 
combining the detection method with other methods that were used to detect evil twin 
attacks using the legitimate AP’s Internet access, such as the ones referenced in this 
dissertation, will provide a complete evil twin attack detection system. 
     The study was delimited to only a hotel public Wi-Fi hotspot located in Ecuador who 
provide free open public Wi-Fi in hotel public areas.  The conclusions reached could be 
extrapolated to other public Wi-Fi hotspots, as long as the design assumptions 
documented in this study apply.  Generalization to other free open public Wi-Fi hotspots 
may not be warranted.  Another delimitation is that the client-side evil twin attack 
detection system was built and evaluated using a laptop platform with Linux operating 
system.  Generalization to other mobile platforms and operating systems may not be 
warranted.  
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Definition of Terms 
     Accuracy:  indicates how accurately the system detects evil twin AP attacks (Hossen 
& Wenyuan, 2014). 
     Artifact: anything that humans have created that has value to accomplish a definite 
function (Chandrasekaran, 1990). 
     Basic service set:  a combination of an access point and one or more wireless devices 
(NIST, 2008). 
    Eavesdropping:  an attacker monitors wireless data transmissions between devices for 
message content, such as authentication credentials or passwords (NIST, 2008). 
     Extended service set:  a multi-BSS network (NIST, 2008). 
     Evil twin attack:  an evil twin attack in a wireless local area network is a reference to a 
hard- or software-based 802.11 rogue Wi-Fi access point that looks like a legitimate one 
offered on the premises, but actually has been set up by a hacker to eavesdrop all wireless 
communications done by the victims (Song et al., 2010). 
     Precision:  the fraction of positively detected attacks to all positively detected attacks 
(correctly or incorrectly) (Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014). 
     Prototype system:  pilot system that is assembled, analyzed, refined, and reproduced 
before implementation in a production environment (Beck & Weber, 2013). 
     Public Wi-Fi hotspots:  locations that provide open and free Wi-Fi internet access 
(Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014). 
     Recall:  the fraction of positively detected attacks to all attacks that should be 
positively detected (Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014). 
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     Social lobby:  hotel areas open to the public that provide amenities and services like 
free Wi-Fi, comfortable chairs, waiter service, restaurant, a bar, and coffee shop (Kelley, 
2012). 
     Wi-Fi:  a trademark of the Wi-Fi Alliance and the brand name for products using the 
IEEE 802.11 family of standards (Singh et al., 2014). 
     Wi-Fi network: network employing the IEEE 802.11 family of standards for creating 
WLAN with internet facility (Singh et al., 2014). 
     Wi-Fi devices:  devices used in the Wi-Fi network (Singh et al., 2014). 
     Wireless local area network:  a group of wireless networking nodes within a limited 
geographic area, such as an office building or campus, that are capable of radio 
communication (NIST, 2008). 
 
Abbreviations  
     AP  Access Point 
     BSS Basic Service Set 
     BSSID Basic Service Set ID 
     DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
     DNS Domain Name System 
     DS  Distribution System 
     DSRM Design Science Research Methodology 
     DSR Design Science Research 
     ESS Extended Service Set 
     ETA Evil Twin Attack  
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     FN  False Negative 
     FP  False Positive 
     HTTPS Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure 
     IP  Internet Protocol 
     IS  Information System(s) 
     ISP  Internet Service Provider 
     IT  Information Technology 
     LAN Local Area Network 
     MAC Media Access Control 
     NIC Network Interface Card 
     RSSI Received Signal Strength Identifier 
     SSID Service Set Identifier 
     TN  True Negative 
     TP  True Positive 
     URL Uniform Resource Locator 
     WLAN Wireless Local Area Network 
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Summary 
    Chapter one of the dissertation report outlined the background for the study 
incorporating the problem statement which describes the need for client-side detection 
solutions for wireless users to be able to protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks 
while using free open public Wi-Fi and the goal to develop a more effective, efficient, 
and practical client-side detection system linking the gap between the need for wireless 
security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots and limitations in existing client-side evil 
twin attack detection solutions.  The research questions determined the specific objectives 
the dissertation report focused on and were instrumental in forming the conceptual 
framework for the study.  The first chapter also shaped the relevance and significance of 
the dissertation report and barriers and issues that were tackled to effectively complete 
the study.  Finally, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations that have an overall impact 
on the dissertation report were presented, key terms defined and abbreviations listed. 
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Chapter 2 
Brief Review of the Literature 
Overview of Topics 
     As groundwork to support the problem statement and research questions in this 
dissertation report, this section presents a review of the literature, analyzed, synthesized 
and organized into four main topics.  The literature review focuses on justification of 
literature, identification of existing studies, strengths and weaknesses, gaps in literature, 
research methods in similar studies, and synthesis of the literature all related to the four 
main topics of (a) wireless security; (b) need for security in free open public Wi-Fi 
hotspots; (c) client-side evil twin attack detection solutions; and (d) design science 
research principles and methodology.  The overall goal of the literature review was to 
guide the development of a client-side evil twin attack detection system for wireless users 
to independently detect and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks while using 
free open public Wi-Fi hotspots.  The design science research literature helped with the 
creation of DSR principles, procedures and specifications that supported the artifact 
construction, implementation and evaluation of the client-side evil twin attack detection 
system that is central to the study and has the potential to protect Wi-Fi users from 
mobile evil twin attacks in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots.  
 
Justification of Literature 
     The literature was selected mainly based on relevancy to design science research, 
client-side evil twin attack detection systems, need for security in free open public Wi-Fi 
hotspots, and wireless security in general.  In order to support the quality of the literature 
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review, scholarly and industry publications such as journal articles, textbooks, conference 
proceedings, technical reports, research reports, and online newspapers, related to the 
problem statement and research questions were included.  Several selected studies were 
also required to include observed evidence so that the researcher of this study could have 
support that it has been accepted by the academic community.  Most of the papers chosen 
in this literature review were published no earlier than 2009 because references authored 
before that would in all likelihood not be relevant to the industry and ongoing academic 
practices. 
 
Identification of Existing Studies 
     There are a number of existing studies that address the four main topics discussed in 
this literature review: (a) wireless security; (b) need for security in free open public Wi-Fi 
hotspots; (c) client-side evil twin attack detection solutions; and (d) design science 
research principles and methodology. This section will begin with a summary of the 
studies in each of the four main topic areas and will help provide the groundwork for 
synthesis of the literature at the end of the section.   
 
Wireless Security 
     This section presents a review of the literature relevant to wireless local area network 
(WLAN) security in general.  This section begins with an introduction to WLAN, the 
basic WLAN components, and architecture of WLAN.  Subsequently, it describes various 
security threats of WLAN, standards for WLAN security, and concludes with several 
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practical solutions for securing WLAN.  The studies chosen for this section offer an 
introductory backdrop on the topic of wireless security. 
Introduction to WLAN 
     Wireless local area network (WLAN) is a group of wireless networking nodes within a 
limited geographic area, such as an office building or campus, that are capable of radio 
communication.  In 1997, IEEE first approved the IEEE 802.11 international 
interoperability standard for WLANs.  In 1999, IEEE ratified two amendments to the 
IEEE 802.11 standard, IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11b, that define radio transmission 
methods and modulation techniques.  WLAN equipment based on IEEE 802.11b rapidly 
became the leading wireless technology.  IEEE 802.11b equipment transmits in the 2.4 
GHz band, offering data rates of up to 11 Mbps.  IEEE 802.11b was proposed to deliver 
performance, throughput, and security features comparable to wired LANs.  IEEE 
802.11a operates in the 5 GHz Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure (UNII) 
frequency band, delivering data rates up to 54 Mbps.  In 2003, IEEE announced the IEEE 
802.11g amendment, which details a radio transmission method that also operates in the 
2.4 GHz ISM band and can sustain data rates of up to 54 Mbps.  Furthermore, IEEE 
802.11g-compliant products are backward compatible with IEEE 802.11b-compliant 
products (NIST, 2008). 
     In 2006, the first IEEE 802.11n draft was offered to enhance the range and speed of 
WLANs up to theoretical speeds of 300 Mbps.  IEEE 802.11n maintains backward 
compatibility with IEEE 802.11a/b/g WLANs because it runs on both the 2.4 GHz ISM 
band and the 5.0 GHz UNII band.  Throughput is enhanced over its predecessors by 
exploiting wider bandwidth channels and devices supplied with multiple antennas to 
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better tap into RF signal.  Moreover, IEEE 802.11n almost doubles the effective range of 
the WLAN (NIST, 2008).  In 2014, IEEE approved IEEE 802.11ac which is planned to 
achieve higher multi-user throughput in wireless local area networks (WLANs). IEEE 
802.11ac is intended to enhance WLAN user experience by offering data rates up to 7 
Gbps in the 5 GHz band, more than 10 times the speed that was previously standardized 
(Kelly, 2014). 
     The network employing the IEEE 802.11 family of standards for creating WLAN with 
Internet facility is called Wi-Fi network, and the devices operating in that network are 
called Wi-Fi devices.  Wi-Fi is a trademark of the Wi-Fi Alliance and the brand name for 
products using the IEEE 802.11 family of standards.  The advantages of Wi-Fi networks 
comprise: convenience, mobility, productivity, deployment, expandability and cost.  The 
disadvantages of using Wi-Fi networks are: security, range, reliability, and speed 
(Kirankumar, Babu, Prasad, and Wishnumurthy, 2012; Singh, Mishra, and Barwal, 2014). 
     WLAN technology generates new threats. For example, since communications take 
place "through the air" riding on radio frequencies, the risk of interception is greater than 
with wired networks. If the message is not encrypted, or encrypted with a weak 
algorithm, the attacker can read it, thereby conceding confidentiality.  Data encryption is 
the principal means of security in a WLAN. Without encryption, any ordinary wireless 
device can read all traffic in a network, and in 802.11 WLANs, encryption is optional.  
The overarching security goals for WLAN are identical to those of wired networks:  
preserving confidentiality, ensuring integrity, and maintaining availability of the 
information and information systems (Habibi, Seyed, and Samadi, 2009; Kirankumar et 
al., 2012). 
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WLAN Components 
     One important advantage of WLAN is the ease of its installation.  WLAN systems can 
remove the requirements of pulling cable through walls and ceilings.  The network 
architecture of a WLAN is very basic. Key components of a WLAN are access points 
(APs) and network interface cards (NICs) (Feng, 2012; Singh et al., 2014). 
     Access Point (AP) is the wireless equivalent of a LAN hub. An AP is usually 
connected to the Ethernet architecture through an Ethernet port.  The AP includes a radio 
and antenna for communication with client devices. Access points function within a 
particular frequency spectrum and use 802.11 modulation techniques specified in the 
standard.  It also informs the wireless clients of its availability, and authenticates and 
associates wireless clients to the wireless network (Feng, 2012; Singh et al., 2014).   
     Wireless NICs connect wireless devices such as laptop computers, PDAs, mobile 
telephones, and other consumer electronic devices to a wireless network either in ad-hoc 
peer-to-peer mode or in infrastructure mode with APs.  NICs scan the specified spectrum 
for potential connectivity and associate to an AP or another wireless device (Feng, 2012; 
Singh et al., 2014). 
WLAN Architecture 
     The IEEE 802.11 standard outlines two basic WLAN topologies: ad-hoc network and 
infrastructure network.  An ad-hoc network is a peer-to-peer network between wireless 
clients, and no APs are part of the architecture. An infrastructure network consists of APs 
connected to a distribution system (DS), usually a wired network, and wireless clients. 
Infrastructure is the most frequently used mode for WLANs (NIST, 2008). 
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Ad-hoc Network 
     This mode of operation occurs when two or more wireless devices communicate 
directly to each other. This is called ad-hoc Wi-Fi transmission. The name ad-hoc is used 
because the network is set up typically for express purpose and for a short time. One of 
the key advantages of ad-hoc WLANs is that theoretically they can be established 
anytime and anywhere, permitting multiple users to create wireless connections cheaply, 
quickly, and easily with minimal hardware and user maintenance. Ad-hoc networks have 
no connection to the other networks.  A set of wireless devices configured in this ad-hoc 
manner is known as an independent basic service set (IBSS).  Figure 2 represents a 
sample IBSS that includes a mobile telephone, laptop computer, and a PDA 
interconnecting via IEEE 802.11 technology. The circle in Figure 2 illustrates the signal 
range of the devices, which is imperative to consider because this limits the coverage area 
within which the stations can continue in communication (NIST, 2008). 
 
Figure 2. Ad-hoc network. 
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Infrastructure Network 
     An infrastructure network involves wireless devices and access points. In an 
infrastructure network, the wireless clients connect with each other by having an access 
point. An access point is the device that operates as a bridge from the wireless network to 
the wired network. When access points connect to a distribution system (such as 
Ethernet), they support the creation of multiple coverage cells that enable roaming 
throughout a facility. A combination of an AP and one or more wireless devices is called 
Basic Service Set (BSS). The use of multiple APs connected to a single distribution 
system (DS) allows for the creation of wireless networks of arbitrary size and complexity. 
In the IEEE 802.11 specification, a multi-BSS network is referred to as an extended 
service set (ESS). Figure 3 conceptually depicts a network with both wired and wireless 
capabilities, comparable to the architecture of a public Wi-Fi environment.  It displays 
two APs with corresponding BSSs, which comprise an ESS.  The ESS is joined to the 
wired enterprise network or DS, which, in turn, is linked to the Internet.  This architecture 
could permit various wireless devices, such as laptop computers and PDAs, to access 
network resources and the Internet.  Also, the use of an ESS affords the opportunity for 
IEEE 802.11 WLAN devices to roam between APs while maintaining network 
connectivity (NIST, 2008).  Public Wi-Fi hotspots usually have multiple wireless access 
points and share the same SSID.  This allows public Wi-Fi users to move around the 
public spaces with their mobile devices without being disconnected from the network.  
While moving around the public spaces, the Wi-Fi user will disassociate and associate to 
the access point with the best signal strength.  All of this is transparent to the user.   
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Figure 3. Infrastructure network. 
Security Threats of WLAN 
     Generally, wireless networks are more susceptible to security attacks than wired 
networks, attributable to the broadcast nature of the transmission.  Despite the 
productivity, convenience and cost advantage that WLAN presents, the radio waves used 
in wireless networks generate a risk that the network can be hacked. Most threats against 
wireless networks include an attacker with access to the radio link between wireless 
devices (Kirankumar et al., 2012; Singh et al., 2014). 
     According to NIST (2008), WLAN technologies usually must support several security 
objectives. The most common security objectives for WLANs are: 
1. Confidentiality:  Ensure that communication cannot be read by unauthorized parties. 
2. Integrity:  Detect any intentional or unintentional changes to data that occur in transit. 
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3. Availability:  Ensure that devices and individuals can access a WLAN and its 
resources whenever needed. 
     NIST (2008) indicated that network security attacks against WLANs are usually 
divided into passive and active attacks. These two broad classes are then subdivided into 
other types of attacks. All are defined below: 
1. Passive Attack: An attack in which an unauthorized individual acquires access to an 
asset and does not modify its content or actively attack or disrupt a WLAN. There are 
two types of passive attacks: 
 Eavesdropping: The attacker monitors wireless data transmissions between 
devices for message content, such as authentication credentials or passwords. An 
example of this attack is an intruder monitoring transmissions on a WLAN 
between an AP and a connected device. 
 Traffic analysis:  The attacker gains intelligence by monitoring the transmissions 
for patterns of communication. A substantial amount of data is contained in the 
flow of messages between communicating parties. This method is subtler than 
eavesdropping. 
2. Active Attack: an attack whereby an unauthorized party makes modifications to a 
message, data stream, or file. It is feasible to detect this type of attack, but it may not 
be avertible. Active attacks consist of four types (or a combination thereof): 
 Masquerading: The attacker impersonates an authorized user to gain access to 
certain unauthorized privileges. 
 Replay: The attacker monitors transmissions (passive attack) and retransmits 
messages posing as the legitimate user. 
39 
 
 
 Message modification: The attacker alters a legitimate message by deleting, 
adding to, changing, or reordering the message. 
 DoS: The attacker prevents or prohibits the normal use or management of a 
WLAN. 
Standards for WLAN Security 
     This section describes the security features provided by IEEE 802.11 WLAN 
standards. 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
     Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is a standard encryption for wireless networking 
leveraging the Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) algorithm with two sides of a data communication.  
It is a user authentication and data encryption system from IEEE 802.11 applied to defeat 
security threats.  Essentially, WEP offers security to a WLAN by encrypting the 
information transmitted over the air, so that only the receivers who have the correct 
encryption key can decrypt the information (Habibi et al., 2009; Singh et al., 2014).  
WEP was originated by the IEEE to deliver the following three basic security services: 
(a) authentication to verify the identity of communicating client stations; (b) 
confidentiality to use encryption to offer wireless networks with the same or similar 
privacy achieved by an unencrypted wired network; and (c) integrity to ensure that 
messages were not modified in transit between wireless clients and APs.  IEEE 802.11 
configurations that rely on WEP have several well-documented security problems.  The 
IEEE and the Wi-Fi Alliance acknowledged the scope of the problems and developed 
short-term and long-term strategies for rectifying the situation.  In early 2003, the Wi-Fi 
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Alliance, in coordination with the IEEE 802.11 Working Group, developed the Wi-Fi 
Protected Access (WPA) security enhancement to replace WEP (NIST, 2008). 
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) 
     WPA was released as a temporary measure until a robust IEEE 802.11 security 
standard could be developed and approved.  WPA includes two main characteristics: 
IEEE 802.1x and the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP). The IEEE 802.1x port-
based access control provides a framework to allow the use of robust upper-layer 
authentication protocols. It also enables the use of session keys that allow the rotation of 
cryptographic keys.  TKIP contains four new features to enhance the security of IEEE 
802.11: TKIP extends the IV space, allows for per-packet key construction, provides 
cryptographic integrity, and provides key derivation and distribution.  Furthermore, it 
addresses the critical need to periodically change encryption keys.  However, WPA has 
significant flaws and does not provide the level of security that Wi-Fi Protected Access II 
(WPA2)/802.11i can (NIST, 2008). 
WPA2/ 802.11i 
     Habibi et al. (2009) stated that the WPA2 and 802.11i terms are often used 
interchangeably.  According to Habibi et al. (2009), Feng (2012), and Singh et al. (2014), 
the WPA2 standard specifies two modes of security: 
1. In “personal” mode a pre-shared secret is used, much like WEP or WAP. Access 
points and clients are all manually configured to use the same secret of up to 64 
ASCII characters, such as “this_is_our_secret_password.” An actual 256-bit 
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randomly generated number may also be used, but this is difficult to enter manually 
into client configurations.  
2. The “enterprise” security is based on 802.1x, the EAP authentication framework, and 
secure key distribution. 802.1x was originally designed for wired Ethernet networks. 
The following discussion of 802.1x is divided into three separate sections: Point-to-
Point Protocol (PPP), Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) and 802.1x itself. 
PPP 
     The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) originally emerged as an encapsulation protocol for 
transporting IP traffic over point-to point links. PPP also launched a standard for the 
assignment and management of IP addresses, asynchronous (start/stop) and bit-oriented 
synchronous encapsulation, network protocol multiplexing, link configuration, link 
quality testing, and error detection. By any standard, PPP is a good protocol. However, as 
PPP usage grew, hackers quickly uncovered its limitation in terms of security. This leads 
to the designation of a new authentication protocol, called Extensible Authentication 
Protocol (EAP). 
EAP 
     The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a general authentication protocol 
defined in IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) standards. It was originally designed 
for use with PPP. It is an authentication protocol that presents a generalized framework 
for several authentication mechanisms. These consist of Kerberos, public key, smart 
cards and one-time passwords. With a standardized EAP, interoperability and 
compatibility across authentication methods become simpler. For instance, when a user 
dials a remote access server (RAS) and use EAP as part of the PPP connection, the RAS 
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does not need to know any of the details about the authentication system. Only the user 
and the authentication server have to be synchronized. By supporting EAP authentication, 
RAS server does not actively participate in the authentication dialog. Instead, RAS just 
re-packages EAP packets to handoff to a remote access dial in user service (RADIUS) 
server to make the actual authentication decision. 
802.1x 
     IEEE 802.1x relates to EAP in a way that it is a standard for carrying EAP over a 
wired LAN or WLAN. There are four important entities that expound upon this standard: 
1. Authenticator: Authenticator is the entity that requires the entity on the other end of 
the link to be authenticated. An example is wireless access points. 
2. Supplicant: Supplicant is the entity being authenticated by the authenticator and 
desiring access to the services of the authenticator. 
3. Port Access Entity (PAE):  It is the protocol entity associated with a port. It may 
support the functionality of authenticator, supplicant or both. 
4. Authentication Server:  Authentication server is an entity that provides authentication 
service to the authenticator. It may be co-located with authenticator, but it is most 
likely an external server. It is typically a RADIUS server. 
Practical Solutions for Securing WLAN 
     This section presents the use of hardware and software solutions to help secure the 
WLAN environment.  
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VPN  
     An alternate method of realizing confidentiality and integrity protection is using a 
virtual private network (VPN). A VPN is a virtual network, built on top of existing 
physical networks, that can afford a secure communications mechanism for data and IP 
information transmitted between networks. VPNs are often used to enable the secure 
transfer of sensitive data across public networks, such as the Internet, for remote access, 
telework, and other situations encompassing connecting multiple locations. VPNs can 
also be set up within a single network, such as a WLAN, to safeguard sensitive 
communications from other parties on the network. A variety of VPN technologies exist, 
such as Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) VPNs and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) VPNs.  
One way to use VPNs to protect WLAN communications is to establish a VPN tunnel 
between the WLAN client device and a VPN concentrator that is behind the AP. With an 
IPsec VPN, security services are provided at the network layer of the protocol stack, 
which will secure all applications and protocols operating at layer 3 and above. The VPN 
security services are independent of layer 2 wireless security and are recommended to be 
used if the underlying wireless security mechanisms are weak (NIST, 2005). 
Universal Authentication Mechanism (UAM) 
     With UAM, any device is permitted to associate to the Wi-Fi access point and is 
allotted an IP address and other network information such as the standard gateway 
automatically via DHCP. After association, the user opens a web browser and enters any 
URL. A transparent HTTP proxy (also called captive portal) on the AP (or the underlying 
infrastructure) captures the request and redirects it to a login page. In the case of free 
open public Wi-Fi, the user is usually just required to accept the terms of use.  Now the 
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user’s primary HTTP request is sent and the response is delivered to the user (Szongott et 
al., 2012). 
 
Need for Security in Free Open Public Wi-Fi Hotspots 
     The review of the literature in this section will attempt to discover the need for 
security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots.  The studies included in this section were 
chosen because they demonstrate a significant trend toward the need for wireless security 
in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots. 
     In order to build the foundation supporting the need for wireless security in free open 
public Wi-Fi, Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), and Kim et al. (2012) 
indicated in their studies that the Internet has become a part of our everyday life and the 
use of IEEE 802.11 based wireless local area networks, WLANs, or Wi-Fi has rapidly 
increased in popularity in recent years for accessing the Internet.  In recent years, Internet 
usage shifted from stationary to mobile devices such as laptops, tablets, or smartphones 
with a wireless connection to the network (Lanze et al., 2014).  Wi-Fi market reached 6.4 
billion in 2011 and a rapid growth is forecasted in the upcoming years as most of mobile 
devices (e.g., laptops, tablets, smartphones, etc.) have Wi-Fi capability (Myslewski, 
2011; IDC, 2017).   
     Wi-Fi’s popularity is due to the following reasons: mobility, flexibility, scalability, 
and ease of installation (Nikbakhsh et al., 2012). Although mobile cellular networks (e. 
g., 3G/4G LTE) have gained an increasing influence, the importance of Wi-Fi networks 
remains crucial. Wi-Fi networks provide faster connectivity, offer unmetered service 
whenever mobile networks are unavailable, overloaded, or overpriced (e.g., in roaming) 
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and are indispensable for devices that do not have hardware to access mobile cellular 
networks, e. g., laptops or many tablets (Lanze et al., 2014).   
     Both users and providers benefit significantly from public Wi-Fi hotspots.  Users 
receive wireless Internet access and providers attract new potential clients (Monica & 
Ribeiro, 2011).  Many public avenues have set up Wi-Fi access points to provide free 
wireless Internet service in order to attract and better serve their customers (Hossen & 
Wenyuan, 2014; Lanze et al., 2014; Nakhila et al., 2015).  
     Han et al. (2009, 2011) indicated that as users’ expectations of wireless availability 
increases, the security of such networks becomes even more important.  Additionally, 
Kim et al. (2012) and Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) stated in their studies that the growing 
popularity of WLANs increases the risk of wireless security attacks. Furthermore, there is 
a negative incentive for providers to implement security mechanisms, because the goal of 
the hotspots is to provide convenience and to attract customers. For instance, public Wi-
Fi hotspots provide free, open, and zero liability Internet access to customers (Hossen & 
Wenyuan, 2014).  Nakhila et al. (2015) indicated that clients will only need to search the 
airwave and connect to the wireless network.  No means of encryption or authentication 
is used besides the wireless network name.  Wi-Fi’s popularity makes it an attractive 
target for intruders to compromise and to eavesdrop wireless client information (Nakhila 
et al., 2015). 
     According to Song et al. (2010, 2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), and Nakhila et al. 
(2015), while users can access Wi-Fi Internet hotspot connections in public more easily, 
they become more vulnerable to fraud and identity theft, referred to as evil twin attacks 
(ETA).  This is a threat that can severely compromise the security of wireless users.  
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Moreover, lack of knowledge and awareness possessed by the user make this issue 
extremely disturbing (Nikbakhsh et al., 2012).  Due to its severity, the evil twin attack 
has gained a significant amount of interest in the media and research community (Han et 
al., 2009, 2011; Song et al., 2010, 2012; Lanze et al., 2014). 
Evil Twin Attack 
     An evil twin attack in a wireless LAN refers to a hard- or software-based 802.11 rogue 
Wi-Fi access point (AP) that appears to be a legitimate one offered on the premises, but 
actually has been set up by a hacker to “eavesdrop” on all wireless communications done 
by the victims (Song et al., 2010, 2012; Monica & Ribeiro, 2011; Lanze et al., 2014; 
Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014; Nakhila et al., 2015; Hsu et al., 2015).  An evil twin AP 
mimics the identity of a legitimate AP by cloning its characteristics, such as SSID, MAC, 
or IP address, to be able to trap users to hijack their Internet connection for monetary gain 
(Nikbakhsh et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2012; Lanze et al., 2014).  In the existing literature, 
the terms evil twin AP, rogue AP, fake AP and spoofed AP are used synonymously. 
Attack Scenarios 
     Song et al. (2010, 2012), Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), and 
Nakhila et al. (2015) discovered the following attack scenarios: 
1. Using the legitimate AP’s Internet access (Multihop attack):  The attacker connects 
his device to a legitimate AP for accessing the Internet. In this scenario, the evil twin 
AP can itself behave as a normal Wi-Fi client and uses the legitimate AP to connect 
with the Internet.  All the wireless traffic from the victim will pass through the 
attacker’s node.  In the literature, this type of attack scenario is denoted as multihop 
attacks.  Figure 4 illustrates the multihop attack scenario.  
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Figure 4. Multihop attack scenario. 
 
2. Using mobile Internet access (Mobile attack):  The attacker uses mobile Internet, e.g. 
3G/4G LTE, as the access network for connecting to the Internet.  A hotspot router 
can act as an evil twin AP.  Also, a smartphone with mobile AP functionality built in 
operating systems such as Android or iOS, can act as an evil twin AP and thus can 
allow Wi-Fi clients to use mobile Internet service of the smartphone.  In the literature, 
this type of attack scenario is denoted as mobile attacks.  Figure 5 illustrates the 
mobile attack scenario.   
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mobile attack scenario. 
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Evil Twin AP Set Up 
     It is easy for an adversary to create an evil twin AP in a public Wi-Fi hotspot using a 
Wi-Fi enabled device, e.g., laptop, smartphone, etc. (Song et al., 2010, 2012; Lanze et al., 
2014).  By using a free, fully-automated software (e.g. aircrack-ng), an attacker can 
simply configure a Wi-Fi enabled device to be an evil twin AP to mimic the legitimate 
access point used in a free public Wi-Fi area (Song et al., 2010, 2012; Hossen & 
Wenyuan, 2014; Lanze et al., 2014).  Additionally, all common mobile operating systems 
including Android and iOS are capable of creating a wireless AP using mobile hotspot 
functionality.  Hence, this process can be performed directly from smartphones, without 
attracting the attention of anybody in the vicinity (Lanze et al., 2014). 
Launch of Evil Twin Attacks 
     An evil twin attack is easy to launch at public places due to the lack of security 
mechanisms.  Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro 
(2011), and Hsu et al. (2015) stated in their studies that there are three strategies for 
attackers to attract victims into connecting to their rogue access points. The first strategy 
is by having a rogue AP with the SSID of the targeted public Wi-Fi network physically 
set closer to clients so that its signal can be stronger than the legitimate access points. The 
attacker can also intensify the transmission power of the evil twin AP.  This strategy 
works, since several operating systems choose the AP with the strongest signal strength 
when several APs with the same SSID are available, as these operating systems believe 
different APs with the same SSID belong to the same hotspot.  Also, wireless users tend 
to choose the network with the highest signal strength when manually selecting a network 
to connect to. The wireless users basically assume that all the APs are legitimate.  The 
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second strategy uses the automatic re-association feature that several end-user systems 
provide. These systems have preferred network lists, containing the SSID names of the 
networks a user has connected to in the past.  The attacker simply choses the evil twin AP 
SSID name as the most commonly used SSID names, and waits for victims to connect.  
Finally, the third strategy involves using a denial-of-service attack against 802.11 
networks. The rogue AP can passively wait for users to connect to it, or actively send 
fake de-associate frames to force users to change connections.  The loss of connectivity 
caused from the continuous disassociations, forces wireless users to choose other 
available wireless networks.   
     Song et al. (2010, 2012) and Monica & Ribeiro (2011) indicated that evil twin attacks 
can be hard to trace.  The attacker can shut off the attacks suddenly or randomly after 
accomplishing the malicious goals.  In a very short time frame, the attacker may already 
have compromised public Wi-Fi user’s sensitive information, such as passwords or credit 
card information.  According to Hsu et al. (2015), when a user connects to an evil AP, it 
is exposed under an open connection to the attacker causing privacy data leakage.  
Detecting evil twin access points is the first step in dealing with this problem.   
     In addition, Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro (2011), Choi, Chang, Ko, and 
Hu (2011), Cheng, Wang, Cheng, Mohapatra, and Seneviratne (2013), Lanze et al. 
(2014), and Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) found that WPA2, VPN and UAM solutions are 
not appropriate for protecting against evil twin attacks.  WPA2 is a mechanism that has to 
be configured and carefully maintained by an operator, and operators of public Wi-Fi 
hotspots in particular have no incentive to provide such a service.  Additionally, VPN 
technology is not easily accessible for all users since security service providers usually 
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charge a monthly fee.  Finally, with UAM, the initial URL accessed by the user is 
redirected to a captive portal page to only accept terms of use of free Wi-Fi.  This page 
can be easily emulated by an attacker.  In addition, UAM at hotspots does not allow the 
user to confirm the integrity of the hotspot or its provider.  Hence, this method does not 
offer any security at all for the user pertaining to the evil twin attack. 
 
Client-side Evil Twin Attack Detection Solutions 
     The client-side evil twin detection studies selected and summarized in this section 
provide insight on limitations of existing client-side detection solutions and also direction 
related to the design, construction, deployment, and evaluation of a client-side detection 
artifact that can be used to detect an evil twin attack in free open public Wi-Fi 
environments.  All the studies found related to this domain focus on the construction of a 
client-side detection artifact based on best practices and industry standards but not on 
design principles derived from DSR since there are no studies that effectively address this 
innovative method of artifact construction, implementation and evaluation. 
     In an early study, Han et al. (2009) developed a client-side timing-base method for 
detection of rogue access points based on round trip time (RTT) calculation between the 
wireless user and the DNS server, and does not require network administrator assistance.  
Their RTT-based method helps distinguish the route through a rogue AP from that 
through a legitimate AP (one hop versus two-hop wireless channels).  Han et al. (2009) 
found that this additional hop introduces an unavoidable time delay.  In a later study, Han 
et al. (2011) extended their work by using an outlier algorithm to reduce false detection, 
and dynamically adjusting the number of samples in each test to reduce detection time 
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without sacrificing accuracy.  Their method requires knowledge of the wireless hotspot 
network infrastructure.  Also, their method is based on the attacker using the legitimate 
wireless network gateway to pass through client data traffic, assumes the attacker is 
connected when the wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the 
wireless user of an evil twin attack before any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it 
does not allow the user to connect to a legitimate AP.  Their method works with any type 
of IEEE 802.11 based wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open 
public Wi-Fi networks.  Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the 
target public Wi-Fi network in the past.  Han et al. (2009, 2011) evaluated their solution 
in the lab and field using their own evil twin AP.  Their study set a benchmark for 
creating client-side detection methods that allow wireless users to use their station to 
independently detect whether an AP is legitimate or not without additional equipment and 
the assistance of a wireless network administrator in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots. 
     Additionally, using timing measurements and also based on the evil twin AP utilizing 
the legitimate AP to connect to the Internet, Song et al. (2010) introduced a prototype 
system called “ETSniffer” (Evil Twin Sniffer) based on Interpacket Arrival Time (IAT) 
to detect evil twin access points by distinguishing a one-hop from a two-hop wireless 
network setting between the wireless client and the remote IAT server (custom server).  
Their method does not require administrator assistance.  Two methods were presented as 
part of this study.  The first method is called Trained Mean Matching (TMM) and 
requires knowing the distribution of server IAT as trained knowledge and the second 
method is called Hop Differentiating Technique (HDT) and does not have such a 
requirement.  Their study suggested that HDT improves TMM by removing the training 
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requirement.  Both algorithms utilize the wireless IAT network statistic, consider the 
influencing factors of received signal strengths (RSSs) and wireless network saturation, 
and employ Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) technique to make the final 
detection.  As an improvement, Song et al. (2012) provided additional options for IAT 
remote servers that can be utilized to measure IAT statistics.  Their method works with 
any type of IEEE 802.11 based wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free 
open public Wi-Fi networks.  Their method assumes the attacker is connected when the 
wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the wireless user of an evil twin 
attack before any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it does not allow the user to 
connect to a legitimate AP.  Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the 
target public Wi-Fi network in the past.  Song et al. (2010, 2012) evaluated their solution 
in the lab and field using their own evil twin AP.  Their work made an important 
contribution by proposing the first client-side evil twin attack detection solution that did 
not require prior knowledge of the wireless hotspot network infrastructure and network 
administrator assistance. 
     As the technology continued to move toward client-side evil twin detection systems, 
Monica & Ribeiro (2011) developed a detection solution called “WiFiHop”.  Their 
method does not require network administrator assistance.  This detection system is based 
on the behavior of the legitimate AP without depending on timing to detect a multihop 
setting between the wireless user and the Internet.  Their solution requires the 
implementation of a script (echo server) on a public hosting server.  Their method is 
based on the evil twin AP relaying traffic to the Internet using the legitimate AP and is 
technology independent.  Monica & Ribeiro found that when an evil twin attack is in 
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place, the user’s data must transit the wireless channel between the evil twin and the 
legitimate AP. If an extra wireless hop is detected, then the presence of an evil twin AP is 
confirmed.  Their method was based on the attacker using the legitimate wireless network 
gateway to pass through client data traffic. Their system is automated with no 
intervention from users.  Their method works with any type of IEEE 802.11 based 
wireless networks and Wi-Fi enabled devices.  Furthermore, their method assumes the 
attacker is connected when the wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns 
the wireless user of an evil twin attack before any traffic is transmitted, and after 
detection, it does not allow the user to connect to a legitimate AP.  Their method assumes 
that the user has not connected to the target public Wi-Fi network in the past.  Monica & 
Ribeiro (2011) evaluated their solution in the lab and field using their own evil twin AP.  
Their major contribution was to develop a solution that does not depend on timing to 
detect a multihop setting, does not require network administrator assistance, and that it 
operates in both free open and encrypted public Wi-Fi networks. 
     In support of warning users to avoid connecting to evil twin access points in public 
Wi-Fi hotspots, Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) developed a client-side approach based on 
traceroute that compares the gateways and routes that a packet travels to determine 
whether an access point is legitimate or not without the assistance from a wireless LAN 
operator.  If the legitimate AP and evil twin AP have the same IP addresses with different 
trace route (IP spoofing), their method does not have any references to check which one 
is the authorized access point, therefore it just warns the user about an evil twin attack.  
Their method was based on the attacker using the legitimate wireless network gateway to 
pass through client data traffic. Their method works with any type of IEEE 802.11 based 
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wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open public Wi-Fi networks.  
Furthermore, their method assumes the attacker is connected when the wireless user 
connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the wireless user of an evil twin attack before 
any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it does not allow the user to connect to a 
legitimate AP.  Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the target public 
Wi-Fi network in the past.  Their approach was not implemented or evaluated in a lab 
environment or in the field. 
     During the same time, Kim et al. (2012) developed a client-side evil twin attack 
detection method for smartphones only based on received signal strengths (RSSs), an 
online detection algorithm, and does not require network administrator assistance.  Their 
method measured RSSs from both the legitimate and evil twin access points on the 
smartphone and used normalization of collected signal strengths for accurate 
measurement.  Finally, the method classified signal strengths that are highly correlated to 
others based on a defined threshold value.  Highly correlated RSSs are considered fake 
signals from an evil twin access point.  Kim et al. (2012) made the assumption that the 
attacker was using the legitimate wireless network gateway to pass through client data 
traffic.  Their system is automated with no intervention from users.  Their method works 
with any type of IEEE 802.11 based wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with 
free open public Wi-Fi networks.  Additionally, their method assumes the attacker is 
connected when the wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the 
wireless user of an evil twin attack before any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it 
does not allow the user to connect to a legitimate AP.  Their method assumes that the user 
has not connected to the target public Wi-Fi network in the past.  Kim et al. (2012) 
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evaluated their solution in the lab and field using their own evil twin AP. Their work 
made an important contribution by proposing the first client-side evil twin detection 
solution for a smartphone that works on open and encrypted networks. 
     A recent study conducted by Lanze et al. (2014) addresses the problem of lack of 
client-side evil twin attack detection solutions for public Wi-Fi hotspot users to 
independently verify whether an access point is legitimate or not through a method for 
detection of software-based evil twin attacks (e.g. aircrack-ng) and without network 
administrator assistance.  Their method separates software access points from legitimate 
hardware access points.  Lanze et al. (2014) found that when software emulates hardware 
behavior, it presents a significant timing inaccuracy due to processing delays and leaks 
information that can be used for detection.  Further, their method explains why airbase-ng 
fails to imitate a hardware AP in regards to the accuracy of Timing Synchronization 
Function (TSF) timestamps in beacon frames.  Their method works with any type of 
IEEE 802.11 based wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open public 
Wi-Fi networks.  In addition, their method assumes the attacker is connected when the 
wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the wireless user of an evil twin 
attack before any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it does not allow the user to 
connect to a legitimate AP.  Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the 
target public Wi-Fi network in the past.  Their solution was only implemented in a lab 
environment.  Lanze et al. (2014) used their own evil twin AP on the evaluation.  
     Similarly, using the legitimate AP to connect to the Internet, Hsu et al. (2015) 
proposed a client-side evil twin attack detection system called “ET Detector” based on 
redirection behavior.  Their method does not require administrator assistance.  By 
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operating the wireless network interface controller (WNIC) in monitor mode (which is 
able to capture all packets that conform to its monitoring channel and protocol) and by 
examining the captured packets, users can simply and accurately discover the evil twin 
attack.  The system has two detection mechanisms: default testing and secondary device 
testing.  Default testing only works when a user is not the only one using public Wi-Fi in 
a hotspot.  Otherwise, the system will be forced to use secondary testing which requires 
an extra Wi-Fi device with no sensitive data on it to associate to the target AP to make 
the detection. Their method works with any type of IEEE 802.11 based wireless 
networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open public Wi-Fi networks.  Their 
method assumes the attacker is connected when the wireless user connects to the public 
Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the wireless user of an evil twin attack before any traffic is 
transmitted, and after detection, it does not allow the user to connect to a legitimate AP.  
Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the target public Wi-Fi network 
in the past.  Hsu et al. (2015) evaluated their solution in the lab and field using their own 
evil twin AP. 
     Szongott et al. (2015) proposed a detection system called Mobile Evil Twin Detection 
System (METDS) for smartphones based on context-based recognition that can help 
mitigate evil twin attacks, and does not require administrator assistance.  To detect evil 
twin APs, the algorithm of the METDS utilizes the following parameters to describe and 
verify an access point's environment: SSID, BSSID, cell tower information, and device’s 
location.  Their method only works if the METDS system has previously been run in the 
hotspot.  In this case, METDS already has an appropriate dataset that can be used to 
verify the current environment.  Their method requires previous knowledge of the target 
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network and also an external server to store learned data.  Their system is automated with 
no intervention from users.  Also, their method works with any type of IEEE 802.11 
based wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open public Wi-Fi 
networks.  Their method assumes the attacker is connected when the wireless user 
connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the wireless user of an evil twin attack before 
any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it does not allow the user to connect to a 
legitimate AP.  Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the target public 
Wi-Fi network in the past.  Their solution was evaluated in a lab using simulations based 
on real-world data. 
     Continuing in the domain of client-side evil twin detection, Hossen & Wenyuan 
(2014) introduced a method called Client end Evil Twin Access Point Detector (CETAD) 
to detect evil twin attacks without network administrator assistance.  Their method 
leverages public servers and was implemented as an application in a smartphone.  Their 
application included two detection techniques:  ISP-based and timing-based.  The 
application utilized the ISP-based detection technique, and if not successful, used the 
timing-based detection technique.  The ISP-based technique was used to detect mobile 
attacks as the ISP information of a legitimate AP and an evil twin AP are different. It 
detects whether or not different gateways are used by multiple APs in one hotspot 
location that have the same SSID.  Hossen & Wenyuan’s ISP-based method for mobile 
attacks uses a public website to gather the global IP address shared by the legitimate APs.  
Timing-based technique was used to detect multihop attacks because the attacker’s evil 
twin AP uses the legitimate AP as the gateway.  Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) claim that 
when the evil twin attack is launched utilizing the victim’s Internet, RTT values vary 
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significantly.  Hossen & Wenyuan assume that the BSSID of the hotspot APs are unique 
and use that as a reference to switch between different APs with the same SSID in the 
hotspot.  Hossen & Wenyuan assume that the evil twin AP is in a different subnet as the 
legitimate AP.  Their method assumes detection of all the APs in the public Wi-Fi 
network during the initial wireless network scanning and that the client is able to 
associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network.  Their system is automated with no 
intervention from users.  Their method works with any type of IEEE 802.11 based 
wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open Wi-Fi networks.  
Furthermore, their method assumes the attacker is connected when the wireless user 
connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, and warns the wireless user of an evil twin attack 
before any traffic is transmitted.  Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) claim that after the attack 
has been detected, the application allows the wireless user to connect to the legitimate 
AP, but this was not included in their algorithm.  Furthermore, their method does not 
cover the scenarios when the attacker blocks access to the public website or when the 
attacker presents an invalid certificate while ISP information is retrieved from the public 
website.  Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the target public Wi-Fi 
network in the past.  Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) was evaluated in the lab and field using 
their own evil twin AP.  Their main contribution was evaluating the effectiveness of the 
client-side detection system at a large scale in uncontrolled environments. 
     In a similar study, Nakhila et al. (2015) also presented a client-side detection method 
for mobile attacks that does not require network administrator assistance and detects 
whether or not different gateways are used by multiple APs in one hotspot location that 
have the same SSID.  Their detection technique relies on an SSL/TCP connection to a 
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remote public server, and detects the changing of wireless network gateway’s public IP 
address in the middle of the SSL/TCP connection.  Nakhila et al. (2015) assume that a 
mobile attack is not executed before the client establish a secure connection to the remote 
server.  Also, Nakhila et al. assume that the BSSID of the hotspot APs are unique and use 
that as a reference in their method to switch between different APs with the same SSID in 
the hotspot.  Nakhila et al.’s (2015) method only works when the evil twin AP is in the 
same subnet as the legitimate AP.  Their method assumes the attacker uses a different 
gateway from a legitimate AP.  If the attacker uses a legitimate gateway to pass wireless 
client data, the proposed detection method will not work.  Their method assumes 
detection of all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network during the initial wireless network 
scanning and that the client is able to associate to all the APs.  Nakhila et al.’s method 
does not cover the scenario when the attacker blocks access to the public website. Their 
system is automated with no intervention from users.  Their method works with any type 
of IEEE 802.11 based wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open Wi-
Fi networks.  Furthermore, their solution assumes the attacker is connected when the 
wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the wireless user of an evil twin 
attack before any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it does not allow the user to 
connect to a legitimate AP.  Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the 
target public Wi-Fi network in the past.  Their solution was only implemented in a lab 
environment.  Nakhila et al. (2015) used their own evil twin AP on the evaluation.   
     The client-side detection artifact constructed as part of this dissertation linked the gap 
between the need of wireless security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots and limitations 
in existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions. 
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     Appendix A shows existing studies requirements and limitations mapping based on 
the literature review. 
 
Design Science Research Principles and Methodology 
     Design theory played a significant role in the development of DSR principles that 
were used in the effective construction, implementation, and evaluation of a client-side 
evil twin attack detection system to allow wireless users of free open public Wi-Fi to 
detect mobile evil twin attacks. 
     According to Walls, Widmeyer, and El Sawy (1992), IS design theories are 
prescriptive, which integrates normative and descriptive theories into design paths 
intended to produce more effective information systems.  IS design theories prescribe 
effective development practices (methods) and a type of system solution (instantiation) 
for a particular class of user requirements (models).  Further, Walls et al. (1992) indicated 
that explanatory theories tell “what is”, predictive theories tell “what will be”, normative 
theories tell “what should be”, and design theories tell “how to/ because”.  
      In support of Walls et al.’s (1992) study, March and Smith (1995) found that design 
science offers prescriptions and creates artifacts that embody those prescriptions. Design 
science attempts to create things that serve human purposes, it is technology oriented and 
its products (constructs, models, methods, and implementations) are assessed against 
criteria of utility to a community of users (e.g. does it work? is it an improvement?).  
However, March and Smith (1995) argued that DSR should be concerned both with 
utility, as a design science, and with theory, as a natural science explaining how and why 
IT systems work within their operating environments.  March and Smith (1995) found 
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that DSR contribution lies in the novelty of the artifact and in the persuasiveness of the 
claims that it is effective.  Along the same thread, Markus, Majchrzak, and Gasser (2002) 
found that a new IS design theory was required for a class of user requirements called 
emergent knowledge processes (EKPs), which are defined as patterns of organizational 
activity that exhibit three characteristics in combination: “deliberations” with no best 
structure or sequence; highly unpredictable potential users and work contexts; and 
information requirements that include general, specific, and tacit knowledge distributed 
across experts and non-experts.   
     From a different view on design theory, Hevner, March, Park, and Ram (2004) 
indicated that DSR is informed by both existing theory (produced by natural or 
behavioral science research) and by identified business needs.  According to Hevner et al. 
(2004), such theories explain or predict organizational and human phenomena related to 
the identified business need and inform researchers and practitioners of the interactions 
among people, technology, and organizations that must be managed if an information 
system is to achieve its stated purpose, namely improving the effectiveness and efficiency 
of an organization.  Hevner et al. (2004) further noted that DSR is a problem solving 
paradigm and knowledge and understanding of a problem domain and its solution are 
achieved in the building and evaluation of an IT artifact to meet the identified business 
need. The goal of behavioral science research is truth.  The goal of design science 
research is utility.  Hevner et al. (2004) argued that truth and utility are inseparable. Truth 
informs design and utility informs theory.  According to Gregor & Jones (2007), Hevner 
et al. (2004) argue with the use of the word “theory” for design type knowledge, 
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preferring to restrict the word to the possibly more familiar natural science (and, later, 
social science) types of theory.   
     According to Venable (2006), design theory building is a central activity related to 
problem diagnosis, technology invention or design (to solve problems), and technology 
evaluation.  Venable (2006) indicated that theory building occurs before, during, 
throughout, and at the end as a result of Design Science Research.  Venable argues that 
design theory should be in the form of utility theories, which relate improvements 
expected from applying a particular type or types of technologies to a particular type of 
problem.  During the same year, Gregor (2006) examined the structural nature of theory 
in the discipline of Information Systems and proposed a taxonomy for classifying 
developed theories.  Using the primary goals of theory (analysis, explanation, prediction, 
and prescription), Gregor (2006) distinguished five interrelated types of theory: (1) theory 
for analyzing; (2) theory for explaining; (3) theory for predicting; (4) theory for 
explaining and predicting (EP); and (5) theory for design and action.  The theory for 
design and action says how to do something.  It is about the principles of form and 
function, methods, and justificatory theoretical knowledge that are used in the 
development of IS.  Models and methods can be evaluated for completeness, simplicity, 
consistency, ease of use, and the quality of results obtained through use of the method.  
     According to Gregor and Jones (2007), IS design theory allows the prescription of 
guidelines for further artifacts of the same type and that design theories can be about 
artifacts that are either products or methods.  As the word “design” is both a noun and a 
verb, a theory can be about both the principles underlying the form of the design and also 
about the act of implementing the design in the real world.  According to Gregor & Jones 
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(2007), researchers in design science have tended not to speak of theory in relation to 
design knowledge at all, but have focused more on design research as an activity that 
results in artifact construction.  One year later, based on Hevner et al.’s (2004) work, 
Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, and Chatterjee’s (2008) developed a design science 
research methodology (DSRM) resulting from theory that incorporates principles, 
practice rules, and procedures required to carry out such design science (DS) research and 
a mental model for its presentation.  DSRM may support with the recognition and 
legitimization of DS research and its objectives, processes, and outputs and it should help 
researchers to present research with reference to a commonly understood framework, 
rather than justifying the research paradigm on an ad hoc basis with each new paper. 
     According to Gregor and Hevner (2013), theory is only one form that a DSR 
contribution can take.  They argued that contributions to knowledge could be partial 
theory, incomplete theory, or even some particularly interesting and perhaps surprising 
empirical generalization in the form of a new design artifact.  Based on Gregor and 
Hevner’s (2013) findings, what is likely to be the most critical part of a DSR article is 
how the author stakes the claim to a knowledge contribution and provides convincing 
evidence that the research makes a practical contribution to the application context. 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
     Several studies exist in the literature review that are sound and support the problem 
statement and research questions. However, there are some studies that are less valuable 
and this section will endeavor to encapsulate both the strengths and weaknesses of some 
of the key studies related to the four main topics mentioned in the literature review: (a) 
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wireless security; (b) need for security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots; (c) client-side 
evil twin attack detection solutions; and (d) DSR principles and methodology. 
      Supporting the topic of wireless security in general, Kirankumar et al. (2012) and 
Singh et al. (2014) indicate that wireless networks are more vulnerable to security attacks 
than wired networks, due to the broadcast nature of the transmission, and that despite the 
productivity, convenience and cost advantage that WLAN offers, the radio waves used in 
wireless networks create a risk where the network can be hacked.  NIST (2008) indicated 
that a passive security attack against WLAN such as “eavesdropping” allows the attacker 
to monitor wireless data transmissions between devices for message content, such as 
authentication credentials or passwords.  An example of this attack is an attacker listening 
to transmissions on a WLAN between an AP and a client. Detecting evil twin access 
points is the first step in dealing with this problem. 
     Supporting the need for wireless security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots, several 
authors such as Song et al. (2010, 2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), Hsu et al. (2015) 
and Nakhila et al. (2015) emphasize the need for mechanisms to protect users against evil 
twin attacks that can severely compromise their security by making them more vulnerable 
to fraud and identity theft.  Song et al. (2010, 2012) described an evil twin attack in a 
wireless LAN as a hard- or software-based 802.11 rogue Wi-Fi access point (AP) that 
looks like a legitimate one offered on the premises, but actually has been set up by a 
hacker to “eavesdrop” all wireless communications done by the victims. Han et al. (2009, 
2011), Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), and Kim et al. (2012) indicate that the growing popularity 
of WLANs, has increased the risk of evil twin attacks and the lack of knowledge and 
awareness of this threat possessed by users make this issue extremely disturbing.  Monica 
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& Ribeiro (2011) indicate the importance of detecting evil twin attacks to prevent 
attacker’s effective interception of all kinds of sensitive data such as passwords or credit 
card information.      
     The client-side evil twin access point detection studies indicated strength based on 
systems that have been recently developed by academic researchers.  Hossen and 
Wenyuan (2014) and Nakhila et al. (2015) developed client-side solutions, CETAD and 
SSL/TCP protocol-based, for the most popular evil twin attack scenario where the 
attacker’s evil twin AP uses broadband cellular service, e.g. 3G/4G LTE, to access the 
Internet.  Based on the review of the literature, Hossen & Wenyuan and Nakhila et al. are 
the only existing studies that assume the attacker using a different gateway from a 
legitimate AP.  Evil twin attacks that use a different gateway from a legitimate AP 
(mobile attacks) will become more popular nowadays due to the increase in the Internet 
access speed of mobile connections, such as 3G/4G LTE, and the inclusion of mobile 
hotspot capabilities in virtually all new mobile devices (Szongott et al., 2012; Nakhila et 
al., 2015).  Unfortunately, there is limited research focused on client-side solutions that 
will allow wireless users to verify the authenticity of access points at free open public 
Wi-Fi hotspots and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks.  CETAD was the 
only solution evaluated at a large scale in public Wi-Fi hotspots.   
     Early studies conducted by Han et al. (2009, 2011) and Song et al. (2010, 2012) are 
considered weak because they developed a client-side detection system based on timing 
measurements which are mainly characterized for technology dependency and low 
efficiency impacting detection results.  Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) developed a client-side 
detection solution based on traceroute results that can be captured by an attacker and send 
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to the wireless client using the rogue wireless network.  Han et al. (2009, 2011) and 
Szongott et al. (2015) require previous knowledge of the public Wi-Fi network.  
Additionally, in studies by Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica and 
Ribeiro (2011), Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Kim et al. (2012), and Hsu et al. (2015),  RTT-
based, ETSniffer, WiFiHop, traceroute, multiple signal detection systems, and ET 
Detector provided limited client-side detection targeted only to the specific evil win 
attack scenario where the attacker uses the legitimate AP for Internet access instead of a 
more popular scenario where the attacker uses a different gateway from a legitimate AP 
such as broadband cellular service, e.g. 3G/4G LTE, to access the Internet.  Studies by 
Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica and Ribeiro (2011), and Szongott et al. (2015) had 
problems providing client-side evil twin detection solutions that require to install a server 
within the hotspot LAN, the implementation of a script in a service provider hosting 
service, or extra Wi-Fi devices.  Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), 
Monica & Ribeiro (2011), Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Kim et al. (2012), Lanze et al. (2014), 
Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), Nakhila et al. (2015), Hsu et al. (2015), and Szongott et al. 
(2015) developed client-side detection systems that could not distinguish which AP is 
evil twin and which is legitimate, and as result could not offer the user to connect to a 
legitimate AP after detection.  Additionally, all existing client-side approaches assume 
that the user has not connected to the target public Wi-Fi network in the past.  Also, none 
of the studies protect the user for the duration of the Wi-Fi connection, discovering and 
reporting on new mobile evil twin access points.  Protection is only provided to the user 
at the beginning based on the assumption that the attacker will be connected when the 
user connects to the public Wi-Fi network.  Lastly, existing solutions were evaluated in a 
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lab environment and in the field (universities, cafes, restaurants, and airports) using their 
own evil twin APs.  Researchers did not evaluate their solution in hotel public Wi-Fi 
environments and did not aim at detecting real evil twin APs. 
     Several strengths and a weakness related to the problem and research question in this 
dissertation report are identified in the design science research section of the literature 
review.  The strengths associated with the literature review of design theory are that 
Walls et al. (1992) and Markus et al. (2002) both used IS design theories targeted to 
develop executive information systems (EIS) and systems to support emergent 
knowledge process (EKPs), respectively.  Hevner et al. (2004) defined the limitations of 
design science within the IS discipline via a conceptual framework for understanding IS 
research and established a set of guidelines for conducting, evaluating and presenting 
DSR.  Gregor (2006) and Venable (2006) underscores the role and structural nature of 
theory in design science research.  Peffers et al. (2008) addressed the lack of a 
methodology to serve as a framework for carrying out DS research in information 
systems and a template for its presentation. 
     The weakness related to the literature of design theory was identified in the study by 
March and Smith’s (1995) contending that in order to insure IT research is both relevant 
and effective, both design science and natural science activities are needed. In addition, 
the study by Gregor and Hevner (2013) was largely concentrated on presenting practical 
guidance on how to comprehend, position, and present DSR knowledge contributions and 
publishing unrelated to this study’s problem. 
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Gaps in the Literature 
     Most of the studies presented in the literature review for this dissertation report did not 
include a thorough review of the existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions 
and limitations. Therefore, the artifacts developed as part of these studies are not robust 
since they are based on a very limited number of requirements and assumptions.  In 
addition, there are no client-side evil twin attack detection studies that are based on DSR 
principles and methodology.  The design science research literature helped with the 
creation of DSR principles, procedures and specifications supported the artifact 
construction, implementation, and evaluation of the client-side evil twin attack detection 
system that is central to the study.   
 
 
Research Methods in Similar Studies 
 
     Peffers et al.’s (2008) DSRM has been adopted for this dissertation report.  The DSR 
methodology is based on Hevner et al.’s DSR principles and includes the following 
process elements: (1) problem identification and motivation; (2) define the objectives for 
a solution; (3) design and development; (4) demonstration; (5) evaluation; and (6) 
communication.  This study used the Peffers et al.’s (2008) research methodology as a 
model to extrapolate on various DSR approaches and presents on Table 1 a comparison 
of the process elements from methods in similar studies to Peffers et al.’s DSRM process 
elements.  This comparison approach guided the creation of design specifications and 
procedures to develop, implement, and evaluate the client-side evil twin attack detection 
system at the center of this study.
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Table 1 
 
Comparison of DSRM approaches 
 
Peffers, Tuunanen, 
Rothenberger, and 
Chatterjee (2008) 
– design process 
elements 
Walls, 
Widmeyer, 
and El 
Sawy 
(1992) 
March and 
Smith 
(1995) 
Markus, 
Majchrzak, and 
Gasser (2002) 
Hevner, 
March, Park, 
and Ram 
(2004) 
Gregor and 
Jones 
(2007) 
Venable 
(2006) 
Gregor and 
Hevner 
(2013) 
1. Problem 
identification and 
motivation 
Kernel 
theories 
Theorize Characteristics 
of emergent 
knowledge 
processes 
(EKPs) 
 
Important and 
relevant 
problems 
Kernel 
theories 
 
Purpose and 
Scope 
Problem 
space 
Purpose and 
Scope 
 
 
2. Objectives of a 
solution  
  Requirements 
for IT support 
of EKPs 
 
 
Implicit in 
relevance 
 Solution 
technology 
Literature 
survey 
3. Design and 
Development  
Design 
Method 
 
Build 
artifact: 
constructs, 
model, 
method, and 
instantiation 
EKP support 
system design 
and 
development 
principles for 
EKPs 
 
Rigorous 
artifact 
iterative 
search process 
 
 
Principles of 
implementa-
tion 
Technology 
invention 
Design 
artifact 
description 
and design 
search 
(developme
nt) process 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                              (continued)  
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Peffers, Tuunanen, 
Rothenberger, and 
Chatterjee (2008) 
– design process 
elements 
Walls, 
Widmeyer, 
and El 
Sawy 
(1992) 
March and 
Smith 
(1995) 
Markus, 
Majchrzak, and 
Gasser (2002) 
Hevner, 
March, Park, 
and Ram 
(2004) 
Gregor and 
Jones 
(2007) 
Venable 
(2006) 
Gregor and 
Hevner 
(2013) 
4. Demonstration   Effective EKP 
support system 
Rigorous 
evaluation 
methods 
Expository 
instantiation 
 
 Novel 
artifact 
proof of 
concept 
demonstra-
tion 
5. Evaluation 
 
Testable 
design 
process 
hypotheses 
 
Evaluate 
artifact 
 Evaluate Testable 
propositions 
Technology 
evaluation 
Summative 
(final) 
testing 
6. Communication    Communicate   Communi-
cate 
 
71 
 
 
Synthesis of the Literature  
 
     Since the artifact design in this dissertation is based on wireless security, the need for 
security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots, client-side evil twin attack detection 
solutions, and design science research principles and methodology involved in the artifact 
construction; the literature was required to be synthesized precisely related to the problem 
domain to provide a high-level, rational point of view. 
     Wireless security in general is strongly supported in studies conducted by NIST 
(2005), NIST (2008), Habibi et al. (2009), Feng (2012), Kirankumar et al. (2012), Kelly 
(2014), Szongott et al. (2012), and Singh et al. (2014).  Their work describes existing 
solutions such as Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2), Virtual Private Networks (VPN), 
and Universal Authentication Mechanism (UAM).  However, according to Song et al. 
(2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro (2011), Choi et al. (2011), Cheng et al. (2013), Lanze et 
al. (2014), and Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), these solutions are not appropriate for 
protecting against evil twin attacks. 
WPA2 
     In personal mode, a pre-shared key (PSK) is established to encrypt traffic between 
client and AP. Such a mechanism can only protect against the evil twin attack if the PSK 
is hidden from the attacker.  The PSK has to be supplied to potential users by some 
method, e.g., printed on a receipt.  Therefore, in the case of public hotspots, the attacker 
can obtain the key by the same means as a public user and mount the attack unimpeded.  
In a public Wi-Fi environment, pre-shared keys are arduous to distribute and this differs 
with the hotspot’ business goals (Choi et al., 2011; Lanze et al., 2014; Hossen & 
Wenyuan, 2014).  In enterprise mode, the wireless AP acts as authenticator between a 
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client and an authentication server using RADIUS and EAP. With EAP, a certificate 
authority (CA) certificate is to be used by devices to authenticate with the server before 
submitting credentials. Theoretically, evil twin attacks become impossible by this setup 
since the attacker cannot easily imitate the authentication server, as it is protected by 
strong cryptographic means. Nevertheless, there is a major weakness of this solution in 
practice.  The mechanism has to be configured and carefully maintained by the operator, 
and operators of public hotspots in particular have no incentive to provide such a service.  
Furthermore, the validation of the server certificate by the client, the crucial element of 
the authentication process, is optional. If this is not done carefully by the user (i.e., the 
certificate check is activated and the user rejects the connection on seeing a certificate 
warning), imitation of the authentication server is possible, e.g., by harvesting and 
cracking handshakes.  In addition, 802.1x needs a trustable authentication server to 
validate the wireless devices, which may not be feasible or suitable for the huge amount 
of traveling users to detect evil twin attacks by themselves in public Wi-Fi hotspots (Song 
et al., 2010, 2012; Choi et al., 2011; Lanze et al., 2014). 
VPN  
     VPNs become the standard when there is the requirement for connecting to the 
Internet through potentially untrustworthy wireless operators. Besides certificate-based 
attacks such as those on SSL, an attacker can terminate a VPN session (e.g., by dropping 
management packets) such that the connection returns to plain mode, usually without a 
noticeable notification to the user.  The use of VPN solutions, is much more complex in 
terms of implementation and still leaves users susceptible to layer 2 and denial-of-service 
attacks.  A user can configure their wireless device to setup a VPN connection through a 
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public access point and all the traffic between the wireless device and the AP will be 
encrypted. However, VPN technology is not easily accessible for all users since such 
security service providers usually charge a monthly fee (Monica & Ribeiro, 2011; Cheng 
et al., 2013; Lanze et al., 2014). 
UAM  
     Free public Wi-Fi hotspots commonly provide a UAM. Usually, the initial URL 
accessed by the user is redirected to a captive portal, a website hosted by the operator that 
provides a disclaimer requiring the acceptance of the terms of use. However, the attacker 
can easily emulate this sort of page.  UAM at hotspots does not allow the user to confirm 
the integrity of the hotspot or its provider.  Hence, this method does not offer any security 
at all for the user pertaining to the evil twin attack (Lanze et al., 2014). 
     The need for security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots is strongly supported in 
studies conducted by Han et al. (2009, 2011), Kim et al. (2012) and Nikbakhsh et al. 
(2012).  Their findings indicate that as people’s expectation of free open public Wi-Fi 
availability increases, the security of such networks becomes more important increasing 
the risk of wireless security attacks. According to JiWire’s Mobile Audience Insights 
Report Q4 2013, nearly 85% of U.S. public Wi-Fi hotspots are free.  Since the goal of 
free open public Wi-Fi hotspots is to provide convenience and to attract customers, 
security mechanisms are not in place.   
     Hossen and Wenyuan’s (2014) study findings indicate that public Wi-Fi provides free, 
open, and zero liability Internet access to customers.  However, generally consumers are 
oblivious to the danger on public Wi-Fi networks, such as evil twin attacks, causing 
identity theft, hacking, and breeched bank accounts (Private Wi-Fi, 2013).  Public Wi-Fi 
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users need to protect themselves from such threats.  Particularly, a study conducted by 
The Guardian in 2011, launched two evil twin attacks conducted with volunteers, in 
which they successfully gather users’ usernames, passwords, messages and even credit 
card information.  This study reinforced that many public Wi-Fi hotspots have no forms 
of identification, except their wireless network names (SSID), which can be easily 
impersonated. 
     According to Harris poll (2014), 39% of U.S. adults have accessed or transmitted 
sensitive information while on public Wi-Fi without taking any steps to protect their data. 
Table 2 presents ways in which adults have accessed sensitive information while using 
public Wi-Fi. 
 
Table 2 
 
Ways in which adults have accessed sensitive information while using public Wi-Fi 
 
Activity Percentage 
1. Say they have checked a bank 
account 
 
26% 
 
2. Say they paid a bill 
 
19% 
 
3. Say they have sent an email with 
sensitive information such as 
their Social Security number or 
an account number 
 
8% 
4. Say they have filed their taxes 
 
6% 
5. Say they have done so in another 
way 
 
10% 
 
     The survey conducted by Harris poll (2014) also revealed U.S. adults’ perceptions and 
attitudes toward potential threats when accessing free public Wi-Fi.  This survey proves 
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that despite their concern over the potential threats that public Wi-Fi poses, many users 
still perform activities that could make them vulnerable to identity theft.  Table 3 shows 
U.S. adults’ perceptions of potential threats when accessing free public Wi-Fi. 
 
Table 3 
 
U.S. adults’ perceptions of potential threats when accessing free public Wi-Fi 
 
Potential threat Percentage 
1. U.S. adults mentioned identify 
theft 
 
88% 
 
2. Answered compromised 
accounts 
 
76% 
3. Noted that fraudulent tax filings 
could be a potential issue 
 
39% 
 
     Based on the literature and surveys, there is evidently a need for security on free open 
public Wi-Fi networks.  Most of the public Wi-Fi hotspots are open, free and do not have 
security protections in place against wireless security attacks (Monica & Ribeiro, 2011; 
Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014; Nakhila et al., 2015).  Wi-Fi’s popularity makes it an 
attractive target for attackers to compromise and to eavesdrop wireless client information 
since many Wi-Fi hotspot users are unaware of the hidden risks that the technology 
poses, such as evil twin attacks, making users vulnerable to fraud and identity theft.  
Users enjoy the benefits of free open public Wi-Fi; however, they are not able to 
differentiate the ones that are safe from the ones that are not. Wi-Fi users must assume 
the responsibility for device protections in the light of these types of attacks.   
     Several researchers have been exploring detection methods of evil twin attacks for 
free open public Wi-Fi networks.  However, existing solutions are mainly for network 
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administrators instead of wireless users.  According to Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), 
administrator-side solutions are not applicable to public Wi-Fi hotspots and more feasible 
in environments such as infrastructure networks, e.g. corporate networks.  Kim et al.’s 
(2012) study indicated that recently several evil twin AP detection methods have 
been designed in order to overcome the administrator-side problems in a client-side 
solution. However, Kim et al. stated that existing client-side solutions have a 
cumbersome process in detecting fake APs in practice.  Similarly, Lanze et al. (2014) 
indicated that existing solutions have limitations regarding requirements, ease of 
deployment, attacker model, and detection efficacy. 
     Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), and Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) 
discovered that a client-side evil twin detection method based on timing measurements 
(e.g. RTT, IAT) is able to distinguish a one-hop from a multihop setting.  However, 
Monica & Ribeiro (2011), discovered that timing measurement methods are technology 
dependent.  According to their study, with the increase in wireless networks speeds, 
transmission delay differences between a wireless node and a wired node will eventually 
fade.  This means that a multihop setting may become indistinguishable from a one-hop 
setting.  Nakhila et al. (2015) indicated that timing-based methods need to monitor many 
packets in order to obtain accurate measurement, which makes the evil twin attack 
detection take a longer time to complete.  In addition, Nakhila et al. (2015) stated that 
timing-based detection will be unreliable when the attacker uses a faster Internet 
connection such as broadband cellular service as the evil twin AP.  The detection system 
developed as part of this study is not based on timing. 
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     Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro (2011), 
Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Kim et al. (2012), Lanze et al. (2014), Hossen & Wenyuan 
(2014), and Hsu et al. (2015) assume in their studies that the attacker will use the 
legitimate wireless network gateway to pass through client data traffic (multihop attack).  
Nakhila et al. (2015) found that their detection methods will fail especially when the 
attacker uses a faster Internet connection (i.e. cellular broadband connection) compared 
to the legitimate wireless network.  The attacker can delay the response time of the 
transmitting packets between the server and the wireless client to match the transmission 
time of the packets passing through the legitimate AP (Nakhila et al., 2015).  Szongott et 
al. (2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), and Nakhila et al. (2015) further indicated that 
evil twin attacks that use their cellular broadband connection will become more popular 
nowadays due to the increase in the Internet access speed of mobile connections, such as 
3G/4G LTE or WiMAX and the inclusion of mobile hotspots capabilities in virtually all 
new mobile devices.  The detection system developed as part of this study protects users 
from attackers that utilize a different gateway from a legitimate access point (mobile 
attack).  
     Han et al.’s (2009, 2011) and Song et al.’s (2010, 2012) client-side evil twin detection 
methods rely on existing networking protocols to work and can be executed by end users 
without any help from network administrators.  Similarly, Monica & Ribeiro (2011), Kim 
et al. (2012), Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Lanze et al. (2014), Hsu et al. (2015), Hossen & 
Wenyuan (2014), Szongott et al. (2015), and Nakhila et al. (2015) developed secure 
client-side evil twin detection methods that do not require network administrator 
privileges or network administrator assistance from hotspots networks.  According to 
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their studies, client-side evil twin detection methods must not require any administrative 
access to modify the routers or wireless access points.  There is no need to modify the 
network architecture, hardware or software on either client or server side applications.  
Furthermore, Monica & Ribeiro (2011), as well as Kim et al. (2012), Hossen & Wenyuan 
(2014), Nakhila et al. (2015), and Szongott et al. (2015) indicated that the client-side evil 
twin detection system must be an automated application for whenever the user joins a 
public Wi-Fi hotspot.  The detection system developed as part of this study does not 
require network administrator assistance or privileges and is automated with no 
intervention from users to ensure usability. 
     As mentioned previously, Han et al. (2009, 2011) developed a detection method that 
calculates the round trip time between the wireless user and the DNS server to 
independently determine whether an AP is legitimate or not without wireless 
administrator assistance.  However, Song et al. (2010, 2012) found that since this work 
mainly utilizes the training detection technique and uses a relatively static threshold to 
differentiate normal and malicious scenarios, it needs to pre-gather the information of the 
target wireless network.  Song et al. (2010, 2012) further indicated that Han et al.’s 
(2009, 2011) method could not be applied to those traveling users at the client side, since 
once the traveling users are in different areas, the network situation may have 
significantly changed.  The trained knowledge in one wireless network can be hardly 
applicable to another network.  Additionally, Szongott et al.’s (2015) system will not 
work if the user connects to a public Wi-Fi network for the first time since it requires 
previous knowledge of the network to assist the user.  Recent studies conducted by 
Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) and Nakhila et al. (2015) also found that to detect an evil 
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twin AP, the system should neither require any training knowledge of the target wireless 
network nor depend on the types of wireless networks to guarantee free open public 
hotspots.  The detection system developed as part of this study does not require 
knowledge of the wireless hotspots infrastructure, AP list and/or user/hosts (trained 
knowledge) and works on any type of IEEE 802.11-based wireless networks.  
     From an equipment requirement perspective, Song et al.’s (2010, 2012) study 
presented an evil twin detection solution that require to install a server within the hotspot 
LAN with ETSniffer for measuring Inter-packet arrival time (IAT) and detecting an evil 
twin AP.  In addition, this custom server must be available for the solution to work 
properly.  Monica & Ribeiro’s (2011) method requires the implementation of a script in a 
service provider hosting service.  Hsu et al.’s (2015) method requires an additional Wi-Fi 
device with no sensitive data to assist with the detection. Szongott et al. (2015) requires 
an external server to store learned data.  A recent study conducted by Hossen & Wenyuan 
(2014) indicated that a client-side detection solution must be able to verify an access 
point in a hotspot and thus cannot assume any custom infrastructure support (e.g. 
hardware or software).  Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) further stated that designing an 
infrastructure-side solution would require hotspot providers to re-design existing 
hotspots, which is unlikely to happen because most hotspots are free services with no 
independent revenue.  According to Han et al.’ (2009, 2011), Monica & Ribeiro’ (2011), 
Kim et al.’ (2012), Nikbakhsh et al.’ (2012), Lanze et al.’ (2014), Hossen & Wenyuan’ 
(2014), and Nakhila et al.’ (2015) studies, to guarantee usability and availability to the 
client, a client-side detection method must discover evil twin APs using their Wi-Fi 
enabled devices (e.g. laptops, smartphones, tablets, etc.) without additional equipment.  
80 
 
 
Hossen & Wenyuan’ (2014) and Nakhila et al.’ (2015) methods do not have the rigid 
requirement of having a custom server inside the LAN, rather their study leverage a 
public web server.  However, their method does not cover the scenarios when the attacker 
blocks access to the public website.  Furthermore, Hossen & Wenyuan’s method did not 
cover the scenario when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while ISP information 
is retrieved from the public website. The detection system developed as part of this study 
does not require any additional equipment or custom infrastructure support, leverages 
public servers, addresses blocked public website and invalid certificate scenarios, and 
works on any type of Wi-Fi enabled devices.   
     According to Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro 
(2011), Kim et al. (2012), Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Lanze et al. (2014), Hsu et al. (2015), 
Szongott et al. (2015), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), and Nakhila et al. (2015), a client-side 
evil twin detection solution must warn the end user of an evil twin attack immediately in 
real time, before any data is transmitted, to avert being exposed to the attacker in the 
least, even when the attack may last for a short period of time.  Song et al. (2010, 2012) 
found that evil twin attacks are hard to trace, because they can suddenly and randomly be 
launched and shut down, and last only for a short time after the attacker achieves his goal.  
Nakhila et al. (2015) indicated that once the attack has been detected, it is very 
challenging to identify which AP is rogue and which is legitimate because both provide 
Internet access that could have comparable quality.  Furthermore, Hossen & Wenyuan 
(2014) claims that after the attack has been detected, their method allows the wireless 
users to connect to a legitimate AP.  However, Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) did not 
include this in their algorithm.  Additionally, Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) and Nakhila et 
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al. (2015) assume that all the APs will be detected in the initial wireless network scanning 
and that they will be able to associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network, which 
in practice is not always the case. All the studies assume that the attacker is already in the 
hotspot and is connected when the wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi network.  
None of the studies addresses the case where the attacker appears later in the hotspot.  
Existing solutions do not protect the public Wi-Fi users for the duration of the Wi-Fi 
connection, discovering and reporting on new mobile evil twin access points.  
Additionally, all existing client-side approaches assume that the user has not connected to 
the target public Wi-Fi network in the past.  According to Kumar & Paul (2016), the 
operating system stores the SSID and BSSID with which it was previously connected to 
in the client’s preferred network list, and it is always in the exploration of the same and 
whenever detects attempts to connect to it.  Therefore, the client will automatically 
connect to a potential evil twin AP when using the public Wi-Fi hotspot.  The detection 
system developed as part of this study warns the wireless user of an evil twin attack 
before any traffic is transmitted and in addition, after evil twin detection, the system 
connects the user to a legitimate AP.  The detection system also protects the users while 
they are connected to the public Wi-Fi network.  The detection system protects the users 
when they have connected to a previous target network in the past.  Lastly, the detection 
system protects the user in the case that not all the APs are detected in the initial wireless 
network scanning and when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the public 
Wi-Fi network.   
     Han et al.’ (2009, 2011), Song et al.’ (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro’ (2011), Kim et 
al.’ (2012), Nikbakhsh et al.’ (2012), Lanze et al.’ (2014), Hsu et al.’ (2015), Szongott et 
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al.’ (2015), Hossen & Wenyuan’ (2014), and Nakhila et al.’ (2015) solutions work with 
free open public Wi-Fi networks.  Monica & Ribeiro (2011) and Hsu et al. (2015) 
indicated in their studies that the evil twin attack is usually launched at public places 
where open Wi-Fi networks are available.  Public Wi-Fi hotspots are ideal networks as 
there is no way for the users to distinguish rogue from legitimate APs (Abdollah, 2007).  
The detection system developed as part of this study works with free open (unencrypted) 
public Wi-Fi networks. 
     Han et al. (2009, 2011) and Song et al. (2010, 2012) indicated that client-side evil twin 
detection methods must be resistant to environment change and consider influencing 
factors such as network saturation and receive signal strengths fluctuation.  If the 
workload of the legitimate AP is extremely heavy, this may adversely affect the response 
time and lead to incorrect rogue AP detection.  The time difference between legitimate 
and evil twin scenarios becomes less distinguishable.  According to Song et al. (2010, 
2012), when multiple devices synchronously attempt to send packets to the same AP, 
medium access collisions emerge and spur the phenomenon of network saturation. This 
phenomenon stochastically increases the time for transmitting packets from a client to the 
AP. According to Monica & Ribeiro (2011), in multi-hop wireless networks, especially 
with high traffic load, packet losses are frequent.  The detection system developed as part 
of this study is technology independent (e.g. received signal strength fluctuation, network 
saturation, or network traffic conditions).   
     Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) and Nakhila et al. (2015) assumed that the BSSID of a 
hotspot legitimate AP is unique and use that as a reference to switch between different 
APs with the same SSID in the hotspot.  According to Szongott et al. (2015), Lanze et al. 
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(2014), and Kumar and Paul (2016), SSIDs and BSSIDs can easily be spoofed by an 
attacker as the legitimate AP always transmits the SSID and the BSSID.  Further, Nakhila 
et al. (2015) method will not work when the evil twin AP is in a different subnet from the 
legitimate AP.  The detection system developed as part of this study considers the 
scenario when the attacker uses the same SSID, BSSID, and subnet of a hotspot 
legitimate AP. 
     Most of the existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions have been 
evaluated at small scales and in lab environments.  Additionally, Han et al. (2009, 2011) 
evaluated their method at two universities in the United States and China.  Song et al. 
(2010, 2012) evaluated their method at one university in the United States.  Monica & 
Ribeiro’s (2011) method was evaluated at one university.  Kim et al.’s (2012) study was 
evaluated at cafes and universities but details were not provided.  Nikbakhsh et al.’s 
(2012) method was evaluated in neither a lab nor the field.  Lanze et al.’s (2014) method 
was evaluated solely in a lab.  Hsu et al. ‘s (2015) method was evaluated at a university.  
Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) evaluated their method at thirty locations, among them 
restaurants, cafes, universities and airports in the United States and China.  Nakhila et 
al.’s (2015) method was evaluated in a lab.  Szongott et al.’s (2015) evaluated their 
method in a lab using a simulator with real-world data. All the studies used their own evil 
twin APs on evaluation.  None of the studies have been evaluated in hotel public Wi-Fi 
environments and aimed at detecting real evil twin APs.  The detection system developed 
as part of this study was evaluated extensively in a lab and at a hotel (public Wi-Fi 
hotspot) in Ecuador.  The detection system aimed at detecting real evil twin APs.  Since 
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no mobile evil twin APs were detected in the wild during the field evaluation period, the 
author proceeded to evaluate the artifact with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab. 
     Han et al.’ (2009, 2011), Song et al.’ (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro’ (2011), Kim et 
al.’ (2012), Hossen & Wenyuan’ (2014), and Hsu et al.’ (2015) solutions were evaluated 
for performance (effectiveness and efficiency).  Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) ISP-based 
solution was based on the attacker using cellular broadband connection as the network 
gateway.  Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) did not measure the artifact’s effectiveness in a 
controlled environment, but instead in an uncontrolled environment.  In their study, 
Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) provided comprehensive metrics for the performance 
evaluation of their client-side detection method using the following standard metrics: (a) 
Accuracy indicates how accurately the method detects evil twin AP attacks; (b) Precision 
is the fraction of positively detected attacks to all positively detected attacks (correctly of 
incorrectly); and (c) Recall (also called in the literature True Positive Rate or TPR) is the 
fraction of positively detected attacks to all attacks that should be positively detected.  To 
calculate these metrics, Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) used True Positive (TP), True 
Negative (TN), False Positive (FP), and False Negative (FN).  The TP and TN represent 
correct classification, and FP and FN represent incorrect classification.  In regards to 
efficiency, Hossen and Wenyuan’s time delay analysis included both detection of evil 
twin APs that use mobile Internet as the access network for connecting to the Internet and 
detection of evil twin APs that use the legitimate AP for Internet access.  Additionally, 
only DHCP configuration time information was provided.  Association time was not 
included in their calculations.  Also, time information on the rest of the algorithm steps 
were not provided.  Hossen & Wenyuan claimed that connection to a legitimate AP was 
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included in their time delay analysis; however, Hossen & Wenyuan did not include this 
step in their detection algorithm.  Information on all the factors impacting efficiency was 
not included in their time delay analysis.  Lastly, it is not clear whether the time delay 
calculation included data collection, detection, and connection to a legitimate AP after 
detection; data collection and detection; or only detection.  Nakhila et al.’s time delay 
technique provided a complete list of measurements and factors impacting efficiency.  
The detection system developed as part of this study was evaluated for performance 
effectiveness using Hossen & Wenyuan (2014)’s evaluation technique and Nakhila et 
al.’s technique was leveraged to improve upon Hossen and Wenyuan’s to measure time 
delay.   
     Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro (2011), Lanze et 
al. (2014), Nakhila et al. (2015), and Hsu et al. (2015) developed their client-side 
detection solutions using a laptop platform.  Han et al. (2009, 2011), Monica & Ribeiro 
(2011), and Nakhila et al. (2015) used Linux OS.  Hsu et al. (2015) used Windows 7.  
Nakhila et al. (2015) used C language.  Szongott et al. (2015) used Java.  Kim et al. 
(2012) and Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) developed their client-side detection solutions 
using a smartphone platform with Android OS.  The client-side evil twin attack detection 
system discussed in this study was constructed in a prototype environment to support 
public Wi-Fi users.  The detection system central to this study was built on a laptop 
platform with Linux OS and Java.    
     Appendix A shows existing studies requirements and limitations mapping based on 
the literature review. 
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     Building an effective client-side evil twin attack detection artifact required that 
procedures and specifications based on DSR principles be developed to guide the 
successful construction, implementation, and evaluation of this type of artifact.  These 
DSR principles that are grounded in design theory are important because according to  
Venable (2006), theory building occurs before, during, throughout, and at the end and as 
a result of DSR.  According to Venable (2006), theory building in DSR begins with the 
spark of an idea, a nascent concept for a not-yet-existing (or not-yet-applied) technology 
as the solution for a problem or type of problem. This spark of an idea may come from 
(1) recombining ideas and conceptualizations of problem spaces; (2) realizing new 
possibilities for solutions; (3) recombining existing solutions/technologies; (4) imagining 
new technologies; and (5) realizing new applications for existing technologies. 
     Hevner et al.’s (2004) study states that artifacts are not exempt from behavioral 
theories.  To the contrary, the creation of design artifacts relies on existing kernel theories 
that are applied, tested, modified, and extended through the experience, creativity, 
intuition, and problem solving capabilities of the researcher (Markus et al., 2002; Walls et 
al., 1992). 
     According to Gregor and Jones (2007), an IS design theory is something in an abstract 
world of man-made things, including abstract ideas such as models and algorithms. 
Gregor and Jones (2007) further indicate that a design theory instantiated would have a 
physical existence in the real world.  According to their research, theories for design and 
action continue to be highly influential in IS, despite the fact that they are not always 
recognized as theories.  Gregor and Jones (2007) stated that the main the characteristic of 
theories for design and action is that they focus on “how to do something” providing 
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specific guidelines on how to design and develop an IT artifact such as a client-side evil 
twin attack detection artifact constructed as part of this study.  In their work, Gregor and 
Jones (2007) emphasized the importance of design work and design knowledge to be 
expressed as theory when building IT artifacts such as a client-side detection system. 
     The work of Gregor and Jones (2007) indicates that IS design theory shows the 
principles inherent in the design of an IT artifact that accomplishes some end, based on 
knowledge of both IT and human behavior. Gregor and Jones (2007) further indicate that 
as the word “design” is both a noun and a verb, a theory can be about both the principles 
underlying the form of the design and also about the act of implementing the design in 
the real world.  According to Gregor and Jones (2007), any design theory should include 
the following components: (1) the purpose and scope; (2) the constructs; (3) the 
principles of form and function; (4) the artifact mutability; (5) testable propositions; (6) 
justificatory knowledge; (7) principles of implementation; and (8) expository 
instantiation.  Table 4 describes each of the eight components of a design theory in the 
context of this study. 
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Table 4 
 
Eight Components of Information Systems Design Theory 
 
Component Description 
1. Purpose and Scope 
 
The system will be used to provide traveling 
wireless users with a client-side detection tool to 
detect mobile evil twin attacks during their 
connection to free open public Wi-Fi networks. 
 
2. Constructs 
 
The system will help users detect mobile evil 
twin attacks and protect them during their 
connection to free open public Wi-Fi networks. 
 
3. Principle of Form and Function 
 
The system will be designed to detect and protect 
public Wi-Fi users from mobile evil twin attacks 
by providing them with a client-side detection 
tool. 
 
4. Artifact Mutability 
 
Suggestions for improving the system will be 
given for future work. 
 
5. Testable propositions 
 
How effective and efficient is the client side 
system in detecting mobile evil twin attacks in 
hotel public spaces? 
6. Justificatory Knowledge 
 
The proposed system will be based on design 
science theory from design sciences that 
provides an explanation for the design. 
 
7. Principles of Implementation 
 
The system will be implemented in a lab and in 
the field using the following steps: (1) establish 
system objectives; (2) define system 
functionality; (3) develop the system; and (4) 
evaluate the system. 
 
8. Expository Instantiation 
 
Examples of the client-side system in action will 
be provided to help explain the design and 
illustrate how the system function.   
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     Gregor and Hevner’s (2013) study indicates that theory is seen as an abstract entity, an 
intermeshed set of statements about relationships among constructs that aims to describe, 
explain, enhance understanding of, and, in some cases, predict the future (Gregor 2006).  
The type of theory that formalizes knowledge in DSR is termed design theory, the fifth of 
the five types of theory in Gregor’s taxonomy. This type of theory gives prescriptions for 
design and action, it says how to do something such as building a client-side evil twin 
detection artifact.  
     Peffers et al.’s (2008) design methodology would provide guidance for IS researchers 
to produce and present DS research in IS that is recognized as valuable, rigorous, and 
publishable in IS research outlets. For DS research, a methodology would include 
three elements: (a) conceptual principles to define what is meant by DS research; (b) 
practice rules; and (c) a process for carrying out and presenting the research.  According 
to Gregor (2006), a design methodology can build on particular idiographic studies of 
what has worked in practice, on predictive relationships that are known but not fully 
understood, and on fully developed theories such as those relating to data representation 
or human behavior.  Along the same thread, Gregor and Hevner (2013), stated in their 
study that the Peffers et al. research process offers a useful synthesized general model, 
building on other approaches. 
     Table 5 presents some examples of how DSR has been used in Security research. 
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Table 5 
 
How DSR has been used in IS 
 
Article Knowledge Contribution 
Repairing trust in an e-commerce 
and security context: an agent-based 
modeling approach (Choi and 
Nazareth, 2014) 
This study examines whether customers are 
willing to transact with an eCommerce vendor 
in light of security and trust violations. 
A secure portable execution 
environment to support teleworking 
(James and Griffiths, 2013) 
This study presents the design, development and 
trialing of the mobile execution environment 
(MEE), a secure portable execution environment 
designed to support secure teleworking. 
Snakes and ladders for digital 
natives: information security 
education for the youth (Reid and 
Van Niekerk, 2013) 
This study presents and evaluates a brain-
compatible, information security educational 
game that can be used to introduce information 
security concepts to the youth from a very 
young age. 
Secure activity resource 
coordination: empirical evidence of 
enhanced security awareness in 
designing secure business processes 
(D’Aubeterre, Singh, and Iyer, 2008) 
This study examines the gap between systems 
development and systems security and develops 
an artifact that can be used to create business 
process models characterized by the secure 
exchange of information within and across 
organizational boundaries. 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
     In Chapter two, the study emphasizes the identification of literature that expounds on 
what is already known about the problem and synthesizing the literature to identify 
potential solutions that support the problem statement and research questions. The 
chapter began with the justification for the study by selecting papers for the review based 
on relevancy to design science, client-side evil twin detection systems, wireless security, 
and need for security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots.  The chapter then formed the 
summarization of existing studies based on the four main topic areas of (a) wireless 
security; (b) need for security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots; (c) existing client-side 
evil twin detection solutions; and (d) DSR principles and methodology.  The chapter 
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further identified the strengths and weaknesses as well as gaps in the literature reviewed 
as they related to the four main topic areas and the problem statement. The overall goal of 
the literature review was met by synthesizing the foundational studies that were used to 
guide the development of a client-side evil twin attack detection system for wireless users 
to independently detect and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks while using 
free open public Wi-Fi hotspots.  The design science research literature helped with the 
creation of DSR principles, procedures and specifications that supported the artifact 
construction, implementation, and evaluation of the client-side evil twin attack detection 
system that is central to the study.    
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Chapter 3 
 
Methodology 
 
Overview of Research Methodology 
     To address the research problem and the methodology of how to accomplish the stated 
goal of designing and building a more effective, efficient, and practical client-side artifact 
to be used to detect mobile evil twin attacks, the author utilized a two phased research 
approach.  In phase one, the author developed design principles, procedures and 
specifications to guide the design, construction, implementation, and evaluation of the 
prototype client-side evil twin detection artifact using Hevner’s seven guidelines of DSR, 
Peffer’s design science research methodology (DSRM), and Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) 
study evaluation methodology.  In phase two, the author extensively evaluated the 
performance of the client-side evil twin attack detection method by implementing a 
prototype system.  The prototype system was implemented and evaluated in two 
environments.  First, in a lab to analyze the requirements and demonstrate its 
effectiveness in a controlled environment.  Second, in the field at a hotel public Wi-Fi 
hotspot to extensively evaluate the robustness of the system in practice.  The prototype 
system aimed at detecting real mobile evil twin APs in the wild at a hotel property that 
provide free open public Wi-Fi in its public spaces.  Since no mobile evil twin APs were 
detected during the field evaluation period, the author proceeded to evaluate the system 
with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.  Hotel public Wi-Fi users spend a 
significant amount of time in hotel public spaces, also called social lobbies. Social 
lobbies define areas open to the public and contiguous to hotels’ main lobbies. In these 
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lobbies, hotels provide amenities and services like free Wi-Fi, comfortable chairs, waiter 
service, restaurant, a bar, and coffee shop (Kelley, 2012).   
     The techniques to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the system were based 
on Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) evaluation methodology which has been published and 
validated.  Nakhila et al.’s technique was leveraged to improve upon Hossen and 
Wenyuan’s to measure time delay.  The client-side evil twin detection method developed 
as part of this dissertation was tested against Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) method for 
detecting mobile evil twin attacks.  The experiments aimed at showing that the detection 
system developed can detect mobile evil twin attacks more effectively and efficiently. 
 
Design Science Research Guidelines      
     To conduct, evaluate and present this research, the author used the seven guidelines 
for design science in information systems research developed by Hevner et al. (2004).  
The seven guidelines were reviewed and mapped to enable the development of the client-
side evil twin attack detection system at the center of this study.  The seven guidelines of 
Hevner et al. are based on the fundamental principle of design-science research that 
knowledge and understanding of a design problem and its solution are achieved in the 
building and application of a designed artifact in the form of a construct (vocabulary and 
symbols), model (abstractions and representations), method (algorithms and practices), or 
an instantiation (implemented and prototype systems).  The seven design guidelines of 
Hevner et al. provide a structure to demonstrate the IS artifact via evaluation methods.  
Hevner et al.’s research indicates that the IT artifact defines the ideas, practices, technical 
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capabilities, and products through which the analysis, design, implementation, and 
evaluation of information systems can be effectively accomplished. 
 
Guideline 1: Design as an Artifact 
     The result of a design-science IS research is a purposeful IT artifact created to address 
an important research problem.  In support of guideline number one, this report  
developed a more effective, efficient, and practical client-side evil twin attack detection 
system for wireless users to independently detect and protect themselves from mobile evil 
twin attacks while using free open public Wi-Fi hotspots.  Additionally, it provided the 
framework to facilitate the design, implementation, and evaluation of an effective 
prototype client-side detection system to detect mobile evil twin attacks in hotel public 
Wi-Fi environments.  A recent study conducted by Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) indicated 
that a client-side detection solution must be able to verify an AP in a hotspot and thus 
cannot assume any custom infrastructure support (e.g. hardware or software).  Hossen & 
Wenyuan (2014) further stated that designing a solution with infrastructure support 
would require hotspot owners to modify hotspots, which is unlikely to happen because 
most hotspots are free services.  According to Kim et al.’ (2012) and Nikbakhsh et al.’ 
(2012) studies, to guarantee usability and availability to the client, a client-side detection 
method must discover evil twin APs using their Wi-Fi enabled devices (e.g. laptops, 
smartphones, tablets, etc.) without extra devices.  Although this study leveraged some of 
the key features of Hossen and Wenyuan’s (2014) method, its main focus was on 
improving its limitations with a novel approach.  The prototype developed as part of this 
study is multi-vendor and open source. 
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Guideline 2:  Problem Relevance 
     The key objective of IS research is to acquire knowledge and understanding that 
enable the development of technology-based solutions to important and unsolved 
business problems.  Design science delivers on this objective through the construction of 
innovative artifacts intended to change the phenomena that occur.  The technology-based 
solution that addresses the problem in this report is the primary motivation of the study 
and potentially impacts wireless security protection in hotel free open public Wi-Fi since 
the artifact is specifically designed to help wireless users to independently detect mobile 
evil twin attacks.  Thus, the IT artifact constructed as part of this study helps solve a 
business problem by equipping traveling users with a client-side detection system to 
protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks in hotel free open public Wi-Fi 
networks. 
 
Guideline 3:  Design Evaluation 
     The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact must be rigorously demonstrated 
via well executed evaluation methods.  According to Hevner et al. (2004), because design 
is inherently an iterative and incremental activity, the evaluation phase provides essential 
feedback to the construction phase as to the quality of the design process and the design 
product under development.  Hevner et al. (2004) identified five design evaluation 
methods to evaluate artifacts: (a) observational (case study or field study); (b) analytical 
(static analysis, architecture analysis, optimization, or dynamic analysis); (c) 
experimental (controlled experiment or simulation); (d) testing (functional (black box) 
testing or structural (white box) testing); and (e) descriptive (informed argument or 
scenarios).  To evaluate the artifact in depth in a hotel environment, the author used 
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Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study evaluation methodology that has been published and 
validated. 
 
Guideline 4:  Research Contributions 
     Effective design-science research must provide clear contributions in the areas of the 
design artifact, design construction knowledge, and/or design evaluation knowledge. 
Design-science research holds the potential for three types of research 
contributions based on the novelty, generality, and significance of the designed artifact. 
Hevner et al. (2004) indicates that in a given research project, one or more of these 
contributions must be found: (1) the design artifact (it must enable the solution 
of unsolved problems and extend the knowledge base or apply existing knowledge in new 
and innovative ways); (2) foundations (the creative development of novel, appropriately 
evaluated constructs, models, methods, or instantiations); and/or (3) methodologies (the 
creative development and use of evaluation methods and new evaluation metrics). 
     Hevner et al. (2004) stated in their research that artifacts must accurately represent the 
business and technology environments used in research and must be “implementable”, 
hence the importance of instantiating design science artifacts. In other words, the artifact 
must demonstrate a clear contribution to the business environment, solving an important, 
previously unsolved problem.  In this study, the artifact adds value to the hotels because 
it potentially provides a client-side evil twin detection solution to help users of hotel free 
open public Wi-Fi to independently detect mobile evil twin attacks and connect them 
only to legitimate APs while using Wi-Fi at hotel public spaces. 
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Guideline 5:  Research Rigor 
     Rigor addresses the way in which research is conducted. DSR requires the application 
of rigorous methods in both the construction and evaluation of the designed artifact. 
According to Hevner et al. (2004), rigor is derived from the effective use of the 
knowledge base and success is predicated on the researcher’s selection of appropriate 
techniques to construct an artifact and the selection of appropriate means to evaluate the 
artifact.  Hevner et al. (2004) indicates the construction of effective metrics is an 
important part of DSR and that researchers must constantly assess the appropriateness of 
their metrics.  In this study, the artifact construction used design procedures and 
specifications based on DSR to provide Wi-Fi users with a client-side detection system to 
independently detect mobile evil twin attacks while connected to hotel public Wi-Fi 
spaces.  After design and construction, the artifact was evaluated extensively for 
performance effectiveness in a lab and a hotel using the following performance metrics 
(Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014): (a) Accuracy indicates how accurately the method detects 
evil twin AP attacks; (b) Precision is the fraction of positively detected attacks to all 
positively detected attacks (correctly or incorrectly); and (c) Recall (also called in the 
literature True Positive Rate or TPR) is the fraction of positively detected attacks to all 
attacks that should be positively detected.  To calculate these metrics, the author used 
True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP), and False Negative (FN).  
The TP and TN represent correct classification, and FP and FN represent incorrect 
classification.   
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Guideline 6:  Design a Search Process 
     Design is essentially a search process to discover an effective solution to a problem. 
Problem solving can be viewed as utilizing available means to reach desired ends while 
satisfying laws existing in the environment. Means are the set of actions and resources 
available to construct a solution. Ends represent goals and constraints on the solution. 
Laws are uncontrollable forces in the environment (Hevner et al., 2004). Effective design 
requires knowledge of both the application domain (e.g., requirements and constraints) 
and the solution domain (e.g., technical and organizational).  In this study, the author 
described the search process in terms of iteratively identifying limitations in existing 
client-side detection solutions and creatively developing a solution to address them.  The 
author employed design principles, procedures and specifications based on DSR to 
facilitate construction, implementation and evaluation of a client-side evil twin attack 
detection system. 
 
Guideline 7:  Communication of Research 
     DSR must be presented both to technology-oriented as well as management-
oriented audiences. According to Hevner et al. (2004), technology-oriented 
audiences need sufficient detail to enable the described artifact to be constructed and used 
within an appropriate organizational context. This allows end users to test and enjoy the 
benefits offered by the artifact and it enables researchers to build a cumulative 
knowledge base for further extension and evaluation. Additionally, the audiences should 
also understand the methods in which the artifact was constructed and evaluated. This 
creates repeatability of the research project and builds the knowledge base for further 
research extensions by design-science researchers in IS.  Management-oriented audiences 
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need sufficient detail to determine if the organizational resources should be committed to 
constructing and using the artifact within their specific organizational context (Hevner et 
al., 2004).  The client-side evil twin detection system design, construction, 
implementation, and evaluation process developed in this study is communicated in the 
form of a solution manual attached as an appendix in this dissertation report. 
 
Specific Research Methods 
Design Science Research Methodology 
     The DRSM used to tackle the research problem as well as the design procedures and 
specifications used to construct the artifact in this study was resultant of design science 
principles using an organized method for building client-side detection architecture 
addressing the problem.  Considering a mixing and condensing of design science process 
elements synthesized from the literature review, a set of design procedures and 
specifications were developed based on DSR principles and methodologies that were 
used to enable the construction, implementation, and evaluation of the client-side 
detection artifact.  The overall goal was to evolve the emergent DSR into design 
application that was lifted and used to direct the construction and evaluation of the 
artifact. 
     According to Peffers et al. (2008), a DS research methodology would include 
three elements: conceptual principles to define what is meant by design science research, 
practice rules, and a process or procedure for carrying out and presenting the research. 
Hevner et al. (2004) introduced principles that define what DS research is, and what goals 
it should pursue, as well as practice rules (guidelines) that provide guidance for 
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conducting it. The missing part was a process or procedure (methodology) that provides a 
generally accepted framework for carrying out research (Peffers et al., 2008).   
     Peffers et al.’s (2008) DSR methodology (DSRM) based on Hevner et al.’s DSR 
principles was adopted for carrying out this study.  Peffers et al.’s (2008) DSRM 
incorporates principles, practices, and procedures and meets three objectives: it is 
consistent with prior DSR literature, it provides a nominal process model for doing DS 
research, and it provides a mental model for presenting and evaluating DS research in IS.  
According to Peffers et al. (2008), a mental model for the conduct and presentation of DS 
research will help researchers to conduct it effectively.  Peffers et al. (2008) stated that “a 
mental model is a "small-scale model" of reality that can be constructed from perception, 
imagination, or the comprehension of discourse” (p. 10).  Table 6 illustrates a model for 
the construction process of the artifact reported in this study guided by Hevner et al.’s 
DSR principles literature that was used to answer the study research questions.  Figure 6 
illustrates the design topology for this study. 
     Based on Peffers et al.’s DSRM, a set of design procedures and specifications were 
developed to facilitate the client-side evil twin attack artifact construction, 
implementation, and evaluation phases.  Table 7 shows an outline of the knowledge base 
principles that were followed during each phase. 
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Table 6 
Artifact Construction Methods and Technologies Associated with Hevner’s Design 
Principles 
Hevner’s design         
principles 
Methods Technologies 
1. The research must 
produce an artifact created 
to address a problem. 
 
5. Rigor must be applied 
in both the construction of 
the artifact and its 
evaluation. 
 
 Apply design 
principles to the 
design and 
construction of the 
prototype system 
 Procure the network 
devices, laptops, 
smartphone, and 
software 
 Assemble and 
interconnect devices 
based on design 
topology 
 Install and configure 
Linux, Java SE 
Development Kit 
(JDK), Netbeans 
IDE, and Wireshark 
on client laptop 
 Install and configure 
Kali Linux 
(Aircrack-ng) and 
Hostapd on ETA 
laptop 
 Configure Android 
Mobile Hotspot & 
Tethering on 
smartphone 
 Apply class C 
logical addressing 
scheme to devices 
across the topology 
 Test connectivity 
through the use of 
the ping and 
traceroute utilities 
 Develop client-side 
detection system  
 Test algorithm and 
Repeat 
 Visio 
 Cisco Router 
 Cisco LAN Switch 
 Cisco Wireless 
Controller 
 Cisco Access Points 
 Lenovo laptops 
 Motorola Android 
smartphone 
 Linux Centos OS 
 Java SE 
Development Kit 
(JDK) 
 Netbeans IDE 
 Wireshark packet 
analyzer 
 Kali Linux 
(Aircrack-ng) 
 Hostapd 
 Android Mobile 
Hotspot & Tethering 
 Cat5e cables 
 USB wireless 
adapter 
 Ping and Traceroute 
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Figure 6. Design topology.  
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Table 7 
 
Peffers’ DSRM Activity combined with Activity Description and Knowledge Base 
Principles 
DSRM Activity Activity Description Knowledge Base 
Principles 
1. Problem identification 
and motivation 
The need for client-side 
detection systems that will 
allow wireless users to 
protect against mobile evil 
twin attacks while using 
free open (unencrypted) 
public Wi-Fi. 
Literature review to 
understand the problem’s 
relevance, existing 
solutions, and limitations. 
2. Define the objectives 
for a solution  
1. The system must not be 
based on timing or 
traceroute. 
2. The system must protect 
users from attackers that 
utilize a different gateway 
from a legitimate access 
point (mobile attack). 
3. The system must not 
require network 
administrator assistance or 
privileges. 
4. The system must be 
automated with no 
intervention from users. 
5. The system must not 
require knowledge of 
wireless hotspots 
infrastructure, AP list 
and/or user/hosts (trained 
knowledge). 
6. The system must not 
require any additional 
equipment or custom 
infrastructure support. 
7. The system must 
leverage public servers. 
  
Literature review to help 
define the objectives. 
  (continued) 
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DSRM Activity Activity Description Knowledge Base 
Principles 
 8. The system must work 
on any type of 802.11-
based wireless networks.  
9. The system must work 
with Wi-Fi enabled 
devices. 
10. The system must work 
with free open 
(unencrypted) public Wi-Fi 
networks. 
11. The system must be 
technology independent. 
12.  The system must 
protect the user when the 
attacker sets up the mobile 
evil twin AP with the same 
SSID, BSSID, and subnet 
of a legitimate AP. 
13.  The system must 
protect the user when the 
attacker blocks access to 
the public website used to 
get ISP information. 
14.  The system must 
protect the user when the 
attacker presents an invalid 
certificate while retrieving 
ISP information from 
public website. 
15.  The system must 
protect the user when not 
all the hotspots APs with 
the desired SSID are 
detected during the initial 
wireless network scanning 
and also when the client is 
not able to associate to all 
the APs in the public Wi-Fi 
network.  
 
  (continued) 
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DSRM Activity Activity Description Knowledge Base 
Principles 
 16.  The system must 
protect the users whether 
or not they have connected 
to a free open public Wi-Fi 
network in the past. 
17. The system must 
protect the user while they 
are connected to the public 
Wi-Fi network. 
18. The system must warn 
the user of an evil twin 
attack before any traffic is 
transmitted. 
19. The system, after 
detection, must connect the 
user to a legitimate AP. 
20.  The system must be 
evaluated in the lab and in 
the field. 
21.  The system must aim 
at detecting real evil twin 
APs. 
22. The system must be 
evaluated for performance 
using standard metrics. 
 
 
3. Design and 
development 
Design and construction of 
the system. 
Application of principles, 
methods, and technologies 
to create the artifact. 
4. Demonstration Demonstrate the use of the 
system in the lab.  
Indicate how the system 
can be used in hotel 
environments to solve the 
problem. 
 
 
(continued) 
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DSRM Activity Activity Description Knowledge Base 
Principles 
5. Evaluation Evaluate the performance 
of the system at a hotel: 
How effective and efficient 
is the client-side system in 
detecting mobile evil twin 
attacks in hotel public 
spaces. 
Evaluation technique from 
literature review to 
evaluate the artifact. 
6. Communication Communicate the problem 
and its importance for 
replication in hotel 
environments. 
Knowledge of hospitality 
environments related to 
client-side evil twin attack 
detection systems. 
 
 
     The proposed design methodology presented on Figure 7 is based on Peffers et al.’s 
(2008) DSRM and was used as a model to document the design procedures and 
specifications that guided the construction of the client-side evil twin attack detection 
system in this study. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Proposed Design Methodology. 
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     Based on Hevner et al.’s (2004) DSR principles 3 and 5, Table 8 presents the methods 
and techniques that were leveraged to collect and analyze data to show the effectiveness 
of the artifact. 
Table 8 
 
Artifact Effectiveness Evaluation Methods Associated with Hevner’s Design Principles 
 
 
Hevner’s design         
principles 
Methods to collect data Techniques to analyze data 
3. The utility, quality, and 
efficacy of a design 
artifact must be rigorously 
demonstrated via well 
executed evaluation 
methods. 
 
5. Rigor must be applied 
in both the construction of 
the artifact and its 
evaluation. 
 
 Evaluation 
Methodology 
(Hossen & 
Wenyuan, 2014)  
 Wireshark packet 
analyzer 
 Researcher-
participant approach 
(Richey & Klein, 
2007) 
 
 Performance 
analysis metrics: (a) 
Accuracy; (b) 
Precision; and (c) 
Recall (Hossen & 
Wenyuan, 2014) 
 
   
 
Design Procedures and Specifications 
     Based on previous chapters and sections of this study, design procedures and 
specifications derived from Hevner et al.’s (2004), Peffers et al.’s (2008), and Hossen & 
Wenyuan’s (2014) including technologies, procedures, and techniques required to guide 
the design, construction, implementation, and evaluation of the client-side evil twin 
attack detection artifact otherwise known as CSMETAD (Client-Side Mobile Evil Twin 
Attack Detection) system at the center of this study are presented in Table 9. 
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Table 9 
 
Design Procedures and Specifications 
 
 
Specifications Procedures Techniques Technologies 
1. Design the 
artifact (physical 
and logical 
diagrams) 
 
Apply DSR derived 
principles to guide 
the design of the 
client-side ETA 
detection system 
 
Apply Industry 
Best Practice to 
design the client-
side ETA 
detection system 
Microsoft Visio 
2. Develop artifact 
specifications 
Apply DSR derived 
principles to guide 
the development of 
the client-side ETA 
detection system 
specifications 
 
Resources 
calculation for 
network, laptops 
and smartphone 
Laptops, 
smartphone and 
network devices 
specifications 
 
 
3. Procure 
equipment for 
client-side evil twin 
attack detection 
system 
 
Order equipment Review equipment 
specs and pricing 
MS Word (Bill of 
Materials) 
(continued) 
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Specifications Procedures Techniques Technologies 
4. Build and 
configure the client-
side ETA detection 
system 
Assemble and 
interconnect network 
devices 
Install and configure 
Linux, JDK, Netbeans 
IDE and Wireshark on 
client laptop 
Install and configure 
Kali Linux (Aircrack-
ng) and Hostapd on 
ETA laptop 
Configure Android 
Hotspot & Tethering 
on smartphone 
Apply class C logical 
addressing scheme to 
devices across the 
topology 
Develop client-side 
evil twin attack 
detection system 
Apply Industry 
Best Practice to 
develop the 
client-side ETA 
detection system  
Wireless client 
laptop 
Linux, JDK, 
Netbeans IDE, 
Wireshark 
ETA laptop   
Kali Linux 
(Aircrack-ng), 
Hostapd 
Smartphone 
Android mobile 
hotspot & tethering 
LAN Router 
LAN Switch 
Wireless Controller 
Wireless Access 
Points 
Ethernet cables 
USB wireless 
adapter 
 
 
    
5. Test client-side 
ETA detection 
system 
 
Test local 
connectivity and 
Algorithm 
Network utility 
commands 
Test cases 
TCP/IP Utilities 
Ping 
Traceroute 
Ifconfig 
Netbeans IDE 
System standard 
output 
 
 
6. Evaluate the 
performance 
effectiveness of the 
client-side ETA 
detection system in 
the lab and a hotel 
 
Test algorithm and 
repeat 
Researcher-
participant 
approach 
Monitor and 
analyze data 
captured using 
performance 
metrics 
Netbeans IDE 
System standard 
output 
Wireshark packet 
analyzer 
 
 
7. Communicate the 
process for 
replication across 
Academia 
Create and publish Solution manual 
attached to 
dissertation 
appendix 
Publish dissertation 
– Nova ProQuest 
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Artifact Design  
 
     The Client-Side Mobile Evil Twin Attack Detection (CSMETAD) system was 
designed based on Hevner’s principle 5 through the application of rigorous design 
methods.  
     The design requirements, assumptions, and framework used to build the CSMETAD 
system were based on a thorough review of the literature and improved to address 
limitations in existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions.  The certified 
equipment included in Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study was replaced for the 
CSMETAD system to expand and provide protection to traveling users that utilize a 
different mobile platform and operating system in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots. 
Design Requirements 
 
     CSMETAD fulfills the following requirements: 
1. It protects users from attackers that use a different gateway from a legitimate AP 
(mobile attack). 
2. It protects users whether or not they have connected to a free open public Wi-Fi 
network in the past. 
3. It protects users when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are detected 
during the initial wireless network scanning. 
4. It protects users when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the public 
Wi-Fi network. 
5. It protects users when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same 
SSID, BSSID (MAC address), and subnet of a legitimate AP. 
6. It protects users when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get ISP 
information. 
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7. It protects users when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving ISP 
information from a public website. 
8. After mobile evil twin AP attack detection, it connects users to a legitimate AP. 
9. It protects users for the duration of the public Wi-Fi connection, discovering and 
reporting on new mobile evil twin access points. 
10. It is evaluated in the wild aiming to detect real mobile evil twin APs.  In the case of 
not detecting real mobile evil twin APs during the field evaluation period, it is 
evaluated with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab. 
11. It is not based on timing or traceroute. 
12. It does not require any additional equipment. 
13. It does not require modification of the hotspot network infrastructure (custom 
infrastructure support). 
14. It does not require trained knowledge of the target wireless hotspots infrastructure. 
15. It is automated with no intervention from users. 
Design Assumptions 
 
     The following are assumptions while designing CSMETAD: 
1. The user may or may not have connected to the public Wi-Fi network in the past.   
2. The wireless network client does not have any prior knowledge about the public Wi-
Fi hotspot infrastructure. 
3. The wireless network client may or may not able to detect all the public Wi-Fi 
hotspot APs with the desired SSID during the initial wireless network scanning. 
4. The wireless network client may or may not be able to associate to all the APs in the 
public Wi-Fi network. 
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5. The public Wi-Fi hotspot provides free open (unencrypted) Wi-Fi access in its public 
spaces. 
6. The public Wi-Fi hotspot supports a DHCP server that assigns dynamically network 
parameters to the clients (e.g. IP address, subnet mask, gateway, DNS, etc.). 
7. The public Wi-Fi hotspot uses multiple AP architecture in which multiple APs 
support multiple wireless clients.  All of the APs have the same SSID so that wireless 
users can automatically switch to another AP with a higher RSSI value when roaming 
across APs. 
8. The public Wi-Fi hotspot does not use mobile Internet (e.g. 4G LTE). 
9. The public Wi-Fi hotspot uses one ISP for Internet connectivity.  The legitimate APs 
are connected to the same router sharing the same global IP address. 
10. The public Wi-Fi hotspot has more than one AP installed in their public Wi-Fi space. 
11. The public Wi-Fi hotpots APs have the same configuration (e.g. shared SSID, global 
IP address, DNS, etc.) to allow smooth AP association while the user roams 
throughout the public areas.  
12. The public Wi-Fi hotspot requires acceptance of terms of use to be able to access the 
Internet. 
13. ISP information of a legitimate AP and evil twin AP is different. 
14. The attacker uses his laptop and smartphone with mobile AP functionality to launch 
an evil twin AP attack (mobile attack). 
15. The attacker arrives later at the public Wi-Fi hotspot after the user has connected to a 
legitimate AP. 
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16. The attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same SSID, BSSID, and subnet 
of a legitimate AP. 
17. The attacker disassociates the user from the legitimate AP and forces the user to 
connect to the mobile evil twin AP. 
18. The attacker may block access to the public website used to get ISP information.  
19. The attacker may present a valid or an invalid public website certificate while 
retrieving ISP information from public website. 
CSMETAD Framework Overview  
     The following provides an overview of the CSMETAD system.  CSMETAD works in 
two phases:   
 In (Phase 1) data collection, performs the initial wireless network scanning 
collecting data of all the access points (APs) in the public Wi-Fi hotspot.  In 
this phase, CSMETAD categorizes the APs. 
 In (Phase 2) detection and protection, detects mobile evil twin APs and 
connects the user to a legitimate AP.  In this phase, CSMETAD protects the 
user for the duration of the public Wi-Fi connection discovering and reporting 
on new mobile evil twin APs.  
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Phase 1 – data collection 
1. CSMETAD is designed based on the idea that the global IP addresses of two or more 
legitimate APs are the same, but they are different in the case of the legitimate APs 
and an evil twin AP.  This occurs because the evil twin AP utilizes a different 
gateway than a legitimate AP (mobile attack) (Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014; Nakhila et 
al., 2015). 
2. CSMETAD disables “auto-connections” to all public Wi-Fi networks protecting the 
user even when he or she has connected to a free open public Wi-Fi network in the 
past.  The system iterates through all 802.11 wireless network connections, and after 
validating that the connection autoconnect is enabled and unencrypted, the system 
disables autoconnect.  This requires for the wireless user to initialize CSMETAD 
before using the public Wi-Fi network. 
3. CSMETAD scans the public Wi-Fi network to discover APs with selected SSID and 
adds APs with signal strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm to a list called “AP for 
selected SSID” list. 
4. CSMETAD validates that the number of APs for the selected SSID is equal to or 
greater than 2.  If CSMETAD determines that the number of APs for the selected 
SSID is less than 2, then CSMETAD displays message: “There is insufficient 
information to detect Evil Twin Attacks.”  CSMETAD ends.  If CSMETAD 
determines that the number of APs for the selected SSID is equal to or greater than 2, 
then CSMETAD has sufficient information to detect ETAs.   
5. CSMETAD goes through an AP iteration from “APs for selected SSID” list and 
associates to an AP, gets a Client DHCP address for the user, accepts terms of use to 
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access the Internet, and accesses secured public website to retrieve the global IP 
address of the AP.  During the AP iteration process, if CSMETAD is not able to 
associate to an AP, then CSMETAD updates “APs for selected SSID” list with AP 
state as “unknown” and associates to the next AP on the “AP for selected SSID” list. 
6. If CSMETAD is able to associate to an AP but not able to get a Client DHCP address 
for the user, accept terms of use to access the Internet, or access secured public 
website to retrieve the global IP address of the AP, then CSMETAD updates “APs for 
selected SSID” list with AP state as “unknown”, disassociates from current AP and 
associates to the next AP on the “APs for selected SSID” list. 
7. If CSMETAD is able to associate to an AP, get a Client DHCP address for the user, 
accept terms of use to access the Internet, and access secured public website to 
retrieve the global IP address of the AP, then CSMETAD proceeds to verify that the 
public website certificate is valid. 
8. CSMETAD is designed based on the idea that the attacker may present a valid or an 
invalid public website certificate while retrieving the global IP address from a public 
website.  If CSMETAD determines that the public website certificate is invalid, 
CSMETAD updates “APs for selected SSID” list with AP state as “ETA”, adds AP 
MAC address to a list called “Learned ETA MAC address” list, disassociates from 
current AP and associates to the next AP on the “APs for selected SSID” list.  If 
CSMETAD determines that the public website certificate is valid, only then, 
CSMETAD proceeds to determine the trusted global IP address to be used for the 
duration of the public Wi-Fi connection. 
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9. CSMETAD determines the trusted global IP address by selecting the global IP 
address with maximum number of occurrences.  If CSMETAD determines that the 
global IP occurrences is less than 2, then CSMETAD displays message: “There is not 
enough information to categorize APs.”, updates “APs for selected SSID” list with 
AP state as “unknown”, and CSMETAD ends.  If CSMETAD determines that the 
global IP occurrences is equal to or greater than 2, then CSMETAD proceeds to 
categorize APs. 
10. CSMETAD categorizes APs by going through an AP iteration and validating whether 
the global IP address of an AP is the same as the trusted global IP address.  If 
CSMETAD determines that the global IP address of an AP is not the same as the 
trusted global IP address, then CSMETAD categorizes the AP as “ETA” and add 
results to “Learned ETA MAC address” list.  If CSMETAD determines that the 
global IP address of an AP is the same as the trusted global IP address, then 
CSMETAD categorizes the AP as “valid” and add results to the “APs for selected 
SSID” list. 
11. CSMETAD moves to phase 2 after finishing AP iteration.  
Phase 2 – detection and protection  
1. CSMETAD re-scans the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID 
and adds APs with signal strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm to the “APs for 
selected SSID” list (new list).  
2. CSMETAD validates that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater 
than 1.  If CSMETAD determines that the number of APs for selected SSID is less 
than 1, then CSMETAD displays message: “Your device is out of range for the 
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selected public Wi-Fi hotspot.  Please move closer”. CSMETAD rescans the public 
Wi-Fi network.   
3. If CSMETAD determines that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or 
greater than 1, then CSMETAD retrieves previously learned ETA MAC addresses 
from “Learned ETA MAC addresses” list and removes learned ETA MAC addresses 
from “AP for selected SSID” list.   
4. After removal, CSMETAD validates that the number of APs for selected SSID is 
equal to or greater than 1.  If CSMETAD determines that the number of APs for 
selected SSID is less than 1, then CSMETAD displays message: “You are located on 
the vicinity of Evil Twin Attacks.  Please move to a different location within the 
public Wi-Fi Hotspot”.  CSMETAD rescans the public Wi-Fi network.  If 
CSMETAD determines that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or 
greater than 1, then CSMETAD starts iterating across all the APs in the “APs for 
selected SSID” list. 
5. CSMETAD proceeds to validate APs even if they have the same SSID, MAC 
address, and subnet of a legitimate AP.  CSMETAD goes through an AP iteration of 
“APs for selected SSID” list and associates to the AP with the highest signal strength.  
During the AP iteration process, if CSMETAD is not able to associate to an AP, then 
CSMETAD associates to the next AP on the “APs for selected SSID” list.  If 
CSMETAD is not able to associate to any of the APs on the “APs for selected SSID” 
list, then CSMETAD rescans the public Wi-Fi network. 
6. If CSMETAD is able to associate to the AP but not able to get a Client DHCP address 
for the user, confirm access to the Internet, or access secured public website to 
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retrieve the global IP address of an AP, then CSMETAD disassociates from current 
AP and associates to the next AP on the “APs for selected SSID” list.   
7. If CSMETAD is able to associate to an AP, confirm Client DHCP address for the 
user, confirm access to the Internet, and access secure public website to retrieve the 
global IP address of an AP, only then, CSMETAD proceeds to verify that the public 
website certificate is valid. 
8. If CSMETAD determines that the public website certificate is invalid, CSMETAD 
displays message: “CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”, 
adds AP MAC address to a list called “Learned ETA MAC address” list (if ETA is 
not in the list), disassociates from current AP, and associates to the next AP on the 
“APs for selected SSID” list.  If CSMETAD determines that the public website 
certificate is valid, only then, CSMETAD proceeds to get the global IP address of the 
AP. 
9. If CSMETAD determines that the global IP address of an AP is not the same as the 
trusted global IP address, CSMETAD displays message: “CSMETAD has detected an 
ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”, adds AP MAC address to “Learned ETA MAC 
address” list (if ETA is not in the list), disassociates from the current AP, and 
associates to the next AP with the highest signal strength on the “APs for selected 
SSID” list.  If CSMETAD determines that the global IP address of an AP is the same 
as the trusted global IP address, then CSMETAD displays message: “Wi-Fi 
connection is safe.  You are connected to a legitimate AP”.  Then, CSMETAD waits 
for a disassociated wireless card event. 
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10. If CSMETAD receives a disassociated wireless card event, CSMETAD rescans the 
public Wi-Fi network to discover and report on new mobile evil twin access points 
for the duration of the public Wi-Fi connection.  Algorithm phase 2 repeats (infinite 
loop). 
     The following is a list of replacement hardware and software included in the design of 
the CSMETAD system that is central to this dissertation report: 
1. Client Platform:  Hossen & Wenyuan’s study’s artifact was built for smartphone 
platforms.  CSMETAD was built for laptop platforms.  The client laptop platform for 
this study is a Lenovo Thinkpad laptop. 
2. Client Operating System (OS): Hossen & Wenyuan’s study’s artifact was built for 
Android operating system.  CSMETAD was built for Linux operating system.  The 
Linux OS version for this study is 7.3.1611. 
3. Client Programming Language: Hossen & Wenyuan’s study’s artifact’s 
programming language was not provided in their study.  CSMETAD was built using 
Java programming language.  The Java SE Development Kit is version 1.8.0_131 (64 
bits) and the NetBeans Integrated Development Environment is version 8.1. 
4. Mobile Evil Twin AP:  Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) performed the evaluation using a 
smartphone with mobile AP functionality as the evil twin AP (Nexus 4 Android 
smartphone with 3G data subscription and Android mobile hotspot and tethering).  
CSMETAD was evaluated using a laptop and smartphone with mobile AP 
functionality as the evil twin AP (Lenovo Thinkpad laptop, Kali Linux (Aircrack-ng) 
and Hostapd, Motorola Moto e5smartphone with 4G data subscription and Android 
mobile hotspot and tethering).  
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Artifact Specifications  
Wireless Client 
     The hardware and software specifications for the wireless client are described as 
follows: 
Hardware 
     The Lenovo Thinkpad Laptop specifications can be retrieved from 
https://support.lenovo.com/mn/en/solutions/pd027202 
Software 
     The Linux OS 7.3.1611 specifications designed for inclusion into the CSMETAD 
system can be retrieved from https://wiki.centos.org/Manuals/ReleaseNotes/CentOS7 
     The Java SE Development Kit 1.8.0_131 (64 bits) programming language 
specifications designed for inclusion into the CSMETAD system can be retrieved from 
https://docs.oracle.com/javase/specs/jls/se8/jls8.pdf 
     The NetBeans Integrated Development Environment 8.1 specifications designed for 
inclusion into the CSMETAD system can be retrieved from 
https://netbeans.org/community/releases/81/relnotes.html 
     The Wireshark Packet Analyzer 2.0.0 software was installed in the client specifically 
for network packet analysis purposes.  The specifications can be retrieved from 
https://www.wireshark.org/docs/relnotes/wireshark-2.0.0.html 
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Mobile Evil Twin AP 
     The hardware and software specifications for the mobile evil twin AP are described as 
follows: 
Hardware 
     The Motorola Moto e5 smartphone specifications can be retrieved from 
https://www.motorola.com/us/products/moto-e-plus-gen-5 
     The Lenovo Thinkpad Laptop specifications can be retrieved from 
https://www.lenovo.com/us/en/laptops/thinkpad/thinkpad-x/Thinkpad-X1-Carbon-4th-
Gen/p/22TP2TXX14G 
Software 
     The Android Mobile Hotspot and Tethering specifications can be retrieved from 
https://www.verizonwireless.com/support/knowledge-base-217411/ 
     The Kali Linux 4.14.0 (Aircrack-ng) specifications can be retrieved from 
https://www.kali.org/news/kali-linux-2018-1-release/ 
     The Hostapd v2.7 specifications can be retrieved from http://w1.fi/hostapd/ 
 
Lab Network 
     The hardware and software specifications for the lab network are described as follows: 
     The Cisco M10 router specifications documented in an installation guide (Cisco 
Systems, 2010) can be retrieved from 
http://downloads.linksys.com/downloads/userguide/1224655305646/Valet_Valet_Plus_
M10_M20_UG_US_V10_D-WEB_3425-014530.pdf 
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     The Cisco 3560 switch specifications documented in a spec sheet (Cisco Systems, 
2009) can be retrieved from 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/switches/catalyst-3560-series-
switches/product_data_sheet09186a00801f3d7d.pdf 
     The Cisco 2504 wireless controller specifications documented in a spec sheet (Cisco 
Systems, 2016) can be retrieved from 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/2500-series-wireless-
controllers/data_sheet_c78-645111.pdf 
     The Cisco 3502I wireless access point specifications documented in a spec sheet 
(Cisco Systems, 2012) can be retrieved from 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/aironet-1250-
series/data_sheet_c78-594630.pdf 
     Figure 8 shows Logical Prototype Topology Design Diagram.  
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Figure 8.  Logical prototype topology design diagram.  
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Artifact Equipment Requirement 
     The components and costs to build the CSMETAD system and lab as defined in this 
dissertation report are listed in Table 10. 
Table 10  
Evil Twin Detection Lab Environment Components and Costs 
Component Quantity Estimated Cost 
Hardware   
Cisco 3560 Switch 1 $150 
Cisco Router M10  1 $200 
Cisco Wireless 
Controller 2504 
1 $490 
Cisco Access Point 
3502I-A-K9 (AP1) 
(legitimate AP) 
1 $80 
Cisco Access Point 
3502I-A-K9 (AP2) 
(legitimate AP) 
1 $80  
Lenovo Laptop  2 $2,500 
Motorola Moto e5 
Android smartphone  
1 $150 
USB wireless adapter 1 $40 
Ethernet cables - $30 
   
Software   
Wireshark Packet 
Analyzer 2.0.0 
1 Free 
Java SE Development 
Kit 1.8.0_131 
1 Free 
NetBeans IDE 8.1 1 Free 
Linux Centos 7.3.1611 1 Free 
Kali Linux 
4.14.0 (Aircrack-ng) 
1 Free 
Hostapd v2.7 1 Free 
Android Mobile 
Hotspot &Tethering  
1 Free 
Switch IOS 1 Included 
Router IOS 1 Included 
Controller IOS 1 Included 
APs IOS 3 Included 
Total  $3,720 
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Artifact Construction 
 
     Construction of the CSMETAD system was based primarily on Hevner’s principles 1 
and 5 through the creation of a viable artifact that relies on the application of rigorous 
construction methods. 
Lab Environment - Steps: 
1. Unpacking and assembling the equipment. 
2. The Linux Centos 7.3.1611 OS was installed and configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad 
laptop (client) in accordance with the installation guide (Centos, 2016) retrieved from 
https://wiki.centos.org/Manuals/ReleaseNotes/CentOS7 
3. The Java SE Development Kit 1.8.0_131 (64 bits) software was installed and 
configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (client) in accordance with the installation 
guide (Oracle, 2016) retrieved from 
http://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/technotes/guides/install/index.html 
4. The NetBeans Integrated Development Environment 8.1 software was installed and 
configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (client) in accordance with the installation 
guide (Netbeans, 2015) retrieved from 
https://netbeans.org/community/releases/81/install.html 
5. The Wireshark Packet Analyzer 2.0.0 software was installed and configured in the 
Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (client) in accordance with the installation guide (Wireshark, 
2014) retrieved from https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html/ 
6. The Kali Linux 4.14.0 (Aircrack-ng) was installed and configured in the Lenovo 
Thinkpad laptop (ETA) in accordance with the installation guide (Kali, 2018) 
retrieved from https://docs.kali.org/category/installation 
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7. The Hostapd v2.7 was installed and configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (ETA) 
in accordance with the installation guide (Hostapd, 2013) retrieved from 
https://w1.fi/hostapd/ 
8. The Motorola smartphone was configured with tethering in accordance with the 
instructions (Motorola, 2018) retrieved from 
https://www.verizonwireless.com/support/knowledge-base-217411/ 
9. The Cisco M10 router was installed and configured in accordance with the 
installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2010) retrieved from 
http://downloads.linksys.com/downloads/userguide/1224655305646/Valet_Valet_Plu
s_M10_M20_UG_US_V10_D-WEB_3425-014530.pdf 
10. The Cisco 3560 switch was installed and configured in accordance with the 
installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2010) retrieved from 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst3560/hardware/installation
/guide/3560hig.pdf 
11. The Cisco 2504 wireless controller was installed and configured in accordance with 
the installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2017) retrieved from 
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/wireless/2500-series-wireless-
controllers/113034-2500-deploy-guide-00.html 
12. The Cisco 3502I access points was installed and configured in accordance with the 
installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2014) retrieved from 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/wireless/access_point/3500/quick/guide/ap350
0getstart.pdf 
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Figure 9.  Lab network. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Lab wireless client and mobile evil twin AP. 
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Client-side Mobile Evil Twin AP Detection (CSMETAD) Algorithm - Steps: 
Phase 1: Data Collection  
 
Basic Flow:  
1. System is initialized by the user before using the free open public Wi-Fi network. 
2. System detects operating system. 
3. System detects wireless network card. 
4. System disables “auto-connections” to all public Wi-Fi networks. 
5. System scans the public Wi-Fi network to discover available SSIDs (encrypted and 
unencrypted).   
6. System creates list of SSIDs in range. 
7. System presents SSIDs in range to the user. 
8. User selects unencrypted public Wi-Fi hotspot SSID. 
9. System creates list of APs for selected SSID with signal level equal to or greater than 
-75dBm. 
10. System validates that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater 
than 2. (Alternative Flow “a”) 
11. IF number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 2 THEN System 
displays message: “There is sufficient information to start detecting ETAs.” 
12. System stops the network manager. 
13. System activates wireless network card. 
14. System starts iterating across all the APs in the APs for selected SSID list. 
15. System associates to the AP in the APs for selected SSID list. (Alternative Flow 
“b”) 
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16. IF System is able to associate to the AP THEN System gets a Client DHCP address 
for the user. (Alternative Flow “c”)  
17. IF System is able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN System accepts 
terms of use to access the Internet. (Alternative Flow “d”) 
18. IF System is able to accept terms of use to access the Internet THEN System connects 
to secured public website to retrieve global IP address of the AP. (Alternative Flow 
“e”) 
19. IF System is able to connect to the secured public website THEN System verifies that 
the public website certificate is valid. (Alternative Flow “f”) 
20. IF the public website certificate is valid only THEN System is able to get the global 
IP address of the AP.   
21. IF System ends iterating across APs in APs for selected SSID list THEN System 
validates that the number of occurrences of a global IP address is equal to or 
greater than 2. (Alternative Flow “g”) 
22. IF the number of occurrences of a global IP address is equal to or greater than 2 
THEN System has enough information to start categorizing APs and sets global IP as 
the trusted global IP address to be used for the duration of the public Wi-Fi 
connection. 
23. System starts categorizing APs. 
24. System starts iterating across all the APs in the APs for selected SSID list. 
25. System validates that the global IP address for an AP is the same as the trusted global 
IP address. (Alternative Flow “h”) 
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26. IF the global IP address for an AP is the same as the trusted global IP address THEN 
System categorizes the AP as “valid”.  System disassociates from current AP and 
associates to the next AP on the APs for selected SSID list. 
27. IF System ends iterating across APs in APs for selected SSID list THEN System 
moves to Phase 2 detection and protection. 
Alternative Flows: 
a) number of APs for selected SSID is less than 2 
On step 10 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the number of APs for selected SSID is less than 2 THEN 
2. System displays message: “There is insufficient information to detect ETAs.” 
3. System ends.  
b) system is not able to associate to an AP 
On step 15 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System is not able to associate to an AP THEN 
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results: 
a. Association status = false 
b. Client DHCP address = not detected 
c. Internet access = not detected 
d. Secured public website access = not detected 
e. Certificate status = not detected 
f. Global IP address = not detected 
g. AP state = unknown 
3. System associates to the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list. 
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4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow. 
5. System ends.  
c) system is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user  
On step 16 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN 
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results: 
a. Client DHCP address = not detected 
b. Internet access = not detected 
c. Secured public website access = not detected 
d. Certification status = not detected 
e. Global IP address = not detected 
f. AP state = unknown 
3. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for 
selected SSID list. 
4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow. 
d) system is not able to accept terms of use to access the Internet 
On step 17 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System is not able to accept terms of use to access the Internet THEN 
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results: 
a. Internet access = false 
b. Secured public website access = not detected 
c. Certification status = not detected 
d. Global IP address = not detected 
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e. AP state = unknown 
3. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for 
selected SSID list. 
4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow. 
e) system is not able to access secured public website 
On step 18 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System is not able to access secured public website THEN 
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results: 
a. Secured public website access = false 
b. Certification status = not detected 
c. Global IP address = not detected 
d. AP state = unknown 
3. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for 
selected SSID list. 
4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow. 
f) invalid certificate 
On step 19 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System receives an invalid certificate message THEN 
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results: 
a. Certification status = invalid 
b. Global IP address = not detected 
c. AP state = ETA 
3. System adds AP MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list. 
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4. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for 
selected SSID list. 
5. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow. 
g) number of occurrences of a global IP address is less than 2 
On step 21 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System determines that number of occurrences of a global IP address is less than 2 
THEN 
2. System displays message: “There is not enough information to categorize APs” 
3. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following result: 
a. AP state = unknown 
4. System ends. 
h) global IP address for an AP is not the same as the trusted global IP address 
On step 25 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System determines that the global IP address for an AP is not the same as the 
trusted global IP address THEN 
2. System categorizes the AP as “ETA”. 
3. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following result:   
a. AP state = ETA 
4. System adds the AP MAC addresses to the learned ETA MAC address list. 
5. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for 
selected SSID list. 
6. Flow of events returns to step 25 of the Basic Flow. 
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Input and Output details: 
1. SSIDs in range list = list of AP MAC address, signal level/RSSI, encryption status, 
frequency, and channel.  This list contains APs with encryption on and off. 
2. APs for selected SSID list = list of AP MAC address, signal level/RSSI, encryption 
status, frequency, channel, Client DHCP address, Internet access, secured public 
website access, certification status, global IP address, and AP state.  This list contains 
only the APs with encryption off and signal/RSSI level equal to or greater than           
-75dBm. 
3. Learned ETA MAC address list = list of ETA MAC addresses. 
Rule details: 
1. Number of APs for selected SSID = the number of APs for selected SSID must be 
equal to or greater than 2. 
2. Number of occurrences of a global IP address = the number of occurrences of a 
global IP address must be equal to or greater than 2. 
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Figure 11.  CSMETAD Algorithm Flow – Phase 1 Data Collection. 
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Phase 2:  Detection & Protection 
 
Basic Flow: 
1. System rescans the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID. 
2. System creates list of SSIDs in range. 
3. System adds all the APs for selected SSID with signal level equal to or greater than    
-75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list (new list). 
4. System validates that number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 1. 
(Alternative Flow “a”) 
5. IF number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 1 THEN System 
retrieves learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC address list.  This 
list includes all ETA MAC addresses learned from the beginning of the program.   
6. System removes learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list. 
7. System validates that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater 
than 1. (Alternative Flow “b”) 
8. IF number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 1 THEN System 
starts iterating across all the APs in APs for selected SSID list. 
9. Systems associates to the AP with the highest signal strength in the APs for selected 
SSID list. (Alternative Flow “c”) 
10. IF System is able to associate to the AP THEN System gets a Client DHCP address 
for the user. (Alternative Flow “d”) 
11. IF System is able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN System confirms 
access to the Internet. (Alternative Flow “e”) 
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12. IF System is able to confirm access to the Internet THEN System connects to secured 
public website to retrieve global IP address of the AP. (Alternative Flow “f”) 
13. IF System is able to access secured public website THEN System verifies that the 
public website certificate is valid. (Alternative Flow “g”) 
14. IF the public website certificate is valid only THEN System is able to get the global 
IP address for the AP. 
15. System validates that the global IP address for the AP is the same as the trusted global 
IP address. (Alternative Flow “h”) 
16. IF the global IP address for the AP is the same as the trusted global IP THEN the 
System displays message: “Wi-Fi connection is safe.  You are connected to a 
legitimate AP”. 
17. System ends iterating across APs in APs for selected SSID list.   
18. System waits for a disassociated wireless card event.   
19. IF System receives a disassociated wireless card event THEN System proceeds to 
rescans the public Wi-Fi network.  Algorithm phase 2 repeats (infinite loop). 
Alternative Flows: 
a) number of APs for selected SSID is less than 1 
On step 4 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the number of APs for selected SSID is less than 1 THEN 
2. System displays message: “Your device is out of range for the selected public Wi-Fi 
hotspot.  Please move closer”. 
3. Flow of events returns to step 1 of the Basic Flow. 
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b) number of APs for selected SSID is less than 1 
On step 7 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the number of APs with the selected SSID is less than 1 THEN 
2. System displays message: “You are located on the vicinity of Evil Twin Attacks.  
Please move to a different location within the public Wi-Fi Hotspot”. 
3. Flow of events returns to step 1 of the Basic Flow. 
c) system is not able to associate to an AP 
On step 9 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System is not able to associate to an AP THEN 
2. System associates to the next AP with the highest signal strength on the APs for 
selected SSID list.   
3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow. 
d) system is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user 
On step 10 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the System is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN 
2. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest 
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list. 
3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow. 
e) system is not able to confirm access to the Internet 
On step 11 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the System is not able to confirm access to the Internet THEN 
2. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest 
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list. 
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3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow. 
f) system is not able to access secured public website 
On step 12 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the System is not able to access secured public website THEN 
2. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest 
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list.   
3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow. 
g) invalid certificate 
On step 13 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the System receives an invalid certificate message THEN 
2. System has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi network.  System displays message: 
“CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”. 
3. System adds the AP MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list (if ETA is 
not in the list). 
4. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest 
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list. 
5. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow. 
h) global IP address for an AP is not the same as the trusted global IP address 
On step 15 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the System determines that the global IP address for an AP is not the same as the 
trusted global IP address THEN 
2. System has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi network.  System displays message: 
“CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”. 
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3. System adds the AP MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list (if ETA is 
not in the list). 
4. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest 
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list. 
5. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow. 
Input and Output details: 
1. APs for selected SSID list = list of AP MAC address, signal level/RSSI, encryption 
status, frequency, channel, Client DHCP address, Internet access, secured public 
website access, certification status, global IP address, and AP state.  This list contains 
only the APs with encryption off and signal level equal to or greater than -75dBm. 
2. Learned ETA MAC address list = list of ETA MAC addresses. 
Rule details: 
1. Number of APs for selected SSID = the number of APs for selected SSID must be 
equal to or greater than 1. 
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Figure 12.  CSMETAD Algorithm Flow – Phase 2 Detection & Protection. 
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Artifact Testing 
     Rigorous testing took place with the CSMETAD system based on Hevner’s DSR 
principle 5 in order to verify that the architecture components were working effectively 
according to the design. 
Lab Environment Testing 
1. The TCP/IP utility “ifconfig” was used to verify the correct address configuration of 
the lab equipment, once the devices in the topology were connected, configured and 
developed in the construction phase. 
2. The Cisco Operating System “show run” command was used to prove and 
troubleshoot the configuration of the router, switch, wireless controller, and wireless 
access points. 
3. The TCP/IP utility “ping” was used to verify connectivity between router, switch, 
wireless controller, and wireless access points. 
4. The TCP/IP utility “traceroute” was used to discover the path between devices across 
the topology. 
Appendix B shows Algorithm test cases and results.
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Artifact Production 
     After the construction was complete, the CSMETAD system was brought into 
production mode.  CSMETAD initially aimed at detecting real mobile evil twin AP 
attacks in the wild at a hotel property.  Since no mobile evil twin APs were detected in 
the wild during the field evaluation period, the author proceeded to evaluate the system 
with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.   
 
Artifact Evaluation 
     The client-side mobile evil twin attack detection system was evaluated based on 
Hevner’s principle 3 that asserts that the utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact 
must be rigorously validated via well executed evaluation methods.  The author 
extensively evaluated the performance of the client-side evil twin attack detection method 
by implementing a prototype system.  The prototype system was evaluated in two 
environments.  First, in a lab to analyze the requirements and demonstrate the 
effectiveness in a controlled environment.  Second, in the field at a hotel public Wi-Fi 
hotspot to extensively evaluate the robustness of the system in practice.  The client-side 
mobile evil twin attack detection system aimed at detecting real mobile evil twin AP 
attacks in the wild at a hotel property that provide free open public Wi-Fi.  Since no real 
mobile evil twin AP attacks were detected in the wild during the field evaluation period, 
the author proceeded to evaluate the system with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.  
Similar approach was used by Hossen & Wenyuan’s study and the remainder of the 
client-side evil twin attack detection studies referenced in this dissertation.   
     The client-side evil twin detection method developed as part of this dissertation was 
tested against Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) method for detecting mobile evil twin 
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attacks.  The experiments aimed at showing that the detection system developed can 
detect mobile evil twin attacks more effectively and efficiently.   
     The techniques to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the system were based 
on Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) evaluation methodology which has been published and 
validated and included the following: 
1. Collected data from a hotel public Wi-Fi hotspot (public spaces). 
2. Ran the experiments on both weekdays and weekends for a period of 5 weeks (2 
weeks at the lab and 3 weeks at the hotel). 
3. Collected approximately 300 hours of data.  
4. Collected more than 151,000 instances of data.  
5. Ran the detection system 140 times at the lab and 210 times at a hotel public Wi-Fi 
hotspot.  
6. Monitored the network with Wireshark packet analyzer. 
     For efficiency, the author used Hossen and Wenyuan’s technique to measure time 
delay but also leveraged Nakhila et al.’s technique to improve upon Hossen and 
Wenyuan’s.  Nakhila et al. included a complete list of measurements and factors 
impacting efficiency. 
     In this study, the author used a researcher-participant approach.  According to Richey 
and Klein (2007), researchers are often the designer/ developers.  In other words, by 
design they “go native” and observe themselves.  “The researcher who ceases to be 
conscious of the observer role is said to be going native” (Singleton & Straits, 2005).  In 
this study, the author participated as the user of the client-side evil twin attack detection 
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system and the researcher observing the client-side evil twin attack detection system 
performance. 
Artifact Communication 
     The CSMETAD system design, implementation, and evaluation process including 
specifications and procedures is communicated as a solution manual named CSMETAD 
System Solution Manual and is included in Appendix D of the dissertation to be made 
available via ProQuest Dissertations database. 
 
Instrument Development and Validation 
     As a first phase in the assessment, and prior to continuing with testing the research 
questions in this study, the validity of the experiment was evaluated.  According to 
Albright and Malloy (2000), experimental validity is built on the way in which variables 
have an influence on both the outcomes of the research and the generality of research 
participants. Researchers have divided experimental validity into internal and external 
validity. 
Internal Validity 
     Internal Validity of a research study refers to the “extent to which its design and the 
data that it yields allow the researcher to draw accurate conclusions about cause-and-
effect and other relationships within the data” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).  Similarly, 
according to Briggs & Schwabe (2011), internal validity is the question of whether the 
observed results were actually caused by the experimental treatment instead of by 
something else. 
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     To establish internal validity, the researcher of this study examined Criterion Validity, 
also known as Instrumental Validity.  According to Leedy & Ormrod (2005), 
instrumental validity is based on the premise that processes and instruments used in a 
study are valid if they parallel similar to those used in previous, validated research.  
Following Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) validated research evaluation methodology, this 
study:  
a) demonstrated the artifact in a laboratory setting; 
b) evaluated the artifact in an uncontrolled environment;  
c) built evaluation steps (such as when to run experiments and collect the data, what 
data to collect, how much data to collect, and how many times to run the tests at 
the hotspot); 
d) analyzed performance (detection effectiveness) using standard metrics (accuracy, 
precision, and recall); and 
e) used researcher-participant approach. 
 
External Validity  
     External validity of a research study refers to the “extend to which its results apply to 
situations beyond the study itself…the extent to which the conclusions drawn can be 
generalized to other contexts” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).  Also, according to Briggs & 
Schwabe (2011), external validity is the degree to which results of the experiment would 
generalize to contexts other than those of the experimental conditions.  Additionally, 
external validity is important to demonstrate that research results are applicable in natural 
settings, as contrasted with laboratory settings (King & He, 2005).  
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     The researcher reached out to a hotel organization in Ecuador that provide free open 
public Wi-Fi in their public spaces and requested approval to participate in this study.  
Based on the responses, the hotel provided its approval to participate.  As far as research 
settings, the hotel provides free open public Wi-Fi in their public spaces such as lobbies, 
restaurants, bars, and coffee shops.  The conclusions reached could be extrapolated to 
other public Wi-Fi hotspots, as long as the design assumptions documented in this study 
apply.  Generalization to other public hotspots may not be warranted.  In addition, the 
client-side evil twin AP attack detection system built as part of this study is based on 
laptop platform with Linux OS.  Generalization to other mobile platforms and operating 
systems may not be warranted. 
 
Sample Population 
     The sample population in this study consists of a hotel property located in Ecuador.  
The hotel property offers free open public Wi-Fi to wireless users in hotel public areas 
such as lobbies, restaurants, bars and coffee shops.   
 
Data Analysis 
     To assess the prototype system and effectively answer the research questions in this 
study, quantitative data was collected and analyzed using Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) 
performance analysis approach: 
1. Used the following standard metrics: 
a) Accuracy:  indicates how accurately the system detects evil twin AP attacks. 
b) Precision: is the fraction of positively detected attacks to all positively 
detected attacks (correctly or incorrectly). 
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c) Recall:  is the fraction of positively detected attacks to all attacks that should 
be positively detected. 
2. Used True positive (TP), True negative (TN), False positive (FP), False negative (FN) 
to calculate above standard metrics: 
a) TP and TN: represent correct classification 
b) FP and FN: represent incorrect classification 
3. Used the following equations to calculate standard metrics: 
 
Accuracy =           TP + TN              N                            
                      TP + TN + FP + FN 
Precision =           TP             N                            
                         TP + FP 
 
Recall =           TP             N                            
                    TP + FN 
4. Used diagrams including performance (%) for accuracy, precision and recall to depict 
performance results. 
5. Answered the research questions based on the performance results.  In addition, the 
data was gathered and analyzed with the intent of showing that the principles, 
processes, methods, and technologies used as well as the issues encountered during 
the evaluation apply to other hotel public Wi-Fi environments. 
 
Format for Presenting Results 
     The design, development, and implementation of the artifact conveyed in this study is 
presented in support of Hevner’s guideline 7 through the creation and  
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communication of a complete solution manual including design, procedures and 
specifications and is made available via ProQuest Dissertations database.  The solution 
manual includes the following sections: 
 
1. Physical network connectivity design  
2. Logical prototype topology design diagram 
3. Artifact construction specifications 
4. Minimum hardware and software requirements 
5. Step-by-step artifact construction procedures 
6. Step-by-step artifact testing procedures 
7. Transition client-side mobile evil twin attack detection system into production 
 
Resource Requirements 
 
     Scholarly and industry publications such as journal articles, textbooks, conference 
proceedings, technical reports, research reports, and online newspapers were used to 
support the client-side detection system.  This section addressed the resources that were 
under the researcher’s control in order to complete the research: 
 Hardware (Cisco router, Cisco switch, Cisco wireless controller, Cisco wireless 
access points, Lenovo laptops, Motorola Android smartphone); 
 Software (Linux OS, Java SE Development Kit, Netbeans IDE, Wireshark packet 
analyzer, Kali Linux (Aircrack-ng), Hostapd, Android Mobile Hotspot and 
Tethering); 
 Client-side evil twin attack detection system; and 
 Access to free open public Wi-Fi at a hotel (public Wi-Fi spaces) 
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Summary 
     Based on Hevner et al.’s (2004) seven guidelines of DSR, Peffers et al.’s DSRM 
(2008), and Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study evaluation method this chapter of the 
dissertation report delivered the structure for the development of design procedures and 
specifications derived from DSR literature to guide the construction, implementation, and 
evaluation of an effective client-side evil twin attack detection architecture artifact 
(CSMETAD). The research problem and the methodology of how to realize the desired 
outcome of building and evaluating the artifact to be used to support users of free open 
public Wi-Fi was achieved by delineating a two phased research approach.  The first 
phase of the research emphasized the development of design principles, procedures and 
specifications that guided the artifact design, construction, implementation, and 
evaluation of the client-side evil twin attack detection artifact based on design science 
methodologies. The second phase of the research evaluated the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the artifact by implementing a prototype system. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Results 
 
     This chapter presents the results of the activities associated with the system 
demonstration and evaluation phases described in previous chapter. The system 
demonstration phase includes lab deployment activities.  The system evaluation phase 
includes the methods used to evaluate the artifact in the field, experiment results, 
followed by an analysis of the artifact’s performance. 
 
System Demonstration 
   Lab deployment activities involved testing and evaluation of the client-side mobile evil 
twin attack detection system contained in a controlled environment as presented in 
chapter 3.  The prototype system was tested and evaluated in the lab to analyze the 
requirements and demonstrate its effectiveness in a controlled environment.  The lab 
simulated the hotel public Wi-Fi hotspot and provided an effective environment suitable 
for testing.  Requirements were analyzed using observations and results from the lab 
experiment.  Over the two-week duration of the lab deployment activities, the author used 
Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) evaluation methodology to collect and analyze the data. 
Requirements Analysis  
     Several key requirements drove the research effort.  These requirements were 
analyzed in the lab to demonstrate the artifact’s effectiveness addressing the problem.  
The key requirements include: 
R1:  It protects users whether or not they have connected to a free open public Wi-Fi 
network in the past. 
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R2:  It protects users when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are detected 
during the initial wireless network scanning. 
R3:  It protects users when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the public 
Wi-Fi network. 
R4:  It protects users when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same 
SSID, BSSID, and subnet of a legitimate AP. 
R5:  It protects users when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get 
ISP information. 
R6:  It protects users when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving ISP 
information from a public website. 
R7:  After mobile evil twin AP attack detection, it connects users to a legitimate AP. 
R8:  It protects users for the duration of the public Wi-Fi connection, discovering and 
reporting on new mobile evil twin access points. 
The following provides the test procedures for each requirement and the results: 
R1:  It will protect users whether or not they have connected to a free open public Wi-Fi 
network in the past. 
     This requirement was tested during phase 1 of the algorithm.  To test this requirement, 
the wireless client was set up with a previous connection to the public Wi-Fi network, in 
this case the lab SSID (labwifi).  The system was initialized by the user before visiting 
the open public Wi-Fi hotspot.  This is required only the first time the system is used in 
the public Wi-Fi hotspot.  Results show that the system iterated through all the 802.11 
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wireless network connections and validated if connection autoconnect was enabled and 
unencrypted.  After validation, the system disabled autoconnect for all open 
(unencrypted) 802.11 wireless network connections. 
R2:  It will protect the user when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are 
detected during initial wireless network scanning. 
     This requirement was tested during phase 2 of the algorithm.  In phase 2, after the 
system received a disassociated wireless card event, the system rescanned the wireless 
network to rediscover APs with selected SSID that were not detected during the initial 
wireless network scanning.  APs with signal strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm 
were added to the APs for selected SSID list.  Results show that when the number of APs 
for selected SSID was less than 1, the system presented the following message: “Your 
device is out of range for the selected public Wi-Fi hotspot.  Please move closer”.  The 
system then rescanned the public Wi-Fi network. 
R3: It will protect the user when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the 
public Wi-Fi network. 
     This requirement was tested during phase 1 and 2 of the algorithm.  In phase 1 and 2, 
the system attempted to associate to an AP with a timeout of 5 seconds.  The system 
checked association status each second for 5 seconds.  In phase 1, results show that when 
the system was not able to associate to an AP within 5 seconds, the system updated the 
APs for selected SSID list with association status as “false”, AP state as “unknown”, and 
client DHCP address, Internet access, secured public website access, certificate status, 
and global IP address as “not detected”.  Next, the system attempted to associate to the 
next AP in the APs for selected SSID list.  In phase 1, when the system was not able to 
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associate to any of the APs, it presented the following message: “There is not enough 
information to categorize APs”, updated APs for selected SSID with AP state as 
“unknown”, and the system ended.  In phase 2, results show that when the system was 
not able to associate to an AP within 5 seconds, it attempted to associate to the next AP 
with the highest signal strength in the APs for selected SSID list.  In phase 2, when the 
system was not able to associate to any of the APs, it rescanned the public Wi-Fi 
network.   
R4 & R7 & R8:  It will protect users when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP 
with the same SSID, BSSID (MAC address), and subnet of a legitimate AP.  After 
detection, it connects the user to a legitimate AP.  Lastly, it protects the user for the 
duration of the public Wi-Fi connection, discovering and reporting on new mobile evil 
twin access points. 
     Requirements 4, 7, and 8 were tested during phase 2 of the algorithm.  To test these 
requirements, the system was run, collected data, detected only legitimate APs, connected 
the user to a legitimate AP, and waited for a disassociated wireless card event.  No evil 
twin AP was present when the user ran the system.  The author simulated the scenario 
when the attacker arrived later at the public Wi-Fi hotspot, configured the mobile evil 
twin AP with the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet of a legitimate AP, placed the 
mobile evil twin AP closer to the user (better signal strength), and proceeded to 
disassociate the user from the legitimate AP to force the user to connect to the mobile evil 
twin AP.   
     The system, after detecting a disassociated wireless card event, it rescanned the 
wireless network to rediscover APs with the same SSID that were not detected during the 
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initial wireless network scanning.  In this scenario, the rescan showed two APs, one with 
signal strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm and one with signal strength less than -75 
dBm.  The system added all APs for selected SSID with signal strength equal to or 
greater than -75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list (new list).  This resulted in only 
one AP added.  Since there were two APs with the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet, 
the system only showed the AP that had the highest signal strength and ignored the other 
AP.  The system does not trust rescanned APs even if they have the same SSID, MAC 
address and subnet of legitimate APs; therefore, the system proceeds to validate them 
again.  Next, the system validated if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or 
greater than 1.  Results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal 
to or greater than 1, the system retrieved learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA 
MAC address list and removed them from the APs for selected SSID list.  In this case, no 
ETA MAC addresses were retrieved and removed.  The system validated that the number 
of APs for selected was equal to or greater than 1.  Results show that when the number of 
APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system attempted to associate to 
the AP with the highest signal strength in the APs for selected SSID list.  When the 
system associated to the AP, obtained DHCP address, confirmed Internet access, 
accessed secured public website and verified that the public website certificate was valid, 
only then, the system obtained the global IP address.  When the AP global IP address was 
not the same as the trusted global IP address, the system printed access as “true”, 
certificate status as “valid”, and the global IP address of the mobile evil twin AP.  Next, 
the system presented the following message: “CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the 
public Wi-Fi hotspot”, added the AP MAC address to the Learned ETA MAC address 
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list, disassociated from current AP and associated to the next AP with the highest signal 
strength in the APs for selected SSID list.  Since there were no more APs in the list, the 
system displayed the following message: “CSMETAD finished iterating across the list of 
APs and was not able to validate that the AP global IP was the same as the trusted global 
IP” and proceeded to scan the public Wi-Fi network again. 
     The results of the rescan showed two APs, one with signal strength equal to or greater 
than -75 dBm and one with signal strength less than -75 dBm.  The system added all APs 
for selected SSID with signal strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm to the APs for 
selected SSID list.  In this case, only one AP with the same MAC address as previously 
learned ETA MAC address was added to the list.  Same as above, since there were two 
APs with the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet, the system only showed the AP that 
had the highest signal strength and ignored the other AP.  Next, the system validated if 
the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1.  Results show that 
when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system 
retrieved learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC address list and removed 
them from APs for selected SSID list, leaving no more APs in the list.  The system then 
validated that the number of APs for selected was equal to or greater than 1.  Results 
show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was less than 1, the system 
presented the following message: “You are located on the vicinity of Evil Twin Attacks.  
Please move to a different location within the public Wi-Fi Hotspot” and proceeded to 
rescan the public Wi-Fi network. 
     The results of the rescan this time showed two APs, both with signal strength equal to 
or greater than -75 dBm.  The system added all APs for selected SSID with signal 
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strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list.  In this case, 
two APs were added to the list, one AP with the same MAC address as previously 
learned ETA MAC address and a second AP.  Same as above, since there were two APs 
with the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet, the system only showed the AP that had 
the highest signal strength and ignored the other AP.  Next, the system validated if the 
number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1.  Results show that when 
the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system retrieved 
learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC address list and removed them 
from APs for selected SSID list, leaving only one AP in the list.  The system then 
validated that the number of APs for selected was equal to or greater than 1.  Results 
show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the 
system attempted to associate to the AP with the highest signal strength in the APs for 
selected SSID list.  When the system associated to the next AP in the list and obtained 
DHCP address, confirmed Internet access, accessed secured public website and verified 
that the public website certificate was valid, only then, the system obtained the global IP 
address.  When the AP global IP address was the same as the trusted global IP address, 
the system printed access as “true”, certificate status as “valid”, and the global IP address 
of the legitimate AP.  Next, the system connected the user to the legitimate AP and 
presented the following message: “Wi-Fi connection is safe.  You are connected to a 
legitimate AP”, and waited for a disassociated wireless card event.  Results show that 
when the system received a disassociated wireless card event, the system rescanned the 
public Wi-Fi network and the algorithm phase 2 repeated (infinite loop).  
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    When the system associated to the next AP in the list but was not able to obtain the 
DHCP address, confirm Internet access, access secured public website or verify that the 
public website certificate was valid, the system disassociated from AP and associated to 
the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list.  When there were no more APs in the list, 
the system rescanned the public Wi-Fi network. 
R5:  It protects the user when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get 
ISP information.   
     Requirement 5 was tested during phase 2 of the algorithm.  To test this requirement, 
the author simulated the scenario when the attacker blocks access to the secured public 
website used to collect the global IP address using iptables rules. 
     From above example, when the system associated to an AP, obtained DHCP address, 
and confirmed Internet access, it proceeded to access secured public website to obtain the 
global IP.  Results show that when the system was blocked access to the secured public 
website, it printed access as “false”, certificate status as “not detected” and global IP as 
“not detected”.  Next, the system disassociated from AP and associated to the next AP in 
the APs for selected SSID list.   
R6:  It protects the user when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving 
ISP information from a public website. 
     To test an invalid public website certificate would require the creation of a fake 
remote server which will be very expensive to set up.  This requirement was tested only 
in the lab.  To test this requirement, two websites that provide invalid certificates were 
used to simulate the attacker using a fake remote server to bypass detection procedure 
(Google Open Source, n.d.).  Results show that when the system verified that the public 
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website certificate was invalid, the system printed access as “true”, certificate status as 
“invalid”, and global IP as “not detected”.  The system then updated the AP MAC 
address list with AP state as “ETA”, added the AP MAC address to the Learned ETA 
MAC address list, disassociated from AP, and associated to the next AP in the APs for 
selected SSID list.   
     Appendix B shows Algorithm test cases and results.  Appendix C shows CSMETAD 
system results for each of the key requirements. 
 
Lab – Performance 
     Performance metrics from Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) as depicted in chapter 3 were 
used to calculate the effectiveness of the artifact in a controlled environment.  The 
findings showed that CSMETAD can detect mobile evil twin AP attacks effectively.  
CSMETAD detected mobile evil twin attacks, with 100% accuracy, precision, and recall.  
CSMETAD performance in detecting mobile evil twin attacks in the lab is depicted in 
Figure 13.   
 
 
Figure 13.  CSMETAD performance for mobile evil twin attacks in the lab. 
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System Evaluation 
     At the conclusion of the lab deployment activities, the author travelled to Ecuador to 
extensively evaluate the robustness of the client-side mobile evil twin attack detection 
(CSMETAD) system in practice at a hotel public Wi-Fi hotspot that provides free open 
public Wi-Fi in its public spaces (restaurant, lobby, coffee shop and bar).  Initially, the 
CSMETAD system aimed at searching for mobile evil twin attacks in the wild.  Since no 
evil twin AP attacks were detected during the field evaluation period, the author 
proceeded to evaluate the system with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab. Similar 
approach was used by Hossen & Wenyuan’s study and the remainder of the client-side 
evil twin attack detection studies referenced in this dissertation.  Over the three-week 
duration of the system evaluation, the author used Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) 
evaluation methodology to collect and analyze the data.  The client-side evil twin 
detection method was evaluated with real-world scenarios.  
Observations 
     During wild testing, the author ran the system in several locations in the hotel public 
Wi-Fi hotspot during busy times and waited for attackers to perform mobile evil twin 
attacks.  During each run, the system collected data, connected the user to a legitimate AP 
and waited for a disassociated wireless card event caused by an attacker (refer to scenario 
1 below).  If no disassociations were detected after 10 to 30 minutes, the author re-ran the 
system.  Results show that no mobile evil twin APs were detected during the field 
evaluation period.   
     Since no mobile evil twin attacks were detected in the wild, the author proceeded to 
evaluate the system with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.  The author simulated 
the scenario of when the user ran the system, the system collected data, connected the 
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user to a legitimate AP, and waited for a disassociated wireless card event.  Attackers 
with mobile evil twin APs were not present when the user ran the system at the hotel 
public Wi-Fi hotspot.  Next, the attacker with a mobile evil twin AP arrived at the public 
Wi-Fi hotspot, disassociated the user from the legitimate AP, and forced the user to 
connect to the mobile evil twin AP.  The system then proceeded to detect mobile evil 
twin attacks, connect the user to a legitimate AP, and protect the user for the duration of 
the public Wi-Fi connection.  In the tests, the public website certificate was valid.  
Detailed experimental results are described in the following paragraphs. 
Scenario 1: User ran the system, system collected data, connected the user to a 
legitimate AP, and waited for a disassociated wireless card event.  Attacker with a 
mobile evil twin AP was not present when the user arrived to the public Wi-Fi hotspot 
and ran the system.   
Scenario 1 - Basic Flow - Phase 1 – Data Collection  
     The system at the beginning of phase 1 disabled auto-connections to all open 
(unencrypted) public Wi-Fi networks.  The system then scanned the wireless network to 
discover SSIDs in range and presented them to the user.  After the user selected the hotel 
public Wi-Fi hotspot SSID, the system created a list including all APs for selected SSID 
with signal strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm.  The system detected two APs.  
The system then validated if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater 
than 2.  Results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or 
greater than 2, the system presented the following message: “There is sufficient 
information to start detecting ETAs”. 
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     The system then started to iterate across all the APs and attempted to associate to each 
AP in the APs for selected SSID list.  After successful AP association, the system 
proceeded to obtain client DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access secured 
public website and verify that the public website certificate was valid.  Results show that 
when the system was able to associate to an AP, obtain client DHCP information, 
confirm Internet access, access secured public website and verify that the public website 
certificate was valid, only then, the system was able to obtain the global IP address.  To 
verify AP association, the system displayed the elements of the network interface specific 
to the wireless operation.  The system printed: “Client has associated to AP”.  To verify 
DHCP information, the system displayed configured network interface parameters.  The 
system printed: “Found IP address: xxx.xxx.xx.xx”. To verify Internet access, the system 
attempted to access an URL to check Internet connection.  If the system was able to 
access the URL, then the system proceeded to approve terms of use.  When redirection to 
a captive portal was detected, the system accepted terms of use and checked the Internet 
connection.  The system printed: “CSMETAD was able to accept terms of use.  Internet 
access confirmed”. When redirection to a captive portal was not detected, Internet access 
was confirmed.  The system printed: “Internet access confirmed”.  If the system was not 
able to access the URL, then the system printed: “Terms of Use approval failed”.  To 
verify access to secured public website and that the public website certificate was valid, 
the system displayed cipher suite parameters and printed secured public website access as 
“true”, certificate status as “valid”, and global IP address results. 
     Once the system finished iterating throughout all the APs, the system determined the 
trusted global IP address to be used by the system for the duration of the public Wi-Fi 
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connection by validating the number of global IP address occurrences.  Results show that 
when the number of global IP address occurrences was equal to or greater than 2, the 
system assigned the global IP address as the trusted global IP and proceeded to iterate 
throughout all APs to categorize them as either “valid”, “ETA”, or “unknown”.  In this 
scenario, the AP global IP addresses in the list were the same as the trusted global IP 
address; therefore, the system updated the APs for selected SSID list with AP state as 
“valid”. 
Scenario 1 - Alternative Flows - Phase 1 – Data Collection  
     During the initial phase 1 scan, results show that when the number of APs for selected 
SSID was less than 2, the system presented the following message: “There is insufficient 
information to detect ETAs”, and the system ended.   
     During AP association, results show that when the system was not able to associate to 
an AP in the first attempt, the system slept for one second and re-attempted association.  
The system attempted to associate to an AP for 5 seconds.  When the system was not able 
to associate to an AP in 5 seconds, it updated the AP state as “unknown” and attempted to 
associate to the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list.   
     After successful AP association, results show that when the system was not able to 
obtain DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access secured public website or 
verify that the public website certificate was valid, the system updated the AP state as 
“unknown”, disassociated from current AP and associated to the next AP in the APs for 
selected SSID list. 
     During the determination of the trusted global IP, results show that when the number 
of global IP address occurrences was less than 2, the system displayed the following 
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message: “There is not enough information to categorize APs”, updated AP state as 
“unknown”, and the system ended. 
Scenario 1 - Basic Flow - Phase 2 – Detection and Protection 
     In phase 2, the system proceeded to rescan the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover 
APs with selected SSID.  The system added all APs for selected SSID with signal 
strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list (new list).  
The system detected two APs with the same MAC addresses as phase 1.  Next, the 
system validated if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1.  
Results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 
1, the system retrieved learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC addresses 
list and removed learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list.  In the 
tests, since no mobile evil twin APs were detected in phase 1, no ETA MAC addresses 
were retrieved and removed.  The system then validated if the number of APs for selected 
SSID continues to be equal to or greater than 1.  Results show that when the number of 
APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system started to iterate across 
all the APs.  First, the system attempted to associate to the AP with the highest signal 
strength in the APs for selected SSID list.  After successful AP association, the system 
proceeded to obtain client DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access secured 
public website and verify that the public website certificate was valid.  Results show that 
when the system was able to associate to an AP, obtain client DHCP information, 
confirm Internet access, access secured public website and verify the public website 
certificate was valid, only then, the system obtained the global IP address.  To verify AP 
association, the system displayed the elements of the network interface specific to the 
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wireless operation.  The system printed: “Client has associated to AP”.  To verify DHCP 
information, the system displayed configured network interface parameters.  The system 
printed: “Found IP address: xxx.xxx.xx.xx”.  To verify Internet access, the system 
attempted to access an URL to check Internet connection.  If the system was able to 
access the URL, then the system proceeded to approve terms of use.  When redirection to 
a captive portal was detected, the system accepted terms of use and checked the Internet 
connection.  The system printed: “CSMETAD was able to accept terms of use.  Internet 
access confirmed”. When redirection to a captive portal was not detected, Internet access 
was confirmed.  The system printed: “Internet access confirmed”.  If the system was not 
able to access the URL, then the system printed: “Terms of Use approval failed”.   To 
verify access to secured public website and that the public website certificate was valid, 
the system displayed cipher suite parameters and printed secured public website access as 
“true”, certificate status as “valid”, and global IP address results. 
     The system then validated if the AP global IP address was the same as the trusted 
global IP address.  Results show that the AP global IP address was the same as the trusted 
global IP address, the system connected to the AP and presented the following message: 
“Wi-Fi connection is safe.  You are connected to a legitimate AP”.  The system then 
waited for a disassociated wireless card event. 
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Scenario 1 - Alternative Flow – Phase 2 – Detection and Protection 
 
     During the rescan, results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was 
less than 1, the system presented the following message: “Your device is out of range for 
the selected public Wi-Fi hotspot.  Please move closer”.  The system then rescanned the 
public Wi-Fi network. 
     After retrieving the learned ETA MAC addresses from the learned ETA MAC 
addresses list and removing learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID 
list, the system validated if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater 
than 1.  Results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was less than 1, the 
system presented the following message: “You are located in the vicinity of Evil Twin 
Attacks.  Please move to a different location within the public Wi-Fi hotspot”.  The 
system then rescanned the public Wi-Fi network. 
     During AP association, results show that when the system was not able to associate to 
an AP in the first attempt, the system slept for 1 second and re-attempted association.  
The system attempted to associate to an AP for 5 seconds.  When the system was not able 
to associate to an AP in 5 seconds, it attempted to associate to the next AP in the APs for 
selected SSID list.  When the system was not able to associate to any APs, it rescanned 
the public Wi-Fi network.   
     After successful AP association, results show that when the system was not able to 
obtain DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access to secured public website or 
verify that the public website certificate was valid, the system disassociated from current 
AP and associated to the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list. 
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Scenario 2: User was connected to a legitimate AP.  Attacker arrived at the public Wi-
Fi hotspot with a mobile evil twin AP, disassociated the user from legitimate AP, and 
forced the user to connect to the mobile evil twin AP (higher signal strength).  Attacker 
set up the mobile evil twin AP with the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet as the 
legitimate AP.   
Scenario 2 - Basic Flow - Phase 2 – Detection and Protection 
     The system received a disassociated wireless card event caused by an attacker and 
proceeded to rescan the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID. 
Case 1: System detected two APs (One AP with signal strength equal to or greater than   
-75 dBm and one AP with signal strength less than -75 dBm). 
     The system added all APs for selected SSID with signal strength equal to or greater 
than -75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list.  This resulted in only one AP added to 
the list.  This AP had the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet of a legitimate AP.  Next, 
the system validated if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 
1.  Results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater 
than 1, the system retrieved learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC 
addresses list and removed learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list.  
Since no mobile evil twin AP was detected in scenario 1, no ETA MAC addresses were 
retrieved and removed.  The system then validated if the number of APs for selected 
SSID continues to be equal to or greater than 1.  Results show that when the number of 
APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system started to iterate across 
APs.  First, the system attempted to associate to the AP with the highest signal strength in 
the APs for selected SSID list.  After successful AP association, the system proceeded to 
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obtain client DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access secured public website 
and verify that the public website certificate was valid.  Results show that when the 
system was able to associate to an AP, obtain the client DHCP information, confirm 
Internet access, access secured public website and verify that public website certificate 
was valid, only then, the system obtained the global IP address.  To verify AP 
association, the system displayed the elements of the network interface specific to the 
wireless operation.  The system printed: “Client has associated to AP”. To verify DHCP 
information, the system displayed configured network interface parameters.  The system 
printed: “Found IP address: xxx.xxx.xx.xx”. To verify Internet access, the system 
attempted to access an URL to check Internet connection.  If the system was able to 
access the URL, then the system proceeded to approve terms of use.  When redirection to 
a captive portal was detected, the system accepted terms of use and checked the Internet 
connection.  The system printed: “CSMETAD was able to accept terms of use.  Internet 
access confirmed”. When redirection to a captive portal was not detected, Internet access 
was confirmed.  The system printed: “Internet access confirmed”.  If the system was not 
able to access the URL, then the system printed: “Terms of Use approval failed”.  To 
verify access to secured public website and that the public website certificate was valid, 
the system displayed cipher suite parameters and printed secured public website access as 
“true”, certificate status as “valid”, and global IP address results. 
     The system then validated if the AP global IP address was the same as the trusted 
global IP address.  Results show that the AP global IP address was not the same as the 
trusted global IP address, the system detected an ETA, and presented the following 
message: “CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”, added the AP 
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MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list, disassociated from current AP and 
associated to the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list.   
     Since there were no more APs in the list, the system displayed the following message: 
“CSMETAD finished iterating across the list of APs and was not able to validate that the 
AP global IP was the same as the trusted global IP” and proceeded to rescan the public 
Wi-Fi network.  
Case 2: System detected two APs (One of the APs had the same MAC address as 
previously detected ETA.  Both APs with signal strength equal to or greater than -75 
dBm).   
     The system added all APs for selected SSID with signal strength equal to or greater 
than -75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list.  Next, the system validated if the number 
of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1.  Results show that when the 
number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system retrieved 
learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC addresses list and removed 
learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list.  In this case, the AP with 
the same MAC address as previously detected ETA was removed from the APs for 
selected SSID list.  After removing learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected 
SSID list, the system validated if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or 
greater than 1.  Results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal 
to or greater than 1, the system started to iterate across APs.  The system associated with 
the AP with the highest signal strength.  After successful AP association, the system 
proceeded to obtain client DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access secured 
public website and verify that the public website certificate was valid.  Results show that 
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when the system was able to associate to an AP, obtain the client DHCP information, 
confirm Internet access, access secured public website and validate public website 
certificate was valid, only then, the system obtained the global IP address.  To verify AP 
association, the system displayed the elements of the network interface specific to the 
wireless operation.  The system printed: “Client has associated to AP”. To verify DHCP 
information, the system displayed configured network interface parameters.  The system 
printed: “Found IP address: xxx.xxx.xx.xx”. To verify Internet access, the system 
attempted to access an URL to check Internet connection.  If the system was able to 
access the URL, then the system proceeded to approve terms of use.  When redirection to 
a captive portal was detected, the system accepted terms of use and checked the Internet 
connection.  The system printed: “CSMETAD was able to accept terms of use.  Internet 
access confirmed”. When redirection to a captive portal was not detected, Internet access 
was confirmed.  The system printed: “Internet access confirmed”.  If the system was not 
able to access the URL, then the system printed: “Terms of Use approval failed”.   To 
verify access to secured public website and that the public website certificate was valid, 
the system displayed cipher suite parameters and printed secured public website access as 
“true”, certificate status as “valid”, and global IP address results. 
     The system then validated if the AP global IP address was the same as the trusted 
global IP address.  Results show that the AP global IP address was the same as the trusted 
global IP address, the system connected to the AP and presented the following message: 
“Wi-Fi connection is safe.  You are connected to a legitimate AP”.  Results show that 
when the system connected to a legitimate AP, it then waited for a disassociated wireless 
card event.  When the system received a disassociated wireless card event, it proceeded to 
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rescan the public Wi-Fi network protecting the user for the duration of the public Wi-Fi 
connection discovering and reporting on new mobile evil twin APs.  Algorithm phase 2 
repeated (infinite loop). 
Case 3: System detected two APs (One AP with the same MAC address as the previously 
detected ETA and signal strength greater than -75 dBm and one AP with signal strength 
less than -75 dBm). 
     The system added all APs for selected SSID with signal strength equal to or greater 
than -75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list.  Only the AP with the same MAC 
address as the previously detected ETA was added to the list.  Next, the system validated 
if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1.  Results show that 
when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system 
retrieved learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC addresses list and 
removed learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list.  In this case, the 
AP with the same MAC address as previously detected ETA was removed from the APs 
for selected SSID list, leaving no more APs in the list.  After removing learned ETA 
MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list, the system validated if the number of 
APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1.  Results show that when the 
number of APs for selected SSID was less than 1, the system presented the following 
message: “You are located in the vicinity of Evil Twin Attacks.  Please move to a 
different location within the public Wi-Fi hotspot”.  The system then rescanned the public 
Wi-Fi network. 
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Scenario 2 - Alternative Flow – Phase 2 – Detection and Protection 
     After the first rescan, results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID 
was less than 1, the system presented the following message: “Your device is out of range 
for the selected public Wi-Fi hotspot.  Please move closer”.  The system then rescanned 
the public Wi-Fi network. 
     During AP association, results show that when the system was not able to associate to 
an AP in the first attempt, the system slept for 1 second and re-attempted association.  
The system attempted to associate to an AP for 5 seconds.  When the system was not able 
to associate to an AP in 5 seconds, it attempted to associate to the next AP in the APs for 
selected SSID list.  When the system was not able to associate to any APs, it rescanned 
the public Wi-Fi network.   
     After successful AP association, results also show that when the system was not able 
to obtain DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access secured public website or 
verify public website certificate was valid, the system disassociated from current AP and 
associated to the next AP with the highest signal strength in the APs for selected SSID 
list.   
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Field – Performance 
     Performance metrics from Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) as presented in chapter 3 were 
used to measure the effectiveness of the artifact in an uncontrolled environment.  
CSMETAD detected mobile evil twin attacks, with 100% accuracy, precision, and recall.  
CSMETAD performance in detecting mobile evil twin attacks is depicted in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14.  CSMETAD performance for mobile evil twin attacks in the field. 
 
Field – Time Delay Analysis 
     Analysis of time delay was conducted using field data.  Delay mainly consisted of 
time to associate to APs, collect DHCP information, confirm Internet access, connect to 
secured public website, verify that the public website certificate was valid, receive 
response from webserver, and connect the user to a legitimate AP after detection of 
mobile evil twin AP.  The author measured the time delay for 3 main steps in the 
detection algorithm.  The test was repeated 50 times.   
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a. Time to associate to an AP and obtain a valid IP address from the DHCP server.  
The results show that the average time to associate to an AP was 1 second and the 
average time to obtain a valid IP address from the DHCP server was 2 seconds.  Total 
of 3 seconds for both parameters.  Many factors affect these values, such as wireless 
network devices, wireless network’s connection, and DHCP server. 
b. Time to confirm Internet access.  The results show that the average to confirm 
Internet access was 0.5 seconds.  These time values depend on factors such as captive 
portal and Internet speed. 
c. Time to connect to secured public website, verify that the public website 
certificate was valid, and receive a response from the webserver.  The results 
show that the average duration of time required to connect to the secured public 
website, verify that the public website certificate was valid, and receive a response 
from the webserver was 0.7 seconds. Many factors affect these values, such as 
Internet speed, DNS response time, and webserver’s response time. 
     For the three AP scenario (two legitimate APs and one mobile evil twin AP), data 
collection was completed within 8.2 seconds, mobile evil twin AP detection took 
approximately 5.2 seconds and the connection to a legitimate AP after detection was 
completed in 3.8 seconds.   
     Figure 15, 16 and 17 illustrate the results of the measurements. 
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Figure 15. Time delay - Data Collection.  a) connecting to legitimate AP1. (b) confirming 
Internet access.  (c) connecting to public website, verifying certificate, and receiving a 
response from the webserver.  d) connecting to legitimate AP2. (e) confirming Internet 
access.  (f) connecting to public website, verifying certificate, and receiving a response 
from the webserver.   
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Figure 16. Time delay - Mobile Evil Twin AP Detection.  a) connecting to mobile evil 
twin AP. (b) confirming Internet access.  (c) connecting to public website, verifying 
certificate, and receiving a response from the webserver.   
  
 
 
Figure 17. Time delay – Connection to legitimate AP after detection.  a) connecting to 
legitimate AP. (b) confirming Internet access.  (c) connecting to public website, verifying 
certificate, and receiving a response from the webserver.   
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Summary of Results 
     As a result of this research and data analysis findings, experimental results show that 
CSMETAD can effectively detect and protect users from mobile evil twin attacks in 
public Wi-Fi hotspots with 100% accuracy, precision and recall.  Data collection was 
completed within 8.2 seconds, mobile evil twin AP detection took approximately 5.2 
seconds and the connection to a legitimate AP after detection was completed in 3.8 
seconds.  Although, time delay may vary according to many factors as explained above, 
these factors did not affect the detection effectiveness.   
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations 
     This chapter presents the conclusions of this study, including its strengths, weakness, 
and limitations.  The chapter also includes the implications for actions and 
recommendations for future research.  This chapter concludes with a summary of the 
study. 
Conclusions 
     For this investigation, the author sought to develop a more effective, efficient, and 
practical client-side evil twin attack detection system for wireless users to independently 
detect and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks while using free open public 
Wi-Fi hotspots.  To this end, this was an experimental study that used Hevner et al.’s 
(2004) seven guidelines of DSR, Peffers et al.’s DSRM (2008), and Hossen & 
Wenyuan’s (2014) study evaluation methodology.  The client-side evil twin attack 
detection system was validated by conducting a three-week field study at a hotel public 
Wi-Fi hotspot and tested against Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) method for detecting 
mobile evil twin attacks. 
     Based on the analysis performed and the results achieved as presented in chapter 4, the 
specifics objectives of the research questions in this study haven been met based on 
evidence that is presented in the following pages and paragraphs.  
     The first research question asked for the requirements that the artifact must meet in 
order to address the problem.  The answer to the first research question is provided in the 
form of requirements based on a thorough review of existing client-side evil twin attack 
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detection literature addressing limitations regarding requirements, assumptions, and 
evaluation approaches as presented in chapter 3. 
     The second research question asked for the major decision points in the design and 
development process.  The answer to this question is provided in the form of design 
principles, procedures and specifications based on DSR that supported the artifact 
construction, implementation, and evaluation of the client-side evil twin attack detection 
system as presented in chapter 3. 
     The third research question asked for the way the product developed meet or fail to 
meet the requirements specified.  The answer to this question is provided in the form of 
observations and results from the lab and field tested against Hossen and Wenyuan’s 
detection method.  Details are presented below: 
R1:  It will protect users whether or not they have connected to a free open public Wi-Fi 
network in the past.  
     Experimental results indicate that the system successfully met this requirement by 
disabling auto-connections to all open (unencrypted) public Wi-Fi connections, 
protecting the user from automatically connecting to a previously connected AP 
(potentially a mobile evil twin AP) when using the public Wi-Fi hotspot.   
     Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it does not protect 
users who have connected to an open (unencrypted) public Wi-Fi network in the past.  
Hossen & Wenyuan’s method does not cover this scenario. 
 
 
180 
 
 
R2: It will protect the user when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are 
detected during initial wireless network scanning.  
     Experimental results indicate that system successfully met this requirement.  After the 
system received a disassociated wireless card event, the system rescanned the wireless 
network to rediscover APs with selected SSID that were not detected during the initial 
wireless network scanning.  If after the rescan, the system did not detect any APs, the 
system rescanned the public Wi-Fi network.  This approach allows for the system to work 
effectively. 
     Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it assumes that all 
the public Wi-Fi APs are detected in the initial wireless network scanning, which in 
practice is not always the case.  Hossen and Wenyuan’s method does not cover the 
scenario when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are detected during the 
initial wireless network scanning. 
R3: It will protect the user when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the 
public Wi-Fi network. 
     Experimental results indicate that the system successfully met this requirement.  The 
system checked association to an AP with a timeout of 5 seconds.  In cases when the 
system was not able to associate to an AP within 5 seconds, it attempted to associate to 
the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list.  In phase 1, when the system was not able 
to associate to any of the APs, the system updated AP state as “unknown” and the system 
ended.   In phase 2, when the system was not able to associate to any of the APs, the 
system rescanned the public Wi-Fi network.  This approach allowed for the system to be 
practical and effective. 
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     Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it assumes that the 
client is able to associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network, which in practice is 
not always the case.  Hossen and Wenyuan’s method does not cover the scenario when 
the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network. 
R4:  It will protect users when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same 
SSID, BSSID (MAC address), and subnet of a legitimate AP. 
     Experimental results indicate that the system successfully met this requirement by 
detecting disassociated wireless network events caused by an attacker, rescanning the 
public Wi-Fi hotspot to rediscover APs with selected SSID, retrieving learned ETA MAC 
address from learned ETA MAC addresses list and removing learned ETA MAC 
addresses from APs for selected SSID list, validating APs even if they have the same 
SSID, MAC address and subnet as a legitimate AP, verifying AP association, DHCP 
information,  Internet access, access to secured public website and public website 
certificate, to be able to get the global IP address and compare it with trusted global IP 
address.  This approach allowed for the system to be effective. 
     Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it only protects 
users from mobile evil twin APs that have the same SSID.  Method assumes that the AP 
MAC addresses are unique and use that as a reference to switch between APs.  Also, 
Hossen & Wenyuan’s method assumes that the mobile evil twin AP is in a different 
subnet as the legitimate AP.  To avoid detection, the attacker could set up the mobile evil 
twin AP with the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet of a legitimate AP.  Also, 
method assumes that the attacker is already in the hotspot and is connected when the 
wireless user runs the detection system.  In a real life environment, an attacker may not 
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be present when the user connects to the hotspot.  Hossen & Wenyuan’s method does not 
cover the scenario when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same SSID, 
MAC address, and subnet of a legitimate AP and when the attacker arrives at the public 
Wi-Fi hotspot at a later time.  Additionally, Hossen & Wenyuan assume that the client is 
always able to associate to an AP, obtain DHCP address, confirm Internet access, and 
access secured public website, which in practice is not always the case. 
R5:  It will protect users when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get 
ISP information. 
     Experimental results indicate that the system successfully met this requirement by 
detecting public website access blocking, disassociating from AP and associating to the 
next AP in the APs for selected SSID list.   
     Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it does not protect 
the user when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get ISP 
information.  An attacker who is aware of the algorithm would try to block the user 
access to the secured public website used to get ISP information.  If the attacker blocks 
access to the website, the method will not work.   
R6:  It will protect users when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving 
ISP information from a public website. 
     This requirement was only simulated and tested in the lab.  Lab results indicate that 
the system successfully met this requirement by verifying public website certificates 
presented by an attacker when the system access secured public website to retrieve ISP 
information; and if invalid, adding AP MAC address to learned ETA MAC address list, 
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disassociating from AP and associating to the next AP from the APs for selected SSID 
list.   
     Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it does not protect 
the user when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving ISP information 
from a public website.  Method does not verify the public web server certificate.  An 
attacker who is aware of the algorithm would try to present an invalid certificate while 
the system is retrieving ISP information.  The attacker would create a fake remote server 
to bypass detection procedure.  If the attacker presents an invalid certificate, the method 
will not work.   
R7:  It will, after mobile evil twin AP detection, connect the user to a legitimate AP. 
     Experimental results indicate that the system successfully met this requirement by 
validating remaining APs after mobile evil twin AP detection, associating to the next AP 
with the highest signal strength, verifying AP association, DHCP information, Internet 
access, access to secured public website and public website certificate, to be able to get 
the global IP address and compare it with trusted global IP address.  This approach allows 
for seamless and secured public Wi-Fi experience in a public Wi-Fi location. 
     Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since after mobile evil 
twin AP detection, it does not connect the user to a legitimate AP.  Method only warns 
the user of the presence of an evil twin AP.  Method does not cover the scenario when 
after detection, it connects the user to a legitimate AP. 
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R8:  It will protect the user for the duration of the public Wi-Fi connection, discovering 
and reporting on new mobile evil twin access points. 
     Experimental results indicate that the system successfully met this requirement by 
detecting a disassociated wireless card event and rescanning the public Wi-Fi network 
environment to rediscover and report on new mobile evil twin access points for the 
duration of the public Wi-Fi connection.  Algorithm phase 2 repeated (infinite loop).  The 
infinite loop approach allowed for the system to be practical and effective. 
     Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it does not protect 
the public Wi-Fi users for the duration of the Wi-Fi connection, discovering and reporting 
on new mobile evil twin access points. Method assumes that the attacker is already in the 
hotspot and is connected when the wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi network. In 
real life environment, an attacker may not be present when the user connects to the 
hotspot. Method does not address the case where the attacker arrives later at the hotspot. 
     In regards to system performance, results show that CSMETAD can effectively detect 
and protect users from mobile evil twin AP attacks in public Wi-Fi hotspots in various 
real-world scenarios despite time delay caused by many factors.  Time delay details are 
provided separately for data collection, detection, and connection to legitimate AP to be 
used as a baseline for future studies. 
Strengths 
     The major strength of this investigation is that the system was designed and developed 
based on a thorough review of the existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions 
literature and addressed limitations regarding requirements, assumptions, and evaluation 
approaches.  Additionally, the DSR principles, procedures and specifications that 
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supported the construction, implementation, and evaluation of the client-side evil twin 
attack detection system provided an approach to conducting field studies of a similar 
nature with focus on multiple real-world scenarios. 
Weakness 
     One weakness of this study is that the detection system built as part of this study does 
not operate under the assumption that the attacker performs an evil twin attack using the 
legitimate AP’s Internet access.  However, combining the detection method with other 
methods that were used to detect evil twin attacks using the legitimate AP’s Internet 
access, such as the ones referenced in this dissertation, will provide a complete evil twin 
attack detection system. 
Limitations 
     One of the limitations in this study is that since the artifact was initially evaluated in 
the wild, the author was not able to control when attackers were going to appear at the 
hotel public Wi-Fi hotspot to perform mobile evil twin AP attacks.  Since no evil twin 
APs were detected during the field evaluation period, the author proceeded to test the 
system using the lab mobile evil twin AP.  Similar evaluation technique was used in 
Hossen & Wenyuan’s and the remainder of client-side evil twin attack detection studies 
referenced in this dissertation. 
     Another limitation in this investigation was evaluation costs that prevented the author 
from evaluating the detection system using public Wi-Fi users (as users of the detection 
system) and at a large scale.  In order to analyze and evaluate the artifact using public 
Wi-Fi users and at a large scale, the system would need to be made available to a large 
number of actual users who can test the system in many public Wi-Fi locations for a 
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defined period and report back to the author on detection effectiveness and efficiency.  
This will improve the likelihood of detecting real mobile evil twin APs in the wild.  
Despite evaluation cost limitations, the scope of the study was appropriate and consistent 
with the budget. 
 
Implications 
   
Impact on the Field of Study 
 
     The goal of this study was to contribute to the body of knowledge of wireless security 
research by developing a more effective, efficient, and practical client-side evil twin 
attack detection system for wireless users to independently detect and protect themselves 
from mobile evil twin attacks while using free open public Wi-Fi.  The artifact was 
designed, developed and evaluated based on a thorough review of the existing client-side 
evil twin attack detection solutions literature and addressed limitations regarding 
requirements, assumptions, and evaluation approaches.  Based on design science research 
(DSR) literature, Hevner’s seven guidelines of DSR, Peffer’s design science research 
methodology (DSRM), and Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study evaluation methodology, 
the author developed design principles, procedures and specifications to guide the 
construction, implementation, and evaluation of a prototype client-side evil twin attack 
detection artifact.  The author evaluated the client-side evil twin attack detection system 
in a hotel public Wi-Fi environment.  To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the 
first academic study in this field that attempts to detect mobile evil twin APs in the wild 
extensively at a public Wi-Fi hotspot.  Since no evil twin APs were detected during the 
field evaluation period, the author proceeded to test the system with the mobile evil twin 
AP used in the lab.  Adoption of this artifact by others will provide a detection method 
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that can be improved to include additional real-world scenarios in studies of a similar 
nature. 
Implications for Future Research 
 
     Implications for future research include a large-scale evaluation with real traveling 
users of the system in many public Wi-Fi hotspot locations.  Because this study focused 
on detecting mobile evil twin APs in a single public Wi-Fi hotspot, similar studies can be 
conducted in many public Wi-Fi hotspots improving the likelihood of detecting real 
mobile evil twin APs.  Conducting such studies would require improvements to the 
client-side mobile evil twin attack detection system.  Suggested improvements are 
presented in the section below.   
 
Recommendations  
     The system limitations observed by the author during this investigation primarily 
involved: (1) initializing the system before arriving to the hotspot to disable 
autoconnection to previously connected open public Wi-Fi hotspots; (2) waiting for a 
disassociated wireless card event to rescan the wireless network and connect to an AP 
with better signal strength when the signal level is below a threshold; (3) costs of creating 
a fake remote server to test the validity of a public website certificate; and (4) creating a 
user interface for a large-scale evaluation in the wild.  To address these limitations, the 
author recommends the following: (1) disabling autoconnect when the user installs the 
system; (2) rescanning the wireless network when the signal strength of an AP is below a 
determined threshold; (3) testing SSL exceptions with a larger set of invalid certificates; 
and (4) creating an effective graphical user interface.  Adoption of these 
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recommendations could provide overall improvements to the client-side mobile evil twin 
attack detection system and facilitate broader adoption in similar studies. 
     To address the limitation of initializing the system before visiting the hotspot to 
disable autoconnection to previously connected open Wi-Fi connections, the author 
recommends disabling autoconnect when the user installs the system on his or her laptop. 
This approach would consist of a subset application that when installed and run will 
disable all previous open Wi-Fi connections.  
     Rescanning the wireless network when the signal strength of an AP is below a 
determined threshold would facilitate not waiting for a disassociated wireless card event 
to rescan the wireless network to connect to an AP that offers a better signal strength. 
     To address the limitation of costs of creating a fake remote server to test the validity 
of a public website certificate, the author recommends instead expanding the simulation 
approach used in this dissertation report to include testing of SSL exceptions with a larger 
list of invalid certificates.  An example of a website that includes a list on invalid SSL 
certificates is badssl.com (Google Open Source, n.d.).   
     To address creating a user interface for a large scale evaluation in the wild, the author 
recommends the development of a graphical user interface that displays simple user 
messages communicating detection and protection results.  The graphical user interface 
should be designed to facilitate a wide adoption and usability of the system by non-
technical users.  
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Summary 
     Users and providers benefit considerably from public Wi-Fi hotspots.  Users receive 
wireless Internet access and providers draw new prospective customers.  While users are 
able to enjoy the ease of Wi-Fi Internet hotspot networks in public more conveniently, 
they are more susceptible to a particular type of fraud and identify theft, referred to as 
evil twin attack (ETA).  Through setting up an ETA, an attacker can intercept sensitive 
data such as passwords or credit card information by snooping into the communication 
links.  Since the objective of free open (unencrypted) public Wi-Fi hotspots is to provide 
ease of accessibility and to entice customers, no security mechanisms are in place.  The 
public’s lack of awareness of the security threat posed by free open public Wi-Fi hotspots 
makes this problem even more heinous.  Client-side systems to help wireless users detect 
and protect themselves from evil twin attacks in public Wi-Fi hotspots are in great need.      
     The author explored the problem of the need for client-side detection systems that will 
allow wireless users to help protect their data from evil twin attacks while using free open 
public Wi-Fi.  The client-side evil twin attack detection system developed as part of this 
dissertation linked the gap between the need for wireless security in free open public Wi-
Fi hotspots and limitations in existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions. The 
goal of this research was to develop a more effective, efficient, and practical client-side 
detection system for wireless users to independently detect and protect themselves from 
mobile evil twin attacks while using free open public Wi-Fi hotspots. 
     To address the research problem and the methodology of how to accomplish the stated 
goal of designing and building a more effective, efficient, and practical client-side artifact 
to be used to detect mobile evil twin attacks, the author utilized a two phased research 
approach.  In phase one, the author developed design principles, procedures and 
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specifications to guide the design, construction, implementation, and evaluation of the 
prototype client-side evil twin detection artifact using Hevner’s seven guidelines of DSR, 
Peffer’s design science research methodology (DSRM), and Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) 
study evaluation methodology.  In phase two, the author extensively evaluated the 
performance of the client-side evil twin attack detection method by implementing a 
prototype system.  The prototype system was implemented and evaluated in two 
environments.  First, in a lab to analyze the requirements and demonstrate the 
effectiveness in a controlled environment.  Second, in the field at a hotel public Wi-Fi 
hotspot to extensively evaluate the robustness of the system in practice.  The prototype 
system aimed at detecting real mobile evil twin APs in the wild at a hotel property that 
provides free open public Wi-Fi in its public spaces.  Since no real evil twin APs were 
detected during the field evaluation period, the author proceeded to evaluate the system 
with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.  Similar approach was used by Hossen & 
Wenyuan’s study and the remainder of the client-side evil twin attack detection studies 
referenced in this dissertation.   
     The techniques to evaluate the effectiveness of the system were based on Hossen & 
Wenyuan’s (2014) evaluation methodology which was published and validated.  The 
client-side evil twin detection method developed as part of this dissertation was tested 
against Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) method for detecting mobile evil twin attacks.  The 
experimental results show that the CSMETAD system can effectively detect and protect 
users from mobile evil twin AP attacks in public Wi-Fi hotspots in various real-world 
scenarios despite time delay caused by many factors.  
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     At the conclusion of this study, the author addressed the observed limitations of the 
study, discussed the implications for further research, and presented recommendations. 
The major limitations of the study were being able to detect mobile evil twin APs in the 
wild and evaluation costs. An implication for further research includes a large-scale 
evaluation with real traveling users of the system in many public Wi-Fi hotspot locations. 
Conducting such study would require improvements to the client-side mobile evil twin 
attack detection system. 
     To address the limitations of initializing the system before arriving to the hotspot to 
disable autoconnection to previous open public Wi-Fi connections, waiting for a 
disassociated wireless card event to rescan the wireless network, costs of creating a fake 
remote server to test the validity of a public website certificate, and creating a user 
interface for a large scale evaluation in the wild, the author offered several 
recommendations. These recommendations included disabling autoconnect when the user 
install the system, rescanning the wireless network when the signal level of an AP is 
below a determined threshold, testing SSL exceptions with a larger set of invalid 
certificates, and creating an effective graphical user interface. Adoption of these 
recommendations can provide overall improvements on the client-side mobile evil twin 
attack detection method and facilitate broader adoption in field studies of a similar nature. 
    To provide visibility and distribution of the CSMETAD system design, 
implementation, and evaluation process developed in this study, specifications and 
procedures are communicated in the form of a solution manual that is available to all 
academic institutions.  Refer to Appendix D. 
 
192 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Requirements and limitations mapping based on literature review 
 
 
 
Requirements 
Han et 
al. 
(2009) 
Song et 
al. 
(2010) 
Han et 
al. 
(2011) 
Monica 
& 
Ribeiro 
(2011) 
Song et 
al.  
(2012) 
Nikbakhsh 
et al. 
(2012) 
Kim et 
al. 
(2012) 
Lanze et 
al. (2014) 
Hsu et al. 
(2015) 
Szongott 
et al. 
(2015) 
Hossen 
& 
Wenyuan 
(2014) 
Nakhila 
et al. 
(2015) 
1. Timing-based or 
traceroute 
Y- Y- Y- N Y- Y- N N N N Y- N 
2. Assume the attacker 
uses the legitimate 
wireless network gateway 
 
Y- 
 
Y- 
 
Y- 
 
Y- 
 
Y- 
 
Y- 
 
Y- 
 
N 
 
Y- 
 
n.a. 
 
Y- 
 
N 
3. Assume the attacker 
uses a different gateway 
from a legitimate AP  
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
n.a. 
 
Y 
 
Y 
4. Assume attacker 
performs a mobile attack  
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
N n.a. Y Y 
 
5. Require network 
administrator assistance 
or privileges 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
6. System is automated 
with no intervention from 
users 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
Y 
 
N- 
 
n.a. 
 
Y 
 
n.a. 
 
N- 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
7. Require knowledge of 
wireless hotspot network 
infrastructure, AP 
authorization list and/or 
user/hosts (trained 
knowledge) 
Y- Y- 
(TMM) 
N 
(HDT) 
Y- N Y- 
(TMM) 
N 
(HDT) 
N N N N Y- N N 
                 (continued) 
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Requirements 
Han et 
al. 
(2009) 
Song et 
al. 
(2010) 
Han et 
al. 
(2011) 
Monica 
& 
Ribeiro 
(2011) 
Song et 
al.  
(2012) 
Nikbakhsh 
et al. 
(2012) 
Kim et 
al. 
(2012) 
Lanze et 
al. (2014) 
Hsu et al. 
(2015) 
Szongott 
et al. 
(2015) 
Hossen 
& 
Wenyuan 
(2014) 
Nakhila 
et al. 
(2015) 
8. Require infrastructure 
support (hotspot wireless 
network modification, 
extra devices/addl. 
equipment, etc.) 
 
N 
 
Y- 
 
N 
 
Y- 
 
Y- 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
Y- 
 
Y- 
 
N 
 
N 
9. Leverage a public 
server 
N N N N N N N N N N Y Y 
10. Work with any type of 
IEEE 802.11 based 
wireless networks 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
11. Work with Wi-Fi 
enabled device 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
12. Work with free open 
(unencrypted) public Wi-
Fi networks 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
13. Technology 
independent (e.g. received 
signal strength 
fluctuation, network 
saturation, network traffic 
conditions, etc.) 
N- N- N- Y N- n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
14. Assume that the 
BSSID of the hotspot APs 
are unique and use that as 
a reference to switch 
between different APs 
with the same SSID in the 
hotspot   
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Y- Y- 
                                       (continued)  
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Requirements 
Han et 
al. 
(2009) 
Song et 
al. 
(2010) 
Han et 
al. 
(2011) 
Monica 
& 
Ribeiro 
(2011) 
Song et 
al.  
(2012) 
Nikbakhsh 
et al. 
(2012) 
Kim et 
al. 
(2012) 
Lanze et 
al. (2014) 
Hsu et al. 
(2015) 
Szongott 
et al. 
(2015) 
Hossen 
& 
Wenyuan 
(2014) 
Nakhila 
et al. 
(2015) 
15. Assume that the evil 
twin AP is in the same 
subnet as the legitimate 
AP 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. N- Y 
16.  Protect users when 
the attacker blocks access 
to the public website used 
to get ISP information  
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. N- N- 
17.  Protect users when 
the attacker presents an 
invalid certificate while 
retrieving ISP information 
from public website 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. N- Y 
18. Assume detection of 
all the APs in the public 
Wi-Fi network during the 
initial wireless network 
scanning  
Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- 
19. Assume that the client 
is able to associate to all 
the APs in the public Wi-
Fi network 
Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- Y- 
20. Assume that the user 
has or has not connected 
to the target public Wi-Fi 
network in the past 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
21. Assume the attacker is 
connected when the 
wireless user connects to 
the public Wi-Fi hotspot 
Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y Y Y 
 
Y 
 
                 (continued)  
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Requirements 
Han et 
al. 
(2009) 
Song et al. 
(2010) 
Han et 
al. 
(2011) 
Monica & 
Ribeiro 
(2011) 
Song et al.  
(2012) 
Nikbak
hsh et 
al. 
(2012) 
Kim et 
al. 
(2012) 
Lanze et 
al. 
(2014) 
Hsu et al. 
(2015) 
Szongott 
et al. 
(2015) 
Hossen 
& 
Wenyuan 
(2014) 
Nakhila 
et al. 
(2015) 
22. Assume the attacker is 
not connected when the 
user connects initially to 
the public Wi-Fi hotspots 
and protect the wireless 
user for the duration to 
the public Wi-Fi network 
connection 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
23. Warn the wireless 
user of an evil twin attack 
before any traffic is 
transmitted 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
24. After evil twin 
detection, the system - 
connects the user to a 
legitimate AP 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
N- 
 
N- 
25. Evaluated in lab 
setting 
Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y 
 
Y 
 
N Y 
26. Evaluated in the field Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N Y N 
27. Used their own evil 
twin AP in the evaluation 
Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
28. Aimed at detecting 
real evil twin APs (wild) 
N- N- N- N- N-  N-  N-  N-  
29. Public Wi-Fi hotspots University University University University University  University 
Cafes 
 University  University 
Cafes 
Restaurants 
Airports 
 
30. Large scale evaluation N N N N N  n.a.   N  Y  
                 (continued)  
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Requirements 
Han et 
al. 
(2009) 
Song et al. 
(2010) 
Han et 
al. 
(2011) 
Monica & 
Ribeiro 
(2011) 
Song et al.  
(2012) 
Nikbak
hsh et 
al. 
(2012) 
Kim et 
al. 
(2012) 
Lanze et 
al. 
(2014) 
Hsu et al. 
(2015) 
Szongott 
et al. 
(2015) 
Hossen 
& 
Wenyuan 
(2014) 
Nakhila 
et al. 
(2015) 
31. Evaluated for 
performance  
Y 
(Detection 
Accuracy, 
Efficiency) 
 
Y 
(Effectiveness, 
Efficiency) 
 
Y 
(Detection 
Accuracy, 
Efficiency) 
 
Y 
(Effectiveness, 
Efficiency) 
 
Y 
(Effectiveness, 
Efficiency) 
 
 
 
 
Y 
(Accuracy, 
True Positive 
Rate (TPR), 
False 
Positive Rate 
(FPR) 
 
 
 
Y*  
 
Y 
(Accuracy, 
Precision, 
Recall) 
 
 
 
32. Language  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. Java n.a. C 
33. Client Platform laptop laptop laptop laptop laptop  smartphone laptop laptop n.a. smartphone laptop 
34. Client OS Linux n.a. Linux Linux n.a.  Android n.a. Windows n.a. Android Linux 
 
Note. Y = included in solution based on literature; N = not included in solution based on literature; n.a. = could not be determined from the literature; - = solution limitation; * = no details provided; 
blank = not applicable. 
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Appendix B 
 
Algorithm Test Cases and Results 
 
Test 
ID 
Phase Test Step Expected Result Actual Result Status 
1 1 System disables 
“auto-connections” 
to open public Wi-Fi 
networks 
 System disabled auto-
connections 
As Expected Pass 
2 1 System scans public 
Wi-Fi network 
 System displayed list of 
SSIDs in range 
As Expected Pass 
3 1 User selects open 
public Wi-Fi hotspot 
SSID 
 System created list of 
APs for selected SSID 
(signal strength ≥ -75 
dBm) 
As Expected Pass 
4 1 Number of APs for 
selected SSID is less 
than 2 
 System displayed 
message: “There is 
insufficient information 
to detect ETAs”;  
 System ended 
As Expected Pass 
5 1 Number of APs for 
selected SSID is 
equal to or greater 
than 2 
 System displayed 
message: “There is 
sufficient information to 
detect ETAs”; 
 System started to iterate 
across all the APs in the 
APs for selected SSID 
list 
As Expected Pass 
(continued) 
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Test 
ID 
Phase Test Step Expected Result Actual Result Status 
6 1 AP iterator is greater 
than the number of 
APs for selected 
SSID 
 System ended iteration; 
 System proceeded to 
determine trusted global 
IP address to be used for 
the duration of the public 
Wi-Fi connection 
As Expected Pass 
7 1 AP iterator is less 
than the number of 
APs for selected 
SSID 
 System attempted to 
associate to AP on APs 
for selected SSID list 
As Expected Pass 
8 1 System is not able to 
associate to an AP 
 System updated APs for 
selected SSID list with 
AP state = “unknown”; 
 System associated to the 
next AP in the APs for 
selected SSID list; 
 Back to step 6/7 
As Expected Pass 
9 1 System is able to 
associate to AP 
 System proceeded to 
obtain Client DHCP 
address for the user 
As Expected Pass 
      
(continued) 
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Test 
ID 
Phase Test Step Expected Result Actual Result Status 
10 1 System is not able to 
get Client DHCP 
address for the user 
 System updated APs for 
selected SSID list with 
AP state = “unknown”; 
 System disassociated 
from current AP and 
associated to the next AP 
in the APs for selected 
SSID list; 
 Back to step 6/7 
As Expected Pass 
11 1 System is able to get 
Client DHCP 
address for the user 
 System proceeded to 
accept terms of use to 
access the Internet 
As Expected Pass 
12 1 System is not able to 
accept terms of use 
to access the Internet 
 System updated APs for 
selected SSID list with 
AP state = “unknown”; 
 System disassociated 
from current AP and 
associated to the next AP 
in the APs for selected 
SSID list; 
 Back to step 6/7 
As Expected Pass 
13 1 System is able to 
accept terms of use 
to access the Internet 
 System proceeded to 
access secured public 
website to retrieve global 
IP address of the AP 
As Expected Pass 
(continued) 
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Test 
ID 
Phase Test Step Expected Result Actual Result Status 
14 1 System is not able to 
access secured 
public website 
 System updated APs for 
selected SSID list with 
AP state = “unknown”; 
 System disassociated 
from current AP and 
associated to the next AP 
in the APs for selected 
SSID list; 
 Back to step 6/7 
As Expected Pass 
15 1 System is able to 
access secured 
public website 
 System proceeded to 
verify that the public 
website certificate is 
valid 
As Expected Pass 
16 1 Public website 
certificate is invalid 
 System updated APs for 
selected SSID list with 
AP state = “ETA”;  
 System added AP MAC 
address to the learned 
ETA MAC address list; 
 System disassociated 
from current AP and 
associated to the next AP 
in the APs for selected 
SSID list; 
 Back to step 6/7 
As Expected Pass 
(continued) 
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Test 
ID 
Phase Test Step Expected Result Actual Result Status 
17 1 Public website 
certificate is valid 
 System proceeded to get 
the global IP address of 
the AP 
As Expected Pass 
18 1 Number of 
occurrences of a 
global IP address is 
less than 2 
 System displayed 
message: “There is not 
enough information to 
categorize APs”; 
 System updated APs for 
selected SSID list with 
AP state = “unknown”;  
 System ended 
As Expected Pass 
19 1 Number of 
occurrences of a 
global IP address is 
equal to or greater 
than 2 
 System displayed 
message: “There is 
enough information to 
categorize APs”; 
 System set global IP as 
the trusted global IP 
address; 
 System started to 
categorize APs; 
 System started to iterate 
across all the APs in the 
APs for selected SSID 
list 
As Expected Pass 
(continued) 
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Test 
ID 
Phase Test Step Expected Result Actual Result Status 
20 1 AP iterator is greater 
than the number of 
APs for selected 
SSID 
 System ended iteration; 
 System moved to Phase 2 
detection and protection 
As Expected Pass 
21 1 AP iterator is less 
than the number of 
APs for selected 
SSID 
 System validated that the 
global IP address is the 
same as the trusted global 
IP address 
 
As Expected Pass 
22 1 Global IP address 
for an AP is not the 
same as the trusted 
global IP address 
 System updated APs for 
selected SSID list with 
AP state = ETA; 
 System added AP MAC 
address to the learned 
ETA MAC address list; 
 System disassociated 
from current AP and 
associated to the next AP 
in the APs for selected 
SSID list; 
 Back to step 6/7 
As Expected Pass 
(continued) 
  
203 
 
 
Test 
ID 
Phase Test Step Expected Result Actual Result Status 
23 1 Global IP address 
for an AP is the 
same as the trusted 
global IP address 
 System updated APs for 
selected SSID list with 
AP state = Valid; 
 System disassociated 
from current AP and 
associated to the next AP 
in the APs for selected 
SSID list; 
 Back to step 6/7 
As Expected Pass 
(continued) 
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Test 
ID 
Phase Test Step Expected Result Actual Result Status 
1 2 System rescans 
public Wi-Fi 
network to 
rediscover APs with 
selected SSID 
 System displayed list of 
SSIDs in range; 
 System created list of 
APs for selected SSID 
(signal strength ≥ -75 
dBm) (new list) 
As Expected Pass 
2 2 Number of APs for 
selected SSID is less 
than 1 
 System displayed 
message: “Your device is 
out of range for the 
selected public Wi-Fi 
hotspot.  Please move 
closer”; 
 Back to step 1 
As Expected Pass 
3 2 Number of APs for 
selected SSID is 
equal to or greater 
than 1 
 System retrieved learned 
ETA MAC addresses 
from Learned ETA 
MAC addresses list; 
 System removed learned 
ETA MAC addresses 
from APs for selected 
SSID list 
As Expected Pass 
(continued) 
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Test 
ID 
Phase Test Step Expected Result Actual Result Status 
4 2 Number of APs for 
selected SSID is less 
than 1 
 System displayed 
message: “You are 
located on the vicinity of 
Evil Twin Attacks.  
Please move to a 
different location within 
the public Wi-Fi 
Hotspot”; 
 Back to step 1 
As Expected Pass 
5 2 Number of APs for 
selected SSID is 
equal to or greater 
than 1 
 System started to iterate 
across all the APs in the 
APs for selected SSID 
list 
As Expected Pass 
6 2 AP iterator is less 
than the number of 
APs for selected 
SSID 
 System rescanned public 
Wi-Fi network; 
 Back to step 1 
As Expected Pass 
7 2 AP iterator is greater 
than the number of 
APs for selected 
SSID 
 System attempted to 
associate to the AP with 
highest signal strength in 
the APs for selected 
SSID list 
As Expected Pass 
8 2 System is not able to 
associate to the AP 
 System associated to the 
next AP with the highest 
signal strength in the APs 
for selected SSID list; 
 Back to step 6/7 
As Expected Pass 
(continued)  
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Test 
ID 
Phase Test Step Expected Result Actual Result Status 
9 2 System is able to 
associate to an AP 
 System proceeded to 
obtain Client DHCP 
address for the user 
As Expected Pass 
10 2 System is not able to 
get a Client DHCP 
address for the user 
 System disassociated 
from current AP and 
associated to the next AP 
in the APs for selected 
SSID list; 
 Back to step 6/7 
As Expected Pass 
11 2 System is able to get 
Client DHCP 
address for the user 
 System proceeded to 
confirm Internet access 
As Expected Pass 
12 2 System is not able to 
confirm Internet 
access 
 System disassociated 
from current AP and 
associated to the next AP 
in the APs for selected 
SSID list; 
 Back to step 6/7 
As Expected Pass 
13 2 System is able to 
confirm Internet 
access 
 System proceeded to 
access secured public 
website to retrieve global 
IP address of the AP 
As Expected Pass 
(continued) 
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Test 
ID 
Phase Test Step Expected Result Actual Result Status 
14 2 System is not able to 
access secured 
public website 
 
 System disassociated 
from current AP and 
associated to the next AP 
in the APs for selected 
SSID list; 
 Back to step 6/7 
As Expected Pass 
15 2 System is able to 
access secured 
public website 
 
 System proceeded to 
verify that the public 
website certificate is 
valid 
As Expected Pass 
16 2 Public website 
certificate is invalid 
 System displayed 
message: “CSMETAD 
has detected an ETA on 
the public Wi-Fi 
hotspot”; 
 System added AP MAC 
address to the learned 
ETA MAC address list; 
 System disassociated 
from current AP and 
associated to the next AP 
in the APs for selected 
SSID list; 
 Back to step 6/7 
As Expected Pass 
(continued) 
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Test 
ID 
Phase Test Step Expected Result Actual Result Status 
17 2 Public website 
certificate is valid 
 System proceeded to get 
the global IP address of 
the AP 
As Expected Pass 
18 2 Global IP address 
for an AP is not the 
same as the trusted 
global IP address 
 System displayed 
message: “CSMETAD 
has detected an ETA on 
the public Wi-Fi 
hotspot”; 
 System added AP MAC 
address to the learned 
ETA MAC address list; 
 System disassociated 
from current AP and 
associated to the next AP 
in the APs for selected 
SSID list; 
 Back to step 6/7 
As Expected Pass 
19 2 Global IP address 
for an AP is the 
same as the trusted 
global IP address 
 System displayed 
message: “Wi-Fi 
connection is safe. You 
are connected to a 
legitimate AP”; 
 System ended iteration; 
 System waited for a 
disassociated wireless 
card event 
As Expected Pass 
(continued) 
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Test 
ID 
Phase Test Step Expected Result Actual Result Status 
20 2 System receives a 
disassociated 
wireless card event 
 System rescanned public 
Wi-Fi network; 
 Back to step 1 
As Expected Pass 
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Appendix C 
 
     CSMETAD System Results – Key Requirements 
     Included herein are the CSMETAD system results for each of the key requirements.  This output was generated by Netbeans. 
 
R1:  It will protect users whether or not they have connected to a free open public Wi-Fi network in the past. 
Setting all connections with open security to autoconnect:no 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
nmcli -f UUID,NAME,TYPE,AUTOCONNECT,AUTOCONNECT-PRIORITY,READONLY,ACTIVE,DEVICE,STATE connection show 
UUID                                  NAME                   TYPE             AUTOCONNECT  AUTOCONNECT-PRIORITY  READONLY  ACTIVE  DEVICE  STATE      
5664862b-502c-4199-954f-209819f1ffc5  labwifi                802-11-wireless  yes          0                     no        no      --      --         
 
 
nmcli --fields connection.id,connection.type,connection.autoconnect,802-11-wireless.ssid,802-11-wireless.mode,802-11-wireless.channel,802-11-
wireless.seen-bssids,802-11-wireless.bssid,802-11-wireless-security.key-mgmt connection show 5664862b-502c-4199-954f-209819f1ffc5 
 
connection.id:                          labwifi 
connection.type:                        802-11-wireless 
connection.autoconnect:                 yes 
802-11-wireless.ssid:                   labwifi 
802-11-wireless.mode:                   infrastructure 
802-11-wireless.channel:                0 
802-11-wireless.bssid:                  -- 
802-11-wireless.seen-bssids:            58:BC:27:93:05:60 
 
***Found an 802.11 connection with open security. Setting autoconnect: no*** 
nmcli con mod 5664862b-502c-4199-954f-209819f1ffc5 connection.autoconnect no 
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R2:  It will protect the user when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are detected during initial wireless network scanning. 
Start re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Listing SSIDs in range on target OS linux 
 
 
---------highestRssiApPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, and Encryption off at top------------------------------------------ 
  SSID         RSSI        Encryption      MAC address 
labwifi                                   -76                  off                  58:BC:27:93:05:60    
Malecon2018                               -36                  on                   B0:7F:B9:74:52:CD    
maleconJAL                                -47                  on                   B0:7F:B9:81:28:AB    
 
 
Listing Aps per Select SSID on target OS linux 
 
  SSID      RSSI   Encryption   MAC address     Frequency 
labwifi                   -76      off      58:BC:27:93:05:60    2.412 GHz (Channel 1)        Signal Level -76 <  threshold -75.    
Not Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList 
labwifi                   -80      off      58:BC:27:12:0C:10    2.462 GHz (Channel 11)       Signal Level -80 <  threshold -75.    
Not Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList 
 
 
---------apsPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, above threshold-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Empty 
 
 
End re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network 
 
Your device is out of range for the selected public Wi-Fi hotspot.  Please move closer. 
 
Start re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID 
 
Listing SSIDs in range on target OS linux 
 
 
---------highestRssiApPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, and Encryption off at top------------------------------------------ 
  SSID         RSSI        Encryption      MAC address 
labwifi                                   -41                  off                  58:BC:27:93:05:60    
Malecon2018                               -37                  on                   B0:7F:B9:74:52:CD    
maleconJAL                                -46                  on                   B0:7F:B9:81:28:AB    
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Listing Aps per Select ESSID on target OS linux 
 
  SSID      RSSI   Encryption   MAC address     Frequency 
labwifi                   -41      off      58:BC:27:93:05:60    2.412 GHz (Channel 1)        Signal Level -41 >= threshold -75.    
Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList 
labwifi                   -57      off      58:BC:27:12:0C:10    2.462 GHz (Channel 11)       Signal Level -57 >= threshold -75.    
Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList 
 
 
---------apsPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, above threshold-------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SSID   RSSI Encryption  MAC address     Frequency 
labwifi                -41      off        58:BC:27:93:05:60     2.412 GHz (Channel 1)     
labwifi                -57      off        58:BC:27:12:0C:10     2.462 GHz (Channel 11)    
 
 
End re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network 
 
  
213 
 
 
R3: It will protect the user when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network. 
Current AP MAC Address:58:BC:27:93:05:60    signal level:-37 
 
Associate client to current AP 
-------------------------------- 
iwconfig wlp3s0 mode managed essid labwifi ap 58:BC:27:93:05:60 
 
Checking association status 
iwconfig wlp3s0 
wlp3s0    IEEE 802.11  ESSID:"labwifi"   
          Mode:Managed  Access Point: Not-Associated   Tx-Power=15 dBm    
          Retry short limit:7   RTS thr:off   Fragment thr:off 
          Encryption key:off 
          Power Management:off 
           
 
inspect Association (1/5).Found value: Not-Associated 
 
sleep 1 second 
 
Checking association status 
iwconfig wlp3s0 
wlp3s0    IEEE 802.11  ESSID:"labwifi"   
          Mode:Managed  Access Point: Not-Associated   Tx-Power=15 dBm    
          Retry short limit:7   RTS thr:off   Fragment thr:off 
          Encryption key:off 
          Power Management:off 
           
 
inspect Association (2/5).Found value: Not-Associated 
 
sleep 1 second 
 
Checking association status 
iwconfig wlp3s0 
wlp3s0    IEEE 802.11  ESSID:"labwifi"   
          Mode:Managed  Access Point: Not-Associated   Tx-Power=15 dBm    
          Retry short limit:7   RTS thr:off   Fragment thr:off 
          Encryption key:off 
          Power Management:off 
           
 
inspect Association (3/5).Found value: Not-Associated 
 
sleep 1 second 
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Checking association status 
iwconfig wlp3s0 
wlp3s0    IEEE 802.11  ESSID:"labwifi"   
          Mode:Managed  Access Point: Not-Associated   Tx-Power=15 dBm    
          Retry short limit:7   RTS thr:off   Fragment thr:off 
          Encryption key:off 
          Power Management:off 
           
 
inspect Association (4/5).Found value: Not-Associated 
 
sleep 1 second 
 
Checking association status 
iwconfig wlp3s0 
wlp3s0    IEEE 802.11  ESSID:"labwifi"   
          Mode:Managed  Access Point: Not-Associated   Tx-Power=15 dBm    
          Retry short limit:7   RTS thr:off   Fragment thr:off 
          Encryption key:off 
          Power Management:off 
           
 
inspect Association (5/5).Found value: Not-Associated 
 
sleep 1 second 
 
 
Client was not able to associate to AP 
 
 
CSMETAD will try to connect to another AP if available 
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R4 & R7 & R8:  It will protect users when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same SSID, BSSID and subnet of a 
legitimate AP.  After detection, it connects the user to a legitimate AP.  Lastly, it protects the user for the duration of the public Wi-Fi 
connection, discovering and reporting on new mobile evil twin access points.   
 
Start re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Listing SSIDs in range on target OS linux 
 
 
---------highestRssiApPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, and Encryption off at top------------------------------------------ 
  SSID         RSSI        Encryption     MAC address 
labwifi                                   -42                  off                 58:BC:27:93:05:60    
Malecon2018                               -37                  on                  B0:7F:B9:74:52:CD    
maleconJAL                                -46                  on                  B0:7F:B9:81:28:AB    
 
 
Listing APs for selected SSID on target OS linux 
 
  SSID      RSSI   Encryption   MAC address     Frequency 
labwifi                   -42      off      58:BC:27:93:05:60    2.412 GHz (Channel 1)        Signal Level -42 >= threshold -75.    
Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList 
labwifi                   -78      off      58:BC:27:12:0C:10    2.462 GHz (Channel 11)       Signal Level -78 <  threshold -75.    
Not Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList 
 
 
---------apsPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, above threshold-------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SSID   RSSI Encryption  MAC address     Frequency 
labwifi                -42      off        58:BC:27:93:05:60     2.412 GHz (Channel 1)     
 
 
End re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network 
 
Showing learned ETA MAC address 
Empty 
 
Remove learned ETA MAC addresses from re-scanned APs for selected SSID list 
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---------AsPerEssidBiDemArrList AP MAC addresses, sorted by signal level, above threshold--------------------------------------------- 
  SSID   RSSI Encryption  MAC address     Frequency 
labwifi                -42      off        58:BC:27:93:05:60     2.412 GHz (Channel 1)     
 
 
Now iterating across APs 
-------------------------- 
 
 
Current AP MAC Address:58:BC:27:93:05:60    signal level:-42 
 
 
Associate client to current AP 
-------------------------------- 
iwconfig wlp3s0 mode managed essid labwifi ap 58:BC:27:93:05:60 
 
Checking association status 
iwconfig wlp3s0 
wlp3s0    IEEE 802.11  ESSID:"labwifi"   
          Mode:Managed  Frequency:2.412 GHz  Access Point: 58:BC:27:93:05:60    
          Bit Rate=1 Mb/s   Tx-Power=15 dBm    
          Retry short limit:7   RTS thr:off   Fragment thr:off 
          Encryption key:off 
          Power Management:off 
          Link Quality=68/70  Signal level=-42 dBm   
          Rx invalid nwid:0  Rx invalid crypt:0  Rx invalid frag:0 
          Tx excessive retries:1  Invalid misc:0   Missed beacon:0 
 
 
Client has associated to AP 
 
 
Get client DHCP address 
------------------------- 
dhclient -timeout 20 wlp3s0 
 
Checking if client has a valid IP address 
------------------------------------------- 
ifconfig wlp3s0 
wlp3s0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST>  mtu 1500 
        inet 192.168.43.37  netmask 255.255.255.0  broadcast 192.168.43.255 
        inet6 fe80::8e70:5aff:fe82:9264  prefixlen 64  scopeid 0x20<link> 
        ether 8c:70:5a:82:92:64  txqueuelen 1000  (Ethernet) 
        RX packets 213  bytes 162995 (159.1 KiB) 
        RX errors 0  dropped 0  overruns 0  frame 0 
        TX packets 232  bytes 31821 (31.0 KiB) 
        TX errors 0  dropped 0 overruns 0  carrier 0  collisions 0 
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Found IP address: 192.168.43.37 
 
cat /etc/resolv.conf 
nameserver 8.8.8.8 
 
 
Confirm Internet access 
------------------------- 
Attempting to access URL to check Internet connection 
URL response code: 200 
First attempt to detect if client is behind a captive portal 
HTML content omitted 
A captive portal was not detected 
Internet access confirmed 
 
 
Access secured public website and verify if public website certificate is valid 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Response Code : 200 
Cipher Suite : TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 
 
 
Cert Type : X.509 
Cert Hash Code : 1749875764 
Cert Public Key Algorithm : RSA 
Cert Public Key Format : X.509 
 
 
Cert Type : X.509 
Cert Hash Code : -2059616493 
Cert Public Key Algorithm : RSA 
Cert Public Key Format : X.509 
 
 
Cert Type : X.509 
Cert Hash Code : 1215155824 
Cert Public Key Algorithm : RSA 
Cert Public Key Format : X.509 
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Now printing secured public website object access, certificate status, global IP 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Access: true 
Certificate status: valid 
Global IP: 174.194.14.15 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot 
 
CSMETAD added ETA MAC address to learned ETA MAC address list 
 
CSMETAD will try to connect to another AP if available 
 
CSMETAD finished iterating across the list of APs 
 
CSMETAD was not able to validate that the AP global IP was the same as the trusted global IP 
 
CSMETAD will scan the public Wi-Fi network again 
 
 
Start re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Listing SSIDs in range on target OS linux 
 
 
---------highestRssiApPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level and encryption off at top------------------------------------------- 
  SSID         RSSI        Encryption      MAC address 
labwifi                                   -9                   off                  58:BC:27:93:05:60    
Malecon2018                               -37                  on                   B0:7F:B9:74:52:CD    
maleconJAL                                -46                  on                   B0:7F:B9:81:28:AB    
 
 
Listing APs for selected SSID on target OS linux 
 
 
  SSID      RSSI   Encryption   MAC address     Frequency 
labwifi                   -9      off      58:BC:27:93:05:60    2.412 GHz (Channel 1)        Signal Level -9  >= threshold -75.       
Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList 
labwifi                   -78     off      58:BC:27:12:0C:10    2.462 GHz (Channel 11)       Signal Level -78 <  threshold -75.       
Not Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList 
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---------apsPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, above threshold-------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SSID   RSSI Encryption  MAC address     Frequency 
labwifi                -9       off        58:BC:27:93:05:60     2.412 GHz (Channel 1)     
 
 
End re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network 
 
Showing learned ETA MAC address 
58:BC:27:93:05:60 
 
Remove learned ETA MAC addresses from re-scanned APs for selected SSID list 
 
You are located on the vicinity of Evil Twin Attacks. Please move to a different location within the public Wi-Fi hotspot. 
 
Scanning the public Wi-Fi network again 
 
 
Start re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Listing SSIDs in range on target OS linux 
 
 
---------highestRssiApPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level and encryption off at top------------------------------------------- 
  SSID         RSSI        Encryption      MAC address 
labwifi                                   -9                   off                  58:BC:27:93:05:60    
Malecon2018                               -37                  on                   B0:7F:B9:74:52:CD    
maleconJAL                                -46                  on                   B0:7F:B9:81:28:AB    
 
 
 
Listing APs for selected SSID on target OS linux 
 
  SSID      RSSI   Encryption   MAC address     Frequency 
labwifi                   -9      off      58:BC:27:93:05:60    2.412 GHz (Channel 1)        Signal Level -9  >=  threshold -75.       
Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList 
labwifi                   -53     off      58:BC:27:12:0C:10    2.462 GHz (Channel 11)       Signal Level -53 >=  threshold -75.       
Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList 
 
 
---------apsPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, above threshold-------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SSID   RSSI Encryption  MAC address     Frequency 
labwifi                -9        off        58:BC:27:93:05:60     2.412 GHz (Channel 1)     
labwifi                -53       off        58:BC:27:12:0C:10     2.462 GHz (Channel 11)     
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End re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network 
 
Showing learned ETA MAC address 
58:BC:27:93:05:60 
 
Remove learned ETA MAC addresses from re-scanned APs for selected SSID list 
 
---------AsPerEssidBiDemArrList AP MAC addresses, sorted by signal level, above threshold--------------------------------------------- 
  SSID   RSSI Encryption  MAC address     Frequency 
labwifi                -53      off        58:BC:27:12:0C:10     2.462 GHz (Channel 11)     
 
 
Now iterating across APs 
-------------------------- 
Current AP MAC Address:58:BC:27:12:0C:10    signal level:-53 
 
 
Associate client to current AP 
-------------------------------- 
iwconfig wlp3s0 mode managed essid labwifi ap 58:BC:27:12:0C:10 
 
Checking association status 
iwconfig wlp3s0 
wlp3s0    IEEE 802.11  ESSID:"labwifi"   
          Mode:Managed  Frequency:2.462 GHz  Access Point: 58:BC:27:12:0C:10    
          Bit Rate=1 Mb/s   Tx-Power=15 dBm    
          Retry short limit:7   RTS thr:off   Fragment thr:off 
          Encryption key:off 
          Power Management:off 
          Link Quality=55/70  Signal level=-55 dBm   
          Rx invalid nwid:0  Rx invalid crypt:0  Rx invalid frag:0 
          Tx excessive retries:0  Invalid misc:0   Missed beacon:0 
 
 
Client has associated to AP 
 
 
Get client DHCP address 
------------------------- 
dhclient -timeout 20 wlp3s0 
 
Checking if client has a valid IP address 
------------------------------------------- 
ifconfig wlp3s0 
wlp3s0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST>  mtu 1500 
        inet 192.168.43.37  netmask 255.255.255.0  broadcast 192.168.43.255 
        inet6 fe80::8e70:5aff:fe82:9264  prefixlen 64  scopeid 0x20<link> 
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        ether 8c:70:5a:82:92:64  txqueuelen 1000  (Ethernet) 
        RX packets 266  bytes 200613 (195.9 KiB) 
        RX errors 0  dropped 0  overruns 0  frame 0 
        TX packets 298  bytes 40803 (39.8 KiB) 
        TX errors 0  dropped 0 overruns 0  carrier 0  collisions 0 
 
Found IP address: 192.168.43.37 
 
cat /etc/resolv.conf 
nameserver 209.244.0.3 
nameserver 209.244.0.4 
 
Confirm Internet access 
------------------------- 
Attempting to access URL to check Internet connection 
URL response code: 200 
First attempt to detect if client is behind a captive portal 
HTML content omitted 
A captive portal was not detected 
Internet access confirmed 
 
 
Access secured public website and verify if public website certificate is valid 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Response Code : 200 
Cipher Suite : TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 
 
 
Cert Type : X.509 
Cert Hash Code : 1749875764 
Cert Public Key Algorithm : RSA 
Cert Public Key Format : X.509 
 
 
Cert Type : X.509 
Cert Hash Code : -2059616493 
Cert Public Key Algorithm : RSA 
Cert Public Key Format : X.509 
 
 
Cert Type : X.509 
Cert Hash Code : 1215155824 
Cert Public Key Algorithm : RSA 
Cert Public Key Format : X.509 
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Now printing secured public website object access, certificate status, global IP 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Access: true 
Certificate status: valid 
Global IP: 173.95.190.140 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Wi-Fi connection is safe.  You are connected to a legitimate AP. 
 
running iwevent. waiting for event "Not-Associated" 
 
Waiting for Wireless Events from interfaces... 
  
223 
 
 
R5:  It protects the user when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get ISP information.   
Access secured public website and verify if public website certificate is valid 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Some other exception thrown: 
java.net.ConnectException: Connection refused (Connection refused) 
 at java.net.PlainSocketImpl.socketConnect(Native Method) 
 at java.net.AbstractPlainSocketImpl.doConnect(AbstractPlainSocketImpl.java:350) 
 at java.net.AbstractPlainSocketImpl.connectToAddress(AbstractPlainSocketImpl.java:206) 
 at java.net.AbstractPlainSocketImpl.connect(AbstractPlainSocketImpl.java:188) 
 at java.net.SocksSocketImpl.connect(SocksSocketImpl.java:392) 
 at java.net.Socket.connect(Socket.java:589) 
 at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.connect(SSLSocketImpl.java:668) 
 at sun.security.ssl.BaseSSLSocketImpl.connect(BaseSSLSocketImpl.java:173) 
 at sun.net.NetworkClient.doConnect(NetworkClient.java:180) 
 at sun.net.www.http.HttpClient.openServer(HttpClient.java:463) 
 at sun.net.www.http.HttpClient.openServer(HttpClient.java:558) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsClient.<init>(HttpsClient.java:264) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsClient.New(HttpsClient.java:367) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.https.AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.getNewHttpClient(AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.java:191) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.plainConnect0(HttpURLConnection.java:1138) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.plainConnect(HttpURLConnection.java:1032) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.https.AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.connect(AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.java:177) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream0(HttpURLConnection.java:1546) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream(HttpURLConnection.java:1474) 
 at java.net.HttpURLConnection.getResponseCode(HttpURLConnection.java:480) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsURLConnectionImpl.getResponseCode(HttpsURLConnectionImpl.java:338) 
 at clientsidemobileeviltwinattackdetection.SecurePublicIpSite.detectGlobalIp(SecurePublicIpSite.java:51) 
 at 
clientsidemobileeviltwinattackdetection.ClientSideMobileEvilTwinAttackDetection.main(ClientSideMobileEvilTwinAttackDetection.java:625) 
 
 
Now printing secured public website object access, certificate status, global IP 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Access: false 
Certificate status: not detected 
Global IP: not detected 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
CSMETAD cannot access secured public website 
 
CSMETAD will try to connect to another AP if available 
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R6:  It protects the user when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving ISP information from a public website. 
Access secured public website and verify if public website certificate is valid 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SSL exception thrown: 
javax.net.ssl.SSLHandshakeException: sun.security.validator.ValidatorException: PKIX path building failed: 
sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderException: unable to find valid certification path to requested target 
 at sun.security.ssl.Alerts.getSSLException(Alerts.java:192) 
 at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.fatal(SSLSocketImpl.java:1949) 
 at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.fatalSE(Handshaker.java:302) 
 at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.fatalSE(Handshaker.java:296) 
 at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.serverCertificate(ClientHandshaker.java:1514) 
 at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.processMessage(ClientHandshaker.java:216) 
 at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.processLoop(Handshaker.java:1026) 
 at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.process_record(Handshaker.java:961) 
 at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.readRecord(SSLSocketImpl.java:1062) 
 at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.performInitialHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1375) 
 at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1403) 
 at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1387) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsClient.afterConnect(HttpsClient.java:559) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.https.AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.connect(AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.java:185) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream0(HttpURLConnection.java:1546) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream(HttpURLConnection.java:1474) 
 at java.net.HttpURLConnection.getResponseCode(HttpURLConnection.java:480) 
 at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsURLConnectionImpl.getResponseCode(HttpsURLConnectionImpl.java:338) 
 at clientsidemobileeviltwinattackdetection.SecurePublicIpSite.detectGlobalIp(SecurePublicIpSite.java:51) 
 at 
clientsidemobileeviltwinattackdetection.ClientSideMobileEvilTwinAttackDetection.main(ClientSideMobileEvilTwinAttackDetection.java:325) 
Caused by: sun.security.validator.ValidatorException: PKIX path building failed: 
sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderException: unable to find valid certification path to requested target 
 at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.doBuild(PKIXValidator.java:387) 
 at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.engineValidate(PKIXValidator.java:292) 
 at sun.security.validator.Validator.validate(Validator.java:260) 
 at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.validate(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:324) 
 at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.checkTrusted(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:229) 
 at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.checkServerTrusted(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:124) 
 at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.serverCertificate(ClientHandshaker.java:1496) 
 ... 15 more 
Caused by: sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderException: unable to find valid certification path to requested target 
 at sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilder.build(SunCertPathBuilder.java:141) 
 at sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilder.engineBuild(SunCertPathBuilder.java:126) 
 at java.security.cert.CertPathBuilder.build(CertPathBuilder.java:280) 
 at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.doBuild(PKIXValidator.java:382) 
 ... 21 more 
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Now printing secured public website object access, certificate status, global IP 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Access: true 
Certificate status: invalid 
global IP: not detected 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot 
 
CSMETAD added ETA MAC address to learned ETA MAC address list 
 
CSMETAD will try to connect to another AP if available 
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Appendix D 
CSMETAD System Solution Manual 
 
1. Physical network connectivity design 
     The certified equipment included in Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study was replaced 
for the CSMETAD system to expand and provide protection to traveling users that utilize 
a different mobile platform and operating system in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots.  The 
following is a list of replacement hardware and software included in the design of the 
CSMETAD system that is central to this dissertation report: 
1. Client Platform:  Hossen & Wenyuan’s study’s artifact was built for smartphone 
platforms.  CSMETAD was built for laptop platforms.  The client laptop platform for 
this study is a Lenovo Thinkpad laptop. 
2. Client Operating System (OS): Hossen & Wenyuan’s study’s artifact was built for 
Android operating system.  CSMETAD was built for Linux operating system.  The 
Linux OS version for this study is 7.3.1611. 
3. Client Programming Language: Hossen & Wenyuan’s study’s artifact’s 
programming language was not provided in their study.  CSMETAD was built using 
Java programming language.  The Java SE Development Kit is version 1.8.0_131 (64 
bits) and the NetBeans Integrated Development Environment is version 8.1. 
4. Mobile Evil Twin AP:  Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) performed the evaluation using a 
smartphone with mobile AP functionality as the evil twin AP (Nexus 4 Android 
smartphone with 3G data subscription and Android mobile hotspot and tethering).  
CSMETAD was evaluated using a laptop and smartphone with mobile AP 
functionality as the evil twin AP (Lenovo Thinkpad laptop, Kali Linux (Aircrack-ng) 
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and Hostapd, Motorola Moto e5smartphone with 4G data subscription and Android 
mobile hotspot and tethering).  
 
2. Logical prototype topology design diagram 
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3. Artifact construction specifications 
Wireless Client 
     The hardware and software specifications for the wireless client are described as 
follows: 
Hardware 
     The Lenovo Thinkpad Laptop specifications can be retrieved from 
https://support.lenovo.com/mn/en/solutions/pd027202 
Software 
     The Linux OS 7.3.1611 specifications designed for inclusion into the CSMETAD 
system can be retrieved from https://wiki.centos.org/Manuals/ReleaseNotes/CentOS7 
     The Java SE Development Kit 1.8.0_131 (64 bits) programming language 
specifications designed for inclusion into the CSMETAD system can be retrieved from 
https://docs.oracle.com/javase/specs/jls/se8/jls8.pdf 
     The NetBeans Integrated Development Environment 8.1 specifications designed for 
inclusion into the CSMETAD system can be retrieved from 
https://netbeans.org/community/releases/81/relnotes.html 
     The Wireshark Packet Analyzer 2.0.0 software was installed in the client specifically 
for network packet analysis purposes.  The specifications can be retrieved from 
https://www.wireshark.org/docs/relnotes/wireshark-2.0.0.html 
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Mobile Evil Twin AP 
     The hardware and software specifications for the mobile evil twin AP are described as 
follows: 
Hardware 
     The Motorola Moto e5 smartphone specifications can be retrieved from 
https://www.motorola.com/us/products/moto-e-plus-gen-5 
     The Lenovo Thinkpad Laptop specifications can be retrieved from 
https://www.lenovo.com/us/en/laptops/thinkpad/thinkpad-x/Thinkpad-X1-Carbon-4th-
Gen/p/22TP2TXX14G 
Software 
     The Android Mobile Hotspot and Tethering specifications can be retrieved from 
https://www.verizonwireless.com/support/knowledge-base-217411/ 
     The Kali Linux 4.14.0 (Aircrack-ng) specifications can be retrieved from 
https://www.kali.org/news/kali-linux-2018-1-release/ 
     The Hostapd v2.7 specifications can be retrieved from http://w1.fi/hostapd/ 
 
Lab Network 
     The hardware and software specifications for the lab network are described as follows: 
     The Cisco M10 router specifications documented in an installation guide (Cisco 
Systems, 2010) can be retrieved from 
http://downloads.linksys.com/downloads/userguide/1224655305646/Valet_Valet_Plus_
M10_M20_UG_US_V10_D-WEB_3425-014530.pdf 
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     The Cisco 3560 switch specifications documented in a spec sheet (Cisco Systems, 
2009) can be retrieved from 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/switches/catalyst-3560-series-
switches/product_data_sheet09186a00801f3d7d.pdf 
     The Cisco 2504 wireless controller specifications documented in a spec sheet (Cisco 
Systems, 2016) can be retrieved from 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/2500-series-wireless-
controllers/data_sheet_c78-645111.pdf 
     The Cisco 3502I wireless access point specifications documented in a spec sheet 
(Cisco Systems, 2012) can be retrieved from 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/aironet-1250-
series/data_sheet_c78-594630.pdf 
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4. Minimum hardware and software requirements 
     The components and costs to build the CSMETAD system and lab as defined in this 
dissertation report are listed in below table. 
Evil Twin Detection Lab Environment Components and Costs 
Component Quantity Estimated Cost 
Hardware   
Cisco 3560 Switch 1 $150 
Cisco Router M10  1 $200 
Cisco Wireless 
Controller 2504 
1 $490 
Cisco Access Point 
3502I-A-K9 (AP1) 
(legitimate AP) 
1 $80 
Cisco Access Point 
3502I-A-K9 (AP2) 
(legitimate AP) 
1 $80  
Lenovo Laptop  2 $2,500 
Motorola Moto e5 
Android smartphone  
1 $150 
USB wireless adapter 1 $40 
Ethernet cables - $30 
   
Software   
Wireshark Packet 
Analyzer 2.0.0 
1 Free 
Java SE Development 
Kit 1.8.0_131 
1 Free 
NetBeans IDE 8.1 1 Free 
Linux Centos 7.3.1611 1 Free 
Kali Linux 
4.14.0 (Aircrack-ng) 
1 Free 
Hostapd v2.7 1 Free 
Android Mobile 
Hotspot &Tethering  
1 Free 
Switch IOS 1 Included 
Router IOS 1 Included 
Controller IOS 1 Included 
APs IOS 3 Included 
Total  $3,720 
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5. Step-by-step artifact construction procedures 
     Construction of the CSMETAD system was based primarily on Hevner’s principles 1 
and 5 through the creation of a viable artifact that relies on the application of rigorous 
construction methods. 
Lab Environment - Steps: 
1. Unpacking and assembling the equipment. 
2. The Linux Centos 7.3.1611 OS was installed and configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad 
laptop (client) in accordance with the installation guide (Centos, 2016) retrieved from 
https://wiki.centos.org/Manuals/ReleaseNotes/CentOS7 
3. The Java SE Development Kit 1.8.0_131 (64 bits) software was installed and 
configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (client) in accordance with the installation 
guide (Oracle, 2016) retrieved from 
http://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/technotes/guides/install/index.html 
4. The NetBeans Integrated Development Environment 8.1 software was installed and 
configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (client) in accordance with the installation 
guide (Netbeans, 2015) retrieved from 
https://netbeans.org/community/releases/81/install.html 
5. The Wireshark Packet Analyzer 2.0.0 software was installed and configured in the 
Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (client) in accordance with the installation guide (Wireshark, 
2014) retrieved from https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html/ 
6. The Kali Linux 4.14.0 (Aircrack-ng) was installed and configured in the Lenovo 
Thinkpad laptop (ETA) in accordance with the installation guide (Kali, 2018) 
retrieved from https://docs.kali.org/category/installation 
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7. The Hostapd v2.7 was installed and configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (ETA) 
in accordance with the installation guide (Hostapd, 2013) retrieved from 
https://w1.fi/hostapd/ 
8. The Motorola smartphone was configured with tethering in accordance with the 
instructions (Motorola, 2018) retrieved from 
https://www.verizonwireless.com/support/knowledge-base-217411/ 
9. The Cisco M10 router was installed and configured in accordance with the 
installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2010) retrieved from 
http://downloads.linksys.com/downloads/userguide/1224655305646/Valet_Valet_Plu
s_M10_M20_UG_US_V10_D-WEB_3425-014530.pdf 
10. The Cisco 3560 switch was installed and configured in accordance with the 
installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2010) retrieved from 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst3560/hardware/installation
/guide/3560hig.pdf 
11. The Cisco 2504 wireless controller was installed and configured in accordance with 
the installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2017) retrieved from 
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/wireless/2500-series-wireless-
controllers/113034-2500-deploy-guide-00.html 
12. The Cisco 3502I access points was installed and configured in accordance with the 
installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2014) retrieved from 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/wireless/access_point/3500/quick/guide/ap350
0getstart.pdf 
  
234 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Lab network. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Lab wireless client and mobile evil twin AP. 
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Client-side Mobile Evil Twin AP Detection (CSMETAD) Algorithm - Steps: 
Phase 1: Data Collection  
 
Basic Flow:  
1. System is initialized by the user before using the free open public Wi-Fi network. 
2. System detects operating system. 
3. System detects wireless network card. 
4. System disables “auto-connections” to all public Wi-Fi networks. 
5. System scans the public Wi-Fi network to discover available SSIDs (encrypted and 
unencrypted).   
6. System creates list of SSIDs in range. 
7. System presents SSIDs in range to the user. 
8. User selects unencrypted public Wi-Fi hotspot SSID. 
9. System creates list of APs for selected SSID with signal level equal to or greater than 
-75dBm. 
10. System validates that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater 
than 2. (Alternative Flow “a”) 
11. IF number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 2 THEN System 
displays message: “There is sufficient information to start detecting ETAs.” 
12. System stops the network manager. 
13. System activates wireless network card. 
14. System starts iterating across all the APs in the APs for selected SSID list. 
15. System associates to the AP in the APs for selected SSID list. (Alternative Flow 
“b”) 
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16. IF System is able to associate to the AP THEN System gets a Client DHCP address 
for the user. (Alternative Flow “c”)  
17. IF System is able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN System accepts 
terms of use to access the Internet. (Alternative Flow “d”) 
18. IF System is able to accept terms of use to access the Internet THEN System connects 
to secured public website to retrieve global IP address of the AP. (Alternative Flow 
“e”) 
19. IF System is able to connect to the secured public website THEN System verifies that 
the public website certificate is valid. (Alternative Flow “f”) 
20. IF the public website certificate is valid only THEN System is able to get the global 
IP address of the AP.   
21. IF System ends iterating across APs in APs for selected SSID list THEN System 
validates that the number of occurrences of a global IP address is equal to or 
greater than 2. (Alternative Flow “g”) 
22. IF the number of occurrences of a global IP address is equal to or greater than 2 
THEN System has enough information to start categorizing APs and sets global IP as 
the trusted global IP address to be used for the duration of the public Wi-Fi 
connection. 
23. System starts categorizing APs. 
24. System starts iterating across all the APs in the APs for selected SSID list. 
25. System validates that the global IP address for an AP is the same as the trusted global 
IP address. (Alternative Flow “h”) 
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26. IF the global IP address for an AP is the same as the trusted global IP address THEN 
System categorizes the AP as “valid”.  System disassociates from current AP and 
associates to the next AP on the APs for selected SSID list. 
27. IF System ends iterating across APs in APs for selected SSID list THEN System 
moves to Phase 2 detection and protection. 
Alternative Flows: 
a) number of APs for selected SSID is less than 2 
On step 10 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the number of APs for selected SSID is less than 2 THEN 
2. System displays message: “There is insufficient information to detect ETAs.” 
3. System ends.  
b) system is not able to associate to an AP 
On step 15 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System is not able to associate to an AP THEN 
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results: 
a. Association status = false 
b. Client DHCP address = not detected 
c. Internet access = not detected 
d. Secured public website access = not detected 
e. Certificate status = not detected 
f. Global IP address = not detected 
g. AP state = unknown 
3. System associates to the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list. 
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4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow. 
5. System ends.  
c) system is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user  
On step 16 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN 
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results: 
a. Client DHCP address = not detected 
b. Internet access = not detected 
c. Secured public website access = not detected 
d. Certification status = not detected 
e. Global IP address = not detected 
f. AP state = unknown 
3. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for 
selected SSID list. 
4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow. 
d) system is not able to accept terms of use to access the Internet 
On step 17 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System is not able to accept terms of use to access the Internet THEN 
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results: 
a. Internet access = false 
b. Secured public website access = not detected 
c. Certification status = not detected 
d. Global IP address = not detected 
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e. AP state = unknown 
3. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for 
selected SSID list. 
4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow. 
e) system is not able to access secured public website 
On step 18 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System is not able to access secured public website THEN 
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results: 
a. Secured public website access = false 
b. Certification status = not detected 
c. Global IP address = not detected 
d. AP state = unknown 
3. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for 
selected SSID list. 
4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow. 
f) invalid certificate 
On step 19 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System receives an invalid certificate message THEN 
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results: 
a. Certification status = invalid 
b. Global IP address = not detected 
c. AP state = ETA 
3. System adds AP MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list. 
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4. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for 
selected SSID list. 
5. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow. 
g) number of occurrences of a global IP address is less than 2 
On step 21 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System determines that number of occurrences of a global IP address is less than 2 
THEN 
2. System displays message: “There is not enough information to categorize APs” 
3. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following result: 
a. AP state = unknown 
4. System ends. 
h) global IP address for an AP is not the same as the trusted global IP address 
On step 25 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System determines that the global IP address for an AP is not the same as the 
trusted global IP address THEN 
2. System categorizes the AP as “ETA”. 
3. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following result:   
a. AP state = ETA 
4. System adds the AP MAC addresses to the learned ETA MAC address list. 
5. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for 
selected SSID list. 
6. Flow of events returns to step 25 of the Basic Flow. 
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Input and Output details: 
1. SSIDs in range list = list of AP MAC address, signal level/RSSI, encryption status, 
frequency, and channel.  This list contains APs with encryption on and off. 
2. APs for selected SSID list = list of AP MAC address, signal level/RSSI, encryption 
status, frequency, channel, Client DHCP address, Internet access, secured public 
website access, certification status, global IP address, and AP state.  This list contains 
only the APs with encryption off and signal/RSSI level equal to or greater than           
-75dBm. 
3. Learned ETA MAC address list = list of ETA MAC addresses. 
Rule details: 
1. Number of APs for selected SSID = the number of APs for selected SSID must be 
equal to or greater than 2. 
2. Number of occurrences of a global IP address = the number of occurrences of a 
global IP address must be equal to or greater than 2. 
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Figure 11.  CSMETAD Algorithm Flow – Phase 1 Data Collection. 
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Phase 2:  Detection & Protection 
 
Basic Flow: 
1. System rescans the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID. 
2. System creates list of SSIDs in range. 
3. System adds all the APs for selected SSID with signal level equal to or greater than    
-75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list (new list). 
4. System validates that number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 1. 
(Alternative Flow “a”) 
5. IF number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 1 THEN System 
retrieves learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC address list.  This 
list includes all ETA MAC addresses learned from the beginning of the program.   
6. System removes learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list. 
7. System validates that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater 
than 1. (Alternative Flow “b”) 
8. IF number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 1 THEN System 
starts iterating across all the APs in APs for selected SSID list. 
9. Systems associates to the AP with the highest signal strength in the APs for selected 
SSID list. (Alternative Flow “c”) 
10. IF System is able to associate to the AP THEN System gets a Client DHCP address 
for the user. (Alternative Flow “d”) 
11. IF System is able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN System confirms 
access to the Internet. (Alternative Flow “e”) 
244 
 
 
12. IF System is able to confirm access to the Internet THEN System connects to secured 
public website to retrieve global IP address of the AP. (Alternative Flow “f”) 
13. IF System is able to access secured public website THEN System verifies that the 
public website certificate is valid. (Alternative Flow “g”) 
14. IF the public website certificate is valid only THEN System is able to get the global 
IP address for the AP. 
15. System validates that the global IP address for the AP is the same as the trusted global 
IP address. (Alternative Flow “h”) 
16. IF the global IP address for the AP is the same as the trusted global IP THEN the 
System displays message: “Wi-Fi connection is safe.  You are connected to a 
legitimate AP”. 
17. System ends iterating across APs in APs for selected SSID list.   
18. System waits for a disassociated wireless card event.   
19. IF System receives a disassociated wireless card event THEN System proceeds to 
rescans the public Wi-Fi network.  Algorithm phase 2 repeats (infinite loop). 
Alternative Flows: 
a) number of APs for selected SSID is less than 1 
On step 4 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the number of APs for selected SSID is less than 1 THEN 
2. System displays message: “Your device is out of range for the selected public Wi-Fi 
hotspot.  Please move closer”.  
3. Flow of events returns to step 1 of the Basic Flow. 
 
245 
 
 
b) number of APs for selected SSID is less than 1 
On step 7 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the number of APs with the selected SSID is less than 1 THEN 
2. System displays message: “You are located on the vicinity of Evil Twin Attacks.  
Please move to a different location within the public Wi-Fi Hotspot”. 
3. Flow of events returns to step 1 of the Basic Flow. 
c) system is not able to associate to an AP 
On step 9 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF System is not able to associate to an AP THEN 
2. System associates to the next AP with the highest signal strength on the APs for 
selected SSID list.   
3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow. 
d) system is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user 
On step 10 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the System is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN 
2. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest 
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list. 
3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow. 
e) system is not able to confirm access to the Internet 
On step 11 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the System is not able to confirm access to the Internet THEN 
2. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest 
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list. 
246 
 
 
3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow. 
f) system is not able to access secured public website 
On step 12 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the System is not able to access secured public website THEN 
2. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest 
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list.   
3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow. 
g) invalid certificate 
On step 13 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the System receives an invalid certificate message THEN 
2. System has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi network.  System displays message: 
“CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”. 
3. System adds the AP MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list (if ETA is 
not in the list). 
4. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest 
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list. 
5. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow. 
h) global IP address for an AP is not the same as the trusted global IP address 
On step 15 of the Basic Flow: 
1. IF the System determines that the global IP address for an AP is not the same as the 
trusted global IP address THEN 
2. System has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi network.  System displays message: 
“CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”. 
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3. System adds the AP MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list (if ETA is 
not in the list). 
4. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest 
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list. 
5. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow. 
Input and Output details: 
1. APs for selected SSID list = list of AP MAC address, signal level/RSSI, encryption 
status, frequency, channel, Client DHCP address, Internet access, secured public 
website access, certification status, global IP address, and AP state.  This list contains 
only the APs with encryption off and signal level equal to or greater than -75dBm. 
2. Learned ETA MAC address list = list of ETA MAC addresses. 
Rule details: 
1. Number of APs for selected SSID = the number of APs for selected SSID must be 
equal to or greater than 1. 
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Figure 12.  CSMETAD Algorithm Flow – Phase 2 Detection & Protection. 
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6. Step-by-step artifact testing procedures 
 
     Rigorous testing took place with the CSMETAD system based on Hevner’s DSR 
principle 5 in order to verify that the architecture components were working effectively 
according to the design. 
Lab Environment Testing 
1. The TCP/IP utility “ifconfig” was used to verify the correct address configuration of 
the lab equipment, once the devices in the topology were connected, configured and 
developed in the construction phase. 
2. The Cisco Operating System “show run” command was used to prove and 
troubleshoot the configuration of the router, switch, wireless controller, and wireless 
access points. 
3. The TCP/IP utility “ping” was used to verify connectivity between router, switch, 
wireless controller, and wireless access points. 
4. The TCP/IP utility “traceroute” was used to discover the path between devices across 
the topology. 
     Appendix B shows Algorithm test cases and results. 
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7. Transition client-side mobile evil twin attack detection system into production 
Artifact Production 
     After the construction was complete, the CSMETAD system was brought into 
production mode.  CSMETAD initially aimed at detecting real mobile evil twin AP 
attacks in the wild at a hotel property.  Since no mobile evil twin APs were detected in 
the wild during the field evaluation period, the author proceeded to evaluate the system 
with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.   
 
Artifact Evaluation 
     The client-side mobile evil twin attack detection system was evaluated based on 
Hevner’s principle 3 that asserts that the utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact 
must be rigorously validated via well executed evaluation methods.  The author 
extensively evaluated the performance of the client-side evil twin attack detection method 
by implementing a prototype system.  The prototype system was evaluated in two 
environments.  First, in a lab to analyze the requirements and demonstrate the 
effectiveness in a controlled environment.  Second, in the field at a hotel public Wi-Fi 
hotspot to extensively evaluate the robustness of the system in practice.  The client-side 
mobile evil twin attack detection system aimed at detecting real mobile evil twin AP 
attacks in the wild at a hotel property that provide free open public Wi-Fi.  Since no real 
mobile evil twin AP attacks were detected in the wild during the field evaluation period, 
the author proceeded to evaluate the system with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.  
Similar approach was used by Hossen & Wenyuan’s study and the remainder of the 
client-side evil twin attack detection studies referenced in this dissertation.   
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     The client-side evil twin detection method developed as part of this dissertation was 
tested against Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) method for detecting mobile evil twin 
attacks.  The experiments aimed at showing that the detection system developed can 
detect mobile evil twin attacks more effectively and efficiently.   
     The techniques to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the system were based 
on Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) evaluation methodology which has been published and 
validated and included the following: 
1. Collected data from a hotel public Wi-Fi hotspot (public spaces). 
2. Ran the experiments on both weekdays and weekends for a period of 5 weeks (2 
weeks at the lab and 3 weeks at the hotel). 
3. Collected approximately 300 hours of data.  
4. Collected more than 151,000 instances of data.  
5. Ran the detection system 140 times at the lab and 210 times at a hotel public Wi-Fi 
hotspot.  
6. Monitored the network with Wireshark packet analyzer. 
     For efficiency, the author used Hossen and Wenyuan’s technique to measure time 
delay but also leveraged Nakhila et al.’s technique to improve upon Hossen and 
Wenyuan’s.  Nakhila et al. included a complete list of measurements and factors 
impacting efficiency. 
     In this study, the author used a researcher-participant approach.  According to Richey 
and Klein (2007), researchers are often the designer/ developers.  In other words, by 
design they “go native” and observe themselves.  “The researcher who ceases to be 
conscious of the observer role is said to be going native” (Singleton & Straits, 2005).  In 
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this study, the author participated as the user of the client-side evil twin attack detection 
system and the researcher observing the client-side evil twin attack detection system 
performance. 
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